
BookiL£2ifer 

Cop>Tight]sl . 



COPYRIGHT DEFOSIT. 



OUR KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST 

An Historical Approach 

by 
LUCIUS HOPKINS MILLER 

Professor of Biblical Instruction, Princeton 
University. $1.00 net. 

Discusses the sources of our information re- 
garding Christ, His life, teaching and Divinity. 

" The reverence of faith is blended with the 
freedom of the scholar. Admirable." — Dean 
Hodges in The Atlantic Monthly. 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS NEW YORK 



BERGSON AND 
RELIGION 



BY 



LUCIUS HOPKINS MILLER 

Assistant Professor of Biblical Instruction in 
Princeton University 




NEW YORK 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 

1916 






Copyright, 1916 

BY 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 



Published May, 1916 



fi 



s~° 



THE QUINN A BOOEN CO. PRCM 

JUITT4T9I6 



CI. A 4 31 63 3 



PREFACE 

As the reader will quickly see, this is not 
primarily a book on philosophy, but a book on 
religion. Otherwise the writing of it should 
have been left to a philosopher, and that I do 
not pretend to be. Still, the ground covered 
lies between the two subjects (or, rather, over- 
laps both) and might therefore be considered 
open to occupancy by students of either sub- 
ject. Theoretically, there is no reason why a 
philosopher's religious deductions should be 
any more reliable than the philosophical de- 
scriptions of a student of religion, for just as 
philosophy has its intricacies so religion also 
has its subtleties, and the subtleties of religion 
can be caught only through that insight which 
is bestowed bv an intimate historical under- 
standing. In this task the application of philo- 
sophical criteria may harm as well as help. 

It is commonly thought, however, that the 
philosopher has more right in the field of re- 
ligion than the student of religion has in the 
field of philosophy, and I must admit that, 

ili 



iv PREFACE 

judging by past performance, there is ground 
for this opinion. It is generally true that the 
philosopher is more at home in religion than 
the student of religion is in philosophy. I do 
not think that he should be, but he undoubtedly 
has been. However, I have noticed among 
philosophers the marked habit of carrying the 
metaphysical " big stick " wherewith to beat 
into subjection recalcitrant facts of religious 
history and psychology. This will not do, even 
though it is a natural tendency and very hard 
to avoid. Because it is so hard for the philoso- 
pher to resist this temptation, and because the 
student of the history of religion is likely to 
be more scientifically respectful in dealing 
with religious facts, there is much to be said 
for " a fair field and no favor " when a pro- 
posed discussion necessarily involves both sub- 
jects. I trust that in the philosophical parts 
of this study philosophers may not find the 
presentation inadequate or mistaken. I have 
at least tried, as best one may, to rid myself 
of prejudice and to present the facts exactly 
as they lie. 

To obviate possible misunderstanding let 
me state definitely what my plan is. It is not 



PREFACE v 

my aim to give a complete picture of Bergson's 
thought, nor is it my purpose to criticise his 
work. These things belong to philosophical 
specialists and they have been taken care of 
in adequate fashion. The religious effects of 
this important phase of recent thought have 
not been adequately dealt with hitherto, and 
this fact constitutes the raison d'etre of the 
book. To discuss these effects satisfactorily 
I have been obliged to present, as briefly as 
clearness would permit, the outstanding em- 
phases of Bergson's position. This, and this 
alone, is what I have tried to do in the philo- 
sophical portions of what follows. 

The problem may be put thus: If Berg- 
son's doctrine be completely accepted, what 
results for religion? The reader will soon dis- 
cover that I sympathize with the teaching of 
Bergson at many points, both on philosophical 
and on religious grounds, but there are also 
elements in his system which I find difficult to 
accept. In other words, I am not a Berg- 
sonian. But, among other things, I agree with 
Bergson in this, that the discovery of the whole 
truth of the universe is not the task of any 
one man. It requires the work of many men 



vi PREFACE 

and many minds to win those approximations 
to truth which are open to mortal beings. 
Nevertheless, Bergson has struck a vein, glis- 
tening and valuable, from which much pure 
and precious metal may be mined. This is 
particularly true for the student of religion 
and, through him, for religious leaders and 
the rank and file of the laity. At least this is 
my firm conviction, a conviction that has arisen 
and matured through a study of Bergson which 
was begun without any presuppositions, purely 
out of a general desire for information, and 
without any idea of writing a book. The think- 
ing world is weary of negations. It is even 
more weary of dogmatic assertions. It must 
know, but it wishes also to believe. Bergson 
teaches us that we may believe without blink- 
ing the facts, and this, I take it, is the bottom- 
most yearning of the educated world today. 
I may add that Bergson is the outstanding 
literary exponent of those new, virile, construc- 
tive forces which are manifesting themselves so 
conspicuously in the bearing of France at the 
present moment. No one can fully under- 
stand the spiritual background of the present 
situation without knowing what Bergson and 



PREFACE 



VII 



others like him have been contributing towards 
a revival of faith among Frenchmen. 

I do not maintain that the religious infer- 
ences I have drawn from Bergson's thought 
are all that might conceivably be drawn, nor 
do I deny that other and different conclusions 
might consistently be reached. I do hold that 
the religious consequences indicated in this 
book are not only compatible with Bergsonian 
doctrine but are also those towards which his 
thinking most clearly points. We know very 
little about Bergson's own religious views, but 
he has conditionally promised to enlighten us 
later. Interesting and important as this in- 
formation will be, it is not an essential matter. 
The effect of a man's thought goes out beyond 
him and beyond his power of control, and it is 
conceivable that it may traverse legitimate 
paths that are quite different from those which 
he himself may wish to mark out for it. I 
shall be surprised, however, if the ultimate 
publication of Bergson's conception of religion 
does not reveal a viewpoint which will justify 
the conclusions of this book. 

In any case, I can say with earnestness that 
Bergson has thrown light for me upon several 



viii PREFACE 

puzzling religious questions, and the result has 
been a quickened appreciation of certain fun- 
damental religious truths and a greater desire 
to experience their benefits. Some of these 
truths, interpreted in the light of Bergson, 
reveal anew the fact that orthodox religionists 
have often obstructed their own path. Others 
show, with a new clarity, who the age-old 
enemies of religion really are. The result re- 
minds one of the parable of the householder 
who brings out of his store things old and 
things new. And that is what we are all seek- 
ing, a result that includes a belief in the good- 
ness of the old wine without thereby denying 
the possibility of new vintages of new and 
satisfying flavor. These too may yield pure, 
unadulterated wine. In other words, if " God 
is in His heaven," all has not yet been given 
to the world, and we of the latter days may 
share with our forefathers the zest of quest, 
discovery, and creative evolution, even in re- 
ligion. 

I have not deemed it necessary to append a 
bibliography of the well-nigh two hundred 
books, articles, and reviews — French, German, 
and English — which have been consulted in the 



PREFACE ix 

preparation of this book. A goodly number 
of these are referred to in the notes. An ex- 
cellent bibliography is to be found in the Eng- 
lish edition of Time and Free Will (1910) , and 
another has been published separately by the 
Columbia University Library (1913). More 
recent literature can be found by consulting 
the various philosophical reviews. 

Chapters I and V have already appeared as 
articles in the Biblical World and in the Jour- 
nal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific 
Methods, respectively. I am indebted to the 
editors of these publications for their kind per- 
mission to reprint these articles here. 

I wish to thank my colleagues, Professor 
Roger Bruce Cash Johnson, Professor Charles 
G. Osgood, and Professor Edward Gleason 
Spaulding, for their kindness in reading parts 
of the manuscript, and for valuable criticism 
and suggestions. 

Lucius Hopkins Miller. 

Princeton, Neio Jersey, 
February, 1916. 





CONTENTS 




CHAPTER 
I. 


Preliminary Observations . 


PAGB 

3 


II. 


Bergson The Protestant . 


. 27 


III. 


How Do We Know Reality? 


. 59 


IV. 


Creative Evolution . 


. 90 


V. 


Intuition and the Primacy 
Spirit 


OF 

. 148 


VI. 


Individual Freedom . 


. 185 


VII. 


Immortality .... 


. 237 




Index ..... 


. 277 



BERGSON AND RELIGION 



CHAPTER I 

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 

The motto prefixed by Pogson to his English 
translation of Bergson's Essai sur les donnees 
immediates de la conscience 1 is the following 
characteristic quotation from Plotinus : 

If a man were to inquire of Nature the reason of 
her creative activity, and if she were willing to give 
ear and answer, she would say : " Ask me not, but 
understand in silence, even as I am silent and am 
not wont to speak." 

This is, of course, a half-truth, but that half- 
truth may help to carry us into the very depths 
of the Bergsonian position. The words of 
Plotinus have in them a touch of fundamental 
religious feeling, and if, in any real sense, 
Bergson's thought pursues the path of " under- 
standing silence," we may expect to find in 
that thought definite religious implications. 
If that is so, Bergson should be of in- 

1 English title, Time and Free Will. 
3 



4 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

terest to all who believe in the significance of 
religion. 

To be sure, Bergson's thought may, and in- 
deed it does, suggest religious implicates which 
are at variance with widely accepted interpre- 
tations of the religious life. But for one who 
believes in the reality of a progressive revela- 
tion of God in human history — and is this not 
biblical and Christian? — departure from exist- 
ing forms of faith will not necessarily disturb 
fundamental faith itself. Mere change of air 
is often invigorating. There is such a thing as 
a healthy mental disturbance, for mental peace 
and placidity are often only the precursors of 
spiritual slumber. To those who wish to main- 
tain a religion of mere peace and placidity, if 
such a thing be possible, I would suggest that 
they shun the influence of Bergson's philoso- 
phy. Set and final forms, rigid and unchang- 
ing formulations, do not flourish in its at- 
mosphere. 

On the other hand, Bergson strikes certain 
notes which harmonize with age-old religious 
themes. Many thinkers object to him because, 
as they say, he is too old-fashioned ; because he 
merely voices in new form ideas which are too 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 5 

old to be any longer regarded — Heracleitan 
ideas, neo-Platonic ideas ; because he resurrects 
conceptions which have been conclusively dis- 
proved, as, for example, the independent exist- 
ence of the soul and the possibility for man of 
at least a modicum of absolute knowledge. 
These conflicting opinions whet curiosity, and 
one wonders whether this philosophy may not 
contain new values for religious thought, espe- 
cially in a day when men are longing as much 
as ever for the great religious verities but are 
often unable to find them satisfactorily in or- 
thodox forms of interpretation. 

Thus far, comparatively little attention has 
been paid to the religious aspects of Bergson's 
thought. A few books and articles discuss 
this question, but they are without exception 
either haphazard in method or otherwise un- 
satisfactory. 2 Naturally enough, most of the 

2 Among others, compare the following: E. Hermann, 
Eucken and Bergson: Their Significance for Christian Thought 
(Boston); A. S. Mories, "Bergson and Mysticism," West- 
minster Review (June, 1912) ; Underhill, " Bergson and the 
Mystics," Living Age (March 16, 1912); Macintosh, "Bergson 
and Religion," Biblical World (January, 1913); Gerrard, 
"Bergson, Newman and Aquinas," Catholic World (March, 
1913); Douglas, "Christ and Bergson," North American Re- 
view (April, 1913) ; E. LeRoy, A New Philosophy; Henri Berg- 



6 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

literature dealing with Bergson has consisted 
of reviews, criticisms, and expositions of his 
philosophy as such. This emphasis still con- 
tinues in spite of the feeling of surfeit which 
is beginning to manifest itself. This monot- 
onous repetition of description has had its value, 
however, in extending to wider and wider cir- 
cles an acquaintance, however superficial, with 
this philosophy. But even lay readers are now 
beginning to ask what bearing, if any, this new 
method of viewing the universe may have upon 
religious thought. 

Another reason for the comparative lack of 
religious emphasis in the literature of the sub- 
ject is the fact that Bergson does not anticipate 
himself. He has promised us for the days to 
come a discussion of both religion and ethics, 
provided he feels when the time comes that 
his results in these directions contribute some- 
thing new to human thought. He is careful 

son (1913); K. Bornhausen; "Die Philosophic Henri Bergsons 
und ihre Bedeutung fur den Religionsbegriff," Zeitschrift filr 
Theologie und Kirche (1910); Charles Corbiere, "Le dieu de 
M. Bergson," Revue de theologie et des questions religicuses 
(March, 1910) ; A. Joussain, Romantisme et religion (Alcan, 
Paris, 1910) ; C. Coignet, De Kant a Bergson. Reconciliation 
de la religion et de la science dans un spiritualisme nouveau 
(Alcan, Paris, 1911).. 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 7 

and conservative in what he publishes and has 
himself said that much of his work has never 
reached the light of publication because the 
results were inconclusive. His own words 
are: 

Throughout my philosophical career I have never 
felt that I was under the obligation of writing a 
book. Many of the lines of investigation which I 
pursued led me nowhere, and I did not think it 
necessary to give the world " news from nowhere." 
It was only when I reached a positive answer to a 
question that I embodied it in a book. 

I still feel the same way. If my studies of ethics 
and religion do not throw new light upon these 
vexed problems, I will not encumber the world with 
an additional book. But if my method enables me 
to grasp certain aspects of the problem which have 
eluded others, I shall endeavor to make others see 
the things which I saw. 3 

Bergson may come to a negative conclusion 
regarding the publication of his religious and 
ethical researches, but I do not think this is 
likely to be the case. On occasion he has made 
specific references to these questions and in a 

3 Dr. Louis Levine's interview with Bergson. Cf. the New 
York Times, February 22, 1914. 



8 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

sympathetic tone. For instance, Levine's in- 
terview, just quoted, contains these statements 
also : 

. . . the craving for religious experience will re- 
main and probably grow stronger as time goes on. 
The religious feeling [in Professor Bergson's philo- 
sophical interpretation] is the sense of not being 
alone in this world, the sense of a relationship be- 
tween the individual and the spiritual source of life. 

And again: 

.... This source of life is undoubtedly spirit- 
ual. Is it personal? Probably. ... of course, per- 
sonal in a different way, without all those accidental 
traits which in our minds form part of personality 
and which are bound up with the existence of the 
body. But personal in a larger sense of the term — a 
spiritual unity expressing itself in the creative 
process of evolution. 

Useful as these statements are, they are at 
best merely straws indicating which way the 
wind is blowing. At the present time, if one 
is to characterize the religious effects of Berg- 
son's thought, he must do it chiefly by means 
of inferences drawn from the main emphases 
of the philosophy. These emphases can be de- 
termined with sufficient certainty, and it is as 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 9 

legitimate as it is interesting and valuable to 
discuss tentatively the relation of these em- 
phases to religious thought and life. 

The imagination of the educated world has 
been fired by this man ; especially in France, of 
course, but only less so in England and in 
America. He has many admirers in Italy and 
in other countries, and even Germany, wedded 
as she is to her own processes of thought, has 
recognized his significance. The modernists in 
Europe, particularly in France, are turning to 
Bergson for inspiration and support. On 
the social side, the syndicalists are appealing 
to him and, whether rightly or wrongly, 
are finding in his philosophy a point d J ap- 
pui for their own views regarding the social 
order. 

More generally, thinking people throughout 
the civilized world have come to realize that 
here is a new force to be reckoned with, a new 
view to be seriously considered. Leaders of 
thought have long since recognized that there 
has not yet been time in which mentally to 
digest the mass of new facts brought to light 
by scientific investigation. Those who know 
the history of human thought and the circum- 



10 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

stances which give rise to new philosophies 
have realized that the time was ripe for an 
attempt to reassess the meaning of life in the 
light of the new knowledge. Even the rank 
and file of men, who necessarily lag behind and 
gather up the crumbs which fall from the 
tables of the masters, have come to feel that 
a new interpretation of life was due. Many 
have been looking in eager expectancy for such 
an interpretation in the hope that old values 
might be conserved while forms and interpreta- 
tions more suited to the temper and informa- 
tion of the age were being wrought out. Thus, 
whether attracted or repelled, all informed 
men are at least curious regarding this new 
philosophy. It is therefore a pertinent and a 
timely matter to attempt to decide what its re- 
ligious values may be. 



The kind and degree of interest one has in 
a task of this sort depend upon the theory one 
holds regarding the relation of philosophy and 
religion to one another. One may start with 
the presupposition that philosophy is the be-all 
and end-all of any attempt to unify the ap- 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 11 

parently conflicting facts of human existence ; 
that one must first have a complete philosophy 
of the universe before he can begin to discuss 
the question of religion. For such a man phi- 
losophy determines religion and the latter must 
ever be subservient to the former. 

This is what the Hegelians have generally 
done and, it must be admitted, with great suc- 
cess, if the size and quality of a following are 
tests of success. One has but to read Edward 
Caird's Evolution of Religion to see this point 
of view at its best. Here evolutionary idealism 
is the key used with a sure and clever hand to 
unlock the door to the mysteries of religious 
truth and history. I may remark in passing 
that when the door is opened, in the case of 
Caird at least, we are led directly to Chris- 
tianity as the goal of all our seeking. Of 
course, for those who think in this way, who 
believe that philosophy should dominate re- 
ligion, there is little use in discussing the re- 
ligious value of a philosophy until they have 
settled the one all-important and prior ques- 
tion: " What philosophy should be espoused? " 
The primary interest of such men is in the com- 
parison of philosophies, in order to determine 



12 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

that philosophy to which one should yield ad- 
herence. When that adherence is achieved, it 
is merely a question of determining the kind of 
religion which such a philosophy may allow 
or suggest. A discussion of the religious val- 
ues of other philosophies becomes, in this in- 
stance, a more or less idle and academic dis- 
cussion. 

On the other hand, there are those who hold 
that it is religion which necessarily deter- 
mines one's philosophy. We need not here 
take into account the " man on the street." 
Such a man may have his philosophy, but it is 
necessarily crude and undeveloped. If he is 
a religious " man on the street," he will more 
than likely be suspicious of all philosophy on 
the general and not wholly despicable supposi- 
tion that all intellectual speculation regarding 
supermundane matters is profitless, or worse. 
There are, however, large sections of the reli- 
gious world in which, because of certain his- 
torical processes, religion has come to exercise 
a dominant authority over philosophy. The 
Roman Catholic position is the best illustra- 
tion of this, although this point of view is not 
at all limited to Roman Catholics. Protestant 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 13 

theologians also have held that only one form 
of philosophical thought was consistent with 
Christian revelation — a philosophy necessarily 
determined, so they thought, by the character 
of that revelation. 

This tendency, at least so far as Roman 
Catholics are concerned, is due to a historical 
development, through which, as a matter of 
fact, philosophy first impressed the iron heel 
of its authority upon religion. The vogue of 
Aristotle in the mediaeval world, especially 
from the time of Thomas Aquinas, estab- 
lished a connection between the Aristote- 
lian philosophy and the Christian religion 
which still persists in the Roman Catho- 
lic Church and seems well-nigh unbreakable. 
The modernist movement continues its nib- 
bling process, but there does not seem to be 
any likelihood of its producing an immediate 
effect upon the great mass of Roman Catholic 
thinkers. Of course, these thinkers now be- 
lieve that their philosophy is as divine and as 
unassailable as Christian revelation itself and, 
from a very early time after the Aristotelian 
conquest of the Church, the exponents of ortho- 
dox theology have believed that this philosophy 



14 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

inescapably follows from the religion. This 
means that to be a Christian in religion is 
necessarily to be an Aristotelian in philosophy. 
The traditional dogmas of the Church, largely 
Augustinian, were fitted into the Aristotelian 
framework by Aquinas in such a way that the 
two elements became fused and the aegis of 
revelation and of Church authority was thrown 
over both alike. Thus Roman Catholic theolo- 
gians have come to think that philosophy is 
necessarily subservient to religion; that there 
is only one philosophy capable of this supreme 
submission, the revealed Aristotelianism ; that 
all other philosophies are anathema. These 
theologians represent a power too strong and 
too extensive to be ignored. 

For such men also a discussion of the re- 
ligious significance of a philosophy is an idle 
discussion, unless it be a discussion of the reli- 
gious implicates of the philosophy — the phi- 
losophy which, as they fondly think, religion 
necessarily dictates to the believer. Indeed, 
such thinkers would go further and brand such 
an attempt with the marks of skepticism and 
infidelity, because there can be only one phi- 
losophy and that philosophy is the divine 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 15 

philosophy — the only one which is consistent 
with divinely revealed religion. 4 

The charming 01% as some would prefer to 
have it, the distressing variety of man's mental 
operations finds one of its best illustrations in 
the subject now before us. After leaving our 
Catholic friend, who insists upon the essential 
connection between religion and philosophy — 
and a particular philosophy at that — we soon 
traverse the path of other friends quite differ- 
ent. In the homes of these people also Reli- 
gion is a welcome guest, but welcome because 
of her own innate charm. She does not need 
the more sophisticated Dame Philosophy to an- 
nounce her entrance into the drawing-room. 
She does not ask or wish the worldly-wise 
Queen of the Sciences to stand at her elbow 
and suggest the next proper step. She moves 
through the homes of men with the sure grace 
of unconscious simplicity. In fact, according 
to these friends, Dame Philosophy should be 
barred the door. She has been such a dis- 
turbing factor at previous gatherings that 

4 The Aristotelianism of Roman Catholic thinkers contains 
within itself the principle by which the Church justifies the 
contention that there is no other philosophy. Hence the un- 
breakable circle of thought in which Catholic theologians move. 



16 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

her presence is no longer desirable or per- 
missible. 

Christianity is an inductive religion and 
Christian theology must take on an inductive 
character. Fact and not theory is the import- 
ant thing and speculation should be disowned. 
We are living in an inductive age which yields 
easily to agnosticism, and if we are to present 
religion to such an age in any effective manner 
we must adapt our religious interpretation 
to the inductive method and the agnostic 
temper. 

According to Ritschl, whom we may take 
as the best example of this tendency in cur- 
rent thought, reason and faith must be sepa- 
rated — philosophy and religion kept apart. 
As Edghill says, Ritschl held that " . . . the 
conclusions of practical religion are supposed 
to be independent of and irreconcilable with 
the results of the theoretic reason . . . reality 
is unknowable by way of metaphysics . . . 
[there is] a line of absolute demarcation be- 
tween religious and theoretic knowledge." 5 
And Hermann has said, " It makes no differ- 
ence to a Christian whether philosophically he 

5 E. A. Edghill, Faith and Fact : A Study of Ritschlianism. 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 17 

is a materialist or an idealist." 6 It should be. 
added that this position is of a kind to appeal 
to " the man on the street." What he wants is 
practice, not theory, of course. What he is 
after is results, no matter how they come or 
how their coming may be metaphysically ex- 
plained. Thus, among average people as well 
as among the intellectual " quality," this anti- 
metaphysical metaphysics has an imposing 
following. 

One is tempted to tarry and discuss the 
validity of this position in itself ; to ask whether 
our knowledge can thus be placed in two or 
more water-tight compartments; to discuss 
whether judgments of value may legitimately 
eliminate judgments of fact, judgments of 
existence. But we must not stop. The dis- 
cussion would not be pertinent for present 
purposes. What we need to realize at this 
point is merely this : for such as the Ritschlians, 
at least so far as they personally are con- 
cerned, our question is once more an idle one. 

6 Quoted by Edghill, op. cit. One must remember, however, 
that there are Ritschlians and Ritschlians. Ritschl himself 
was not consistent in this matter of the relation of religion to 
metaphysics, and there are striking differences between the 
position of Hermann, for instance, and that of such men as 
Kaftan and Harnack. 



18 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

I mean the question of the religious value of a 
given philosophy. A given philosophy has no 
religious value because philosophy as such has 
no religious value. Men who wish to keep 
young that way may, if they like, gambol in 
metaphysical meadows and emit philosophical 
pipings. The Ritschlian is rather inclined to 
think such an attempt at a renewal of youth 
will prove disappointing. The way of life is 
not there. Reality is not in it. It is all dark- 
ness, fog, uncertainty. If you want youth and 
life, come over into the fair fields of religion. 
Drop your metaphysics and renew your faith, 
hope, and love at religion's fount. Give over 
your attempt to secure religious values from 
philosophy, or even to assess philosophy's re- 
ligious value. It has none. 

Needless to say, this book will not interest 
such men except that men of all schools of 
thought are alike in this, at least, that their ears 
itch to hear what others say about them. As 
for the subject itself, there is nothing in it. 
It is a no-thing. 

• •••••• 

In considering the foregoing positions I 
have already given by implication that view of 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 19 

the relation between religion and philosophy 
which commends itself to me as most reason- 
able and true. To say that philosophy deter- 
mies religion is, in the long run, to eliminate 
religion in favor of philosophy; it is to turn 
religion into philosophy. Still, we may re- 
assure ourselves with Lincoln's reminder, in 
his famous sheep anecdote, that " calling a tail 
a leg doesn't make it one." On the other hand, 
to think that religion can determine, or ever 
has determined, philosophy is merely to mis- 
read and misinterpret the history of human 
thought. 

Those, no doubt, are nearer the truth who 
say that the two — philosophy and religion — 
move in different spheres and do not touch. 
They would be still nearer the truth, I think, 
did they grant some measure of contact or 
influence, even while insisting upon a real in- 
dependence. That many men today, over- 
borne by the inductive method of modern 
science and the temptation to agnosticism, are 
unable to react spontaneously to the appeal of 
metaphysics, may argue a defect in them quite 
as easily as it may indicate unreality and im- 
practicality in metaphysical effort. 



20 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

That religious faith is generated apart from 
metaphysics, at least of a formal or conscious 
sort ; that religion is in a very real sense a scion 
of the House of Humanity, quite as old and 
quite as independently worthy of consideration 
as philosophy — these are statements whose 
truth we gladly recognize and accept. Its 
acceptance need not prevent our recognizing 
other complementary truths of a different 
order. One of these truths is : that men have 
perennially felt the necessity of using philos- 
ophy in formulating religious experience. 
Feeling is fundamental, perhaps, but if it is 
confined to one's self the thought comes, " Per- 
haps I am an exception, a bit queer." If the 
feeling is shared with others, a comparison re- 
sults, which leads back to the rationale of the 
feeling — that is, to its philosophy. Or again, 
action is insisted upon, perchance. But ac- 
tion, without some fundamental purpose to 
which to link it, soon falters. Be it ethical or 
ritual, the act soon suggests a question and the 
question leads one to philosophy. 

For the individual, therefore, generally 
speaking, philosophy is bound to assert itself 
in the inevitable attempt to make more clear 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 21 

and reasonable to one's self a faith already 
held, and in bringing forward supplementary 
considerations which may set the religious na- 
ture free for further gains of faith. In other 
words, philosophy often accompanies the re- 
ligious life of the individual, now consciously, 
now unconsciously; sometimes preceding the 
advance of religious faith, sometimes follow- 
ing behind to consolidate the gains made by 
direct frontal attack. 

When we turn from the individual aspects 
of religion to its social side, we find philosophy 
still dogging our steps. There has been mis- 
conception, no doubt, in regard to the way in 
which religion actually spreads from man to 
man. That intellectual argument is a gun of 
smaller caliber than it is usually thought to 
be, is certainly true. Life, and naught else, 
begets life. Religious life, and naught else, 
begets religious life. Argue with your neigh- 
bor until the flow of words chokes you and 
he will still persist in his iniquity. Live 
against his error and say nothing; soon the 
cause for argument will have disappeared. 
Nevertheless, as with the individual, so in the 
spread of religion from man to man philoso- 



22 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

phy helps. In certain cases it may precede the 
main charge, cutting the entanglements and 
clearing the way. In following up these ad- 
vances it certainly has helped to preserve the 
gains so as to make continuity of combined 
action possible. That the forms thus produced 
have often been given an exaggerated im- 
portance, and have thus been made harmful, 
is no necessary argument against the value and 
inevitableness of their rise. 

May we not conclude, then, thai; philosophy 
and religion do indeed represent autonomous 
phases of human life; that they differ, if not 
in their material and in their goal, at least in 
their method; but that, nevertheless, they are 
not independent, in that either can ignore the 
other entirely? Certainly philosophy cannot 
ignore religion, if for no other reason than that 
religion is a great fact of human history; and 
religion cannot ignore philosophy, not merely 
because the philosophy of past ages has pushed 
itself, perhaps to an unjustifiable extent, into 
the territory of religion, but also because the 
studies that deal with the human personality, 
be they of one sort or of another, cannot thus 
be cut asunder. The direct experience of the 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 23 

religious believer is undeniable, but it must be 
tested, or checked up, by the reason. The grist 
of religion must be put through the mill of phi- 
losophy that man may secure a product of the 
very highest value, with the chaff of ignorance 
and of illusion winnowed away. It is, there- 
fore, no idle question, but one of supreme mo- 
ment oftentimes, to ask what the religious 
value of a philosophy may be. 

It is conceivable that such an inquiry as this 
might be conducted in a variety of ways with 
an equal amount of profit, though of differing 
kind. One might study the relation of the 
philosophy of Bergson to religion in general. 
He might proceed by first defining religion 
in general, setting forth its essential features 
as manifested in the various religions of man 
in all ages and climes ; then, taking up in turn 
these essential features of religion, he might 
discuss the relation to them and the effect upon 
them of the Bergsonian ideas. In this way it 
might be found that certain of the philosoph- 
ical ideas under examination would have a 
positive and favorable relation to religion, 
others a negative relation, and still others a 



24 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

neutral influence. From these specific con- 
clusions a general conclusion might be drawn 
regarding the relation to religion of the phi- 
losophy as a whole, whether favorable or un- 
favorable. 

Another profitable method would be to select 
a particular religion, such as Christianity, and 
apply to it the process just described. First, 
define the essence of Christianity and then pass 
judgment upon the philosophy in accordance 
with the positive or negative relation of its 
ideas to the essential elements of Christianity 
as thus defined. 

A more modest plan commends itself to me 
and yields values which do not have to wait 
for the completion of such extended investiga- 
tions as are presupposed in the previous sug- 
gestions. These values, too, are not at all to 
be despised. Let us yield the subjects, " Re- 
ligion in General " and ' Essence of Chris- 
tianity." Have we not already had a suffi- 
ciency of such discussions? Let us also forego 
any attempt to give a complete description of 
Bergson's philosophy. There are now literally 
hundreds of books and articles, in English, 
French, and German, not to speak of other 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 25 

languages, in which satisfactory characteriza- 
tions of Bergson's philosophy may be found. 
It would be of small use, but rather a great 
weariness, to repeat in such a study as this 
what has been so often and so excellently done 
elsewhere. The modern literary world would 
gain much by recalling the caution of the wise, 
even though overwise, author of Ecclesiastes, 
' Of making many books there is no end ; and 
much study is a weariness of the flesh." 

It is possible, therefore, to assume a knowl- 
edge of these details or, at least, to refer to 
others the reader who desires them. For the 
same reason, and for other reasons as well, no 
attempt at a criticism of the philosophy need 
be made. That is being attended to by the 
philosophers, ably, loquaciously, and vocifer- 
ously. Our task would be large enough in 
itself to excuse us from embroiling ourselves 
in these other matters. To turn to these things 
would prove too tempting; they are so com- 
plicated and so interesting. Besides, others 
are attending to them in a thoroughly com- 
petent way. 

We would be children of w T isdom should we 
limit ourselves to the single task of passing 



26 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

in review the outstanding Bergsonian em- 
phases for the sake of drawing any possible 
inferences in a religious direction, but with 
special reference, perhaps, to Christianity. 
We might thus determine what would be the 
religious result of a complete acceptance of 
the Bergsonian philosophy and thus determine 
whether, and how far, this philosophy is com- 
patible with religion, and especially with the 
Christian religion. As LeRoy says : 

The present question of the relation of Bergson 
to morality and religion is, not to find bases for the 
latter in his philosophy, but to know whether they 
are compatible. It is not a question of deducing 
morality and religion from what is already given, 
but whether there is room for new intuitions along 
these lines — intuitions of different orders of life. 7 

T Edouard LeRoy, A New Philosophy : Henri Bergson 
(1913). 



CHAPTER II 

BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 

Some of the greatest changes in human his- 
tory have begun with protests. The human 
mind, connected with Reality by a slight 
thread as it often seems, swings backward and 
forward pendulum-like, never able to main- 
tain itself at the plumb-line for more than a 
fraction of a second at a time — seconds of in- 
sight, immediately past, whose interpretation 
has to be figured out at the inevitable angle 
of the succeeding swing. We may not quar- 
rel with the law of our being but only recog- 
nize and master it. To pursue the figure, 
perhaps the clock would stop without the pen- 
dulum-swing. Maintenance upon the plumb- 
line of thought might prove the end of all 
progress. Surely it would be deadly dull. Be 
these things as they may, we have to reckon 
with the fact of action and reaction, extreme 
and revulsion from the extreme. And if this 
shuttle-like movement of thought is a necessary 
law of human development, then protests and 

27 



28 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

protesters are fundamentally grounded in the 
very philosophy of history itself. * 

I do not forget that we are at present bored, 
and rightly so, by the omnipresent " muck- 
raker." The " muck-raker," as distinguished 
from the genuine reformer, is a sham Prot- 
estant; a child of littleness who is either an 
insincere imitator, for reasons best known to 
himself and best not known by others, or one 
whose humanitarianism is so expansive and so 
unballasted that it cannot be confined within 
reasonable limits; one whose sense of dispro- 
portion varies directly as the square of his 
charitable feeling or, in other cases, of his 
overweening self-interest. The " muck-raker ' 
is the modern public form of a private nuis- 
ance which God gave man from the beginning, 
for his chastening — the acquaintance who al- 
ways and inevitably objects, criticises, and pro- 
tests. 

Still, I shall reaffirm the remark that the 

1 The pendulum figure is suggestive and the best that occurs 
to me for the immediate purpose. Were progress and not 
protest my present theme, I should prefer to use the illustra- 
tion of the ascending spiral as truest, though not perfectly 
true, to the facts of life. That is, round and round we go; 
and that means backward and forward, but never directly 
backward nor directly forward; ever onward and, at least 
eventually, upward. 



BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 29 

beginnings of great things in human history 
have usually been attended by protests. The 
earlier Greek thinkers protested against the 
crudely anthropomorphic Olympians and thus 
laid the basis for the later developments of 
Greek philosophy. The Hebrew Prophets 
criticised the customary religion of their day 
and by their criticism " made straight/' or at 
least more straight, " a highway for our God." 
Paul disengaged the innate freedom and life 
of the Christian religion by lodging an effective 
protest against the Judaizing of Christianity 
through rabbinical legalism. Luther, a de- 
voted disciple of Paul, repeated the work of his 
master, under different conditions but with a 
similar result. And the Great Master of Paul 
and of Luther, Himself brought into being the 
most powerful spiritual explosive the world has 
known and thus became the Leader and Pro- 
genitor of true Protestants. All progress is 
necessarily accompanied by protest, even 
though all protest is not on the way of 
progress. 

• • . • • • 

One of the things that first fix the atten- 
tion of a reader of Bergson, it matters not 



30 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

which of his books he may be reading, 2 is the 
frequent note of polemic. He, too, is a Pro- 
tester. Should we call him a true Protestant? 
Perhaps time alone will tell. But, surely, the 
range of his knowledge and the beauty of his 
style predispose us in his favor. Whatever he 
may or may not be, he is not a small man. 
Neither his intellect nor his soul, to employ a 
Bergsonian distinction, is of small caliber. 
There must be some greatness in a man whom 
some seriously consider to be another Kant. 
Thus it is impossible to dismiss him with cheap 
and flippant characterization and equally im- 
possible to silence him with scorn and epithet. 
He is genuine; and those who do not relish 
his protests must be as genuine, as big, and as 
clever as he or their chance of successful refu- 
tation is gone. Even were he refuted, at least 
a part of his protest would carry through for 

2 One should begin, I think, with his Introduction to Meta- 
physics, where he himself draws up his program in definite 
fashion. Over against Creative Evolution, this book presents 
the bareness, but also the sharp definition, of a landscape 
gardener's plan as compared with the garden itself, whose 
paths are beautified and set off, but also somewhat obscured, 
by the luxuriance of plant, shrub, and tree. The remaining 
works of importance are, Time and Free Will and Matter 
and Memory. To these may be added his short and charming 
essay on Laughter. 



BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 31 

Bergson is the harbinger, or better, an early- 
manifestation of a new spiritual season whose 
warmth none of us shall be able or willing to 
resist. One may prefer this manifestation, 
another that, but all must live the season 
through. 

Bergson has crossed swords primarily with 
absolutistic rationalism, whose vice is a narrow, 
unvitalized logic; with scientific determinism, 
which has often deserted its proper scientific 
attitude for one of intellectual dogmatism 
often bordering on that of absolutism; and 
finally, with materialism, which too often lurks 
near both of the preceding points of view. 

Coming into prominence contemporaneously 
with pragmatism and receiving, also, highest 
praise from William James himself, it is but 
natural that this philosophy, being what it is, 
should often be confused with pragmatism. 
Bergson protests, as the pragmatists protest, 
against a rigidly rationalistic absolutism and 
against an equally rigid scientific determin- 
ism. It should be borne in mind, however, that 
these likenesses are more than offset by differ- 
ences. Bergson is essentially anything but 
pragmatic. To be sure, his world, like that of 



32 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

James, is a wide-open world, not fixed and 
static, but his interest is in " what is " rather 
than in " what works." I should say that the 
chief difference between Bergson and other 
thinkers of an idealistic type is not one of 
pragmatism versus idealism, but of biological 
versus a purely logical idealism. In classing 
Bergson with the pragmatists, men have used 
the mistaken formula that two men who fight 
the same thing are necessarily in agreement 
with each other. Protestantism has ever been 
pursued by the genius, good or evil, of sec- 
tarianism. James, the Protestant, and Berg- 
son, the Protestant, are not to be identi- 
fied. 

Confusion also exists regarding Bergson's 
estimate of the intellect. In spite of his de- 
motion of the intellect, as some would call it, 
Bergson is not so anti-intellectual as he has 
often been made out. His polemic against the 
immortal intellectualists has, indeed, fairly 
laid him open to such a charge, but a care- 
ful analysis of his position reveals a recog- 
nition of the intellect, not merely as a neces- 
sary instrument of action — though it is chiefly 
that, according to Bergson — but also as a 



BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 33 

means of acquiring at least a partial knowl- 
edge of the Absolute. Evidently Bergson's 
polemical emphasis has misled some of the 
critics. He does not impeach the intellect. 
He impeaches those who, he thinks, have mis- 
used the intellect. Even did he entirely debar 
the intellect from practising its art in the realm 
of ultimate reality, he might present a show 
of reason by exhibiting the discordant results 
hitherto obtained by this means, and the in- 
creasing wreckage of agnosticism. But he 
does not so completely debar the intellect. 
He merely wishes, as we shall see, to legitima- 
tize another power along with that of the in- 
tellect, the power of intuition which, he thinks, 
has been unfairly and harmfully repressed. 
From the cooperation of the two will come 
mutual enrichment. 3 

Again, Bergson has been branded as anti- 
scientific. I think this characterization is very 
misleading. Those who proclaim it are misled 

8 Doubtless the logic Bergson attacks is, to the modern logi- 
cian himself, a " man of straw." But it is not so in general. 
The less rigid, more inclusive logic of recent years is still 
merely " food for the gods." The modern logician can be 
of help to Bergson, but not by misinterpreting his attack upon 
the Aristotelian logic. That logic may be outworn for them, 
but its general sway is still undoubted. 



34 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

by the pronounced polemic of the man against 
certain tendencies among scientists; a polemic 
which is far from being anti-scientific, in the 
proper sense of that term. Bergson holds, as 
Rene Gillouin says, that " determinism is an 
excellent method within certain limits, but that 
it has been pushed beyond those limits and 
made ruinous by being set up as a fundamental 
doctrine." This is not an anti-scientific posi- 
tion. It is merely a sane recognition of the 
limits of science and of the scientific method. 
It is aimed only against those who wish to 
exalt their scientific method to a metaphysical 
throne and burden us with the tyranny of a 

New Dogmatism. 

....... 

We now begin to see what the main lines 
of the Bergsonian protest are and whither they 
lead. Let us first discuss his protest against 
what he considers to be an abuse of the prin- 
ciple of scientific determinism. The scientist 
has been crowding us rather hard. He knows 
that we honor him and that we cannot get 
along without him. He has not only enriched 
our imagination by revealing to us the im- 
mensely great, as well as the infinitely small, 



BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 35 

wonders of nature, but he has also given us 
increased length of days through the elimina- 
tion of disease and, to some of us (others of 
us, I should say) , through the capture of na- 
ture's intimate secrets, increased riches with 
which to enjoy these multiplied days. That 
men who have done such things should not be 
conscious of their power, would indicate an 
anomalous lack of mental acumen. 

I think that this self-consciousness has 
tended to spoil the scientist. At any rate, we 
have been told often enough that it was a 
question of all or none. Either give up your 
scientific method altogether, or pursue it 
everywhere. To be sure, its natural home is in 
the physical sciences but now it has come up 
into psychology, by way of biology and physi- 
ology, and even religion and ethics are about 
to be subdued. Not that the scientific method 
should not be applied in every direction. It 
certainly should be. But its own fundamental 
principle should lead it to recognize that dif- 
ferences in the nature of the material must 
differentiate the scientific handling of living 
organisms from the scientific handling of 
purely material masses. 



36 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

I suppose it has been the fear that deter- 
ministic materialism would dominate, if not 
eliminate, ethics and religion that has caused the 
continued distrust of conservatives, or their ac- 
tive opposition, towards anything which looked 
like evolution. We too easily dismiss the crav- 
ing of religious people for miracle, for " signs 
and wonders," when we condemn it as merely 
the product of ignorance and credulity. Par- 
ticular judgments and beliefs may often be ex- 
plained in this way, but back of the craving 
itself there often lies a deeper reason, usually 
not clearly realized, but a reason that concerns 
the very springs of religion. For the truly re- 
ligious man there is always a dualism, more 
or less clearly defined, between the personal 
and the impersonal in life. One constant ele- 
ment of religious experience is a sense of the 
triumph of the personal over the impersonal. 
Here lie eternal issues; and any tendency to- 
wards the reduction of the world-life to the 
level of impersonality will always be resisted, 
and rightly even though unintelligently re- 
sisted, by all sincere religious men. 

But indeed it is not merely ultra-conserva- 
tives who scent present danger. Even Mc- 



BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 37 

Dougall has pointed out 4 that, due to the all- 
embracing extension of scientific determinism, 
our psychology has become very largely a 
' psychology without a soul." For religion 
this spells danger, if not disaster, because, he 
continues, religion is inevitably bound up with 
some form of " animism " (as he calls it), that 
is, with a belief in the distinct existence of the 
soul of the individual. 

Now Bergson does not start out from any 
religious presupposition ; but solely on the 
basis of facts, chiefly biological facts, he comes 
to the conclusion that science is pushing its 
necessarily deterministic method too far. It 
is stepping out of the circle, thus disqualifying 
the throw. The interesting thing, however, 
about Bergson's attack upon science is, that 
it is itself united with an extensive use of the 
scientific method and of scientific material. It 
might better be called a challenge, or a sharp 
reminder, than an attack. Let us see what 
Bergson himself says : 

Men of science have fixed their attention mainly 

on the concepts with which they have marked out 

the pathway of intuition. The more they laid stress 

4 William McDougall, Mind and Body. Cf. Preface, p. xiii. 



38 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

on these residual products, which have turned into 
symbols, the more they attributed a symbolic char- 
acter to every kind of science. And the more they 
believed in the symbolic character of science, the 
more did they indeed make science symbolical. Grad- 
ually they have blotted out all difference, in positive 
science, between the natural and the artificial, be- 
tween the data of immediate intuition, and the enor- 
mous work of analysis which the understanding pur- 
sues round intuition. Thus they have prepared the 
way for a doctrine which affirms the relativity of all 
our knowledge. 5 

And again, 6 

Now I recognize that positive science can and 
should proceed as if organization was like making a 
machine. Only so will it have any hold on organized 
bodies. For its object is not to show us the essence 
of things, but to furnish us with the best means of 
acting on them. Physics and chemistry are well ad- 
vanced sciences, and living matter lends itself to our 
action only so far as we can treat it by the processes 
of our physics and chemistry. Organization can 
therefore only be studied scientifically if the organ- 
ized body has first been likened to a machine. The 
cells will be the pieces of the machine, the organism 

6 Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, English 
translation by T. E. Holme, pp. 77-78. 

6 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution. English transla- 
tion by Mitchell. The following quotations are to be found 
on pp. 93, 195, 207 and 254, respectively. 



BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 39 

their assemblage, and the elementary labors which 
have organized the parts will be regarded as the 
real elements of the labor which has organized the 
whole. This is the standpoint of science. Quite 
different, in our opinion, is that of philosophy. . . . 

Positive science is, in fact, a work of pure intel- 
lect. Now, whether our conception of the intellect 
be accepted or rejected, there is one point on which 
everybody will agree with us, and that is that the 
intellect is at home in the presence of unorganized 
matter. This matter it makes use of more and more 
by mechanical inventions, and mechanical inventions 
become the easier to it the more it thinks matter as 
mechanism. . . . 

In principle, positive science bears on reality it- 
self, provided it does not overstep the limits of its 
own domain, which is inert matter. . . . 

Now, it might easily be shown that the conclusions 
of this metaphysic, springing from science, have re- 
bounded upon science itself, as it were, by ricochet. 
They penetrate the whole of our so-called empiri- 
cism. Physics and chemistry study only inert 
matter ; biology, when it treats the living being phy- 
sically and chemically, considers only the inert side 
of the living : hence the mechanistic explanations, 
in spite of their development, include only a small 
part of the real. To suppose a priori that the whole 
of the real is resolvable into elements of this kind, 
or at least that mechanism can give a complete trans- 
lation of what happens in the world, is to pronounce 



40 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

for a certain metaphysic — the very metaphysic of 
which Spinoza and Leibnitz have laid down the prin- 
ciples and drawn the consequences. 



Now the upshot of such a protest is, in itself, 
heartening to religionists. Before all, we are 
put in the way of seeing that, in a certain 
sense, religion is out of the range of science. 
This figure is rather more apt than figures 
usually are in that, though religion is out of 
the range of the scientific batteries, needing no 
longer to fear destruction by them, she must, 
nevertheless, dispose her forces in accordance 
with the territory covered by science. The 
main thing, however, is to realize that scien- 
tific dogmatism is in discredit ; that science did 
not destroy philosophical and theological dog- 
matism in order to set up a new dogmatism of 
her own; that the facts, inductively studied, 
lead to an " open-door policy " by which reli- 
gion enters into its rightful own without the 
unfair and illegitimate intrusion upon her of 
other claims and interests. This does not bring 
us up into the free air of finality. Not at all. 
But it certainly does bring to religion a great 
opportunity — the opportunity to demonstrate 



BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 41 

unimpeded her power and validity. The case 
shall not be prejudged against her. It would 
be going beyond the facts to say that Bergson 
alone is responsible for this changing attitude. 
He is but one among those, though a leader 
among them, who have been restraining scien- 
tific smartness and preparing the way for more 
vivid, non-scientific but not anti- scientific, ap- 
preciations. 

But Bergson, at least, has done more than 
this — more than reading science a needed lesson. 
The inductive method of science has superin- 
duced the inductive temper. The result has been 
a great increase of fundamental agnosticism. 
Now, one finds it hard to be severe with even 
an out-and-out agnostic. His extreme mod- 
esty disarms one's attack and makes almost 
any statement about spiritual realities appear 
too self-assertive, if not actually dogmatic. 
And yet one has the suspicion that, even with 
the agnostic, a bit of dogmatism has crept in 
unawares; that the Absolute which went out 
of the door, clothed in the garments of knowl- 
edge, has come in again at the window, garbed 
in the weeds of ignorance. 

One thing, however, the agnostic himself will 



42 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

tell you. The agnostic diet is not as filling as 
porridge. Indeed it is distinctly unsatisfying 
and leaves a longing in the heart, if not a 
gnawing there. Agnosticism may be the final 
thing. I doubt it. But if it is, I pity hu- 
manity as it grows in unsatisfied and unsatisfi- 
able spiritual hunger. Let priests unfrock 
themselves and the pious raise no more pin- 
nacled spires to the glory of God; it is all 
" vanity of vanities," as the Preacher said. If 
agnosticism is the last word, then a good case 
could be made out for the Illusion Theory. 
Better be deceived by a pretty and satisfying 
fancy than to face with dull eye a certain un- 
certainty. At least, if one were thorough- 
going, one could never be sure that it was an 
illusion anyway, and it might therefore be 
true, according to the most consistent agnostic. 
But he wouldn't — couldn't — say so. 

Let us come out of the cave into the sun- 
light. The air is rather heavy in there and 
breathing is difficult. Who calls us out? 
There are several voices, but one is Bergson's. 
We may appreciate the sunlight all the more 
for having been in the cave, but we are grate- 
ful, nevertheless, for the release. To leave the 



BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 43 

figure: the modern educated world has been 
- sicklied o'er with a pale cast of thought " — 
with agnosticism. All our knowledge is rela- 
tive; there is no hope of our ever being able 
to " jump out of our skins " and attain to any 
final knowledge ; absolute knowledge, the truly 
real, is forever shut off from us. 

These things Bergson disputes with vigor, 
reasserting the old belief of man that he can 
know truth, the truth, the final truth. And 
with the reassertion of this belief comes back 
the collateral conviction, " the truth shall make 
you free." May not the twentieth century see 
the advent of a " Day View " of existence — 
a view of faith, appreciation and enjoyment — 
after the " Night View " of an all-embracing 
determinism, a self -distrustful agnosticism and 
a despairing skepticism? This need not be the 
pantheistic " Day View " of Fechner, though 
even that has its qualities compared with the 
" Night View." 

There is pregnancy in Jacks' thought 7 that 
the world should be taken as a work of art 
rather than as a problem to be solved. That 
is, we must open the eyes of our appreciative 

7 L. P. Jacks, The Alchemy of Thought. Cf. Chapter 2. 



44 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

self as well as those of our logical self. This 
may seem a very ironical suggestion to those 
who are caught in the web of practical life 
and are struggling for their very existence. 
But the Christian message, likewise, often im- 
presses such hearers ironically. That may be 
so much the worse for the Christian message, 
but I am inclined to think that it is just so 
much the better for Jacks. At any rate, Berg- 
son is here on the side of Christianity and on 
the side of Jacks, Fechner or anyone else who 
thinks, for any reason whatsoever, that life is 
still worth living. " True religion and unde- 
filed " is fundamentally optimistic. It frowns 
upon pessimism and pessimism frowns upon 
it. Pessimism is the Deadly Nightshade in 
the garden of man. Whoso destroys it serves 
man and religion. This Bergson does by cut- 
ting off one of its roots, namely, radical agnos- 
ticism. He holds it to be untrue that we can 
" believe only what we can claw," or rather, 
he holds that we can claw further into Reality 
than many think — in fact, into the Absolute 
itself. That makes life worth while and gives 
religion a new chance. 



BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 45 

But while with one hand Bergson slays the 
Agnostic Leviathan, with the other he reaches 
out over the territory of the orthodox — whether 
philosophical or theological — and lays about 
the head of the Absolutistic Giant of dogmatic 
orthodoxy. To understand fully the nature 
and amount of Bergson's emphasis upon evo- 
lution, creative evolution, and upon his new 
idea of time and teleology, one must appre- 
ciate that, in every case, Bergson is largely 
engaged in a vigorous polemic against pre- 
vailing modes of thought. It is not to our pur- 
pose to discuss these matters here, except by 
way of brief illustration of the present point — 
Bergson's protest against mere logical abso- 
lutism. 

The novelty of his approach to the question 
is seen in that he also opposes the Spencerian 
scheme of evolution which ends in the doc- 
trine of the " Unknowable." This system, he 
says, is equally rigid, formal, and barren with 
the systems of the absolutists. It only gets out 
of its evolution what was already put in at the 
beginning and therefore, like orthodox abso- 
lutism, does not fit into, or explain, the facts 
of a life that is ever growing. On the con- 



46 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

trary, evolution rightfully viewed is a real 
process actually giving rise to new things all 
the time, things unpredictable and unforesee- 
able and therefore not pre-ordained, at least in 
detail. Bergson sees in such a world a place 
for a certain kind of teleology, final purpose — 
Providence, if you will — but it cannot be the 
fixed and rigid finality of the absolutistic dog- 
matist, be he rationalistic or orthodox, or both. 
Bergson says : 8 

If philosophy leave biological and psychological 
facts to positive science alone, as it has left, and 
rightly left, physical facts . . . [then] ... it 
will accept a priori a mechanistic conception of all 
nature, a conception unreflected and even uncon- 
scious, the outcome of a material need . . . 

The moment it does so, its fate is sealed. The 
philosopher has no longer any choice save between 
a metaphysical dogmatism and a metaphysical skep- 
ticism, both of which rest, at bottom, on the same 
postulate, and neither of which adds anything to 
positive science. He may hypostasize the unity of 
nature, or, what comes to the same thing, the unity 
of science, in a being who is nothing since he does 
nothing, an ineffectual God who simply sums up in 

8 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution. English transla- 
tion by Mitchell. The following quotations are to be found 
on pp. 196, 197, 40, 94-95, 248-249. 



BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 47 

himself all the given; or in an eternal Matter from 
whose womb have been poured out the properties of 
things and the laws of nature; or, again, in a pure 
Form which endeavors to seize the unseizable multi- 
plicity, and which is, as we will> the form of nature 
or the form of thought. ... In many cases, how- 
ever, we feel the frame cracking. . . . To a meta- 
physical dogmatism, which has erected into an abso- 
lute the factitious unity of science, there succeeds 
a skepticism or a relativism that universalizes and 
extends to all the results of science the artificial 
character of some of them. . . . 

Yet finalism is not, like mechanism, a doctrine 
with fixed rigid outlines. It admits of as many in- 
flections as we like. The mechanistic philosophy is 
to be taken or left : it must be left if the least grain 
of dust, by straying from the path foreseen by 
mechanics, should show the slightest trace of spon- 
taneity. The doctrine of final causes, on the con- 
trary, will never be definitely refuted. If one form 
of it be put aside, it will take another. Its princi- 
ple, which is essentially psychological, is very flexi- 
ble. It is so extensible, and thereby so comprehen- 
sive, that one accepts something of it as soon as one 
rejects pure mechanism. The theory we shall put 
forward in this book will therefore necessarily par- 
take of finalism to a certain extent. . . . 

With greater precision, we may compare the 
process by which nature constructs an eye to the 
simple act by which we raise the hand. But we 



48 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

supposed at first that the hand met with no resist- 
ance. Let us now imagine that, instead of moving 
in air, the hand has to pass through iron filings 
which are compressed and offer resistance to it in 
proportion as it goes forward. At a certain mo- 
ment the hand will have exhausted its effort, and, at 
this very moment, the filings will be massed and 
coordinated in a certain definite form, to wit, that 
of the hand that is stopped and of a part of the 
arm. Now, suppose that the hand and arm are in- 
visible. Lookers-on will seek the reason of the ar- 
rangement in the filings themselves and in forces 
within the mass. Some will account for the position 
of each filing by the action exerted upon it by the 
neighboring filings : these are the mechanists. Others 
will prefer to think that a plan of the whole has 
presided over the detail of these elementary actions : 
they are the finalists. But the truth is that there 
has been merely one indivisible act, that of the hand 
passing through the filings : the inexhaustible detail 
of the movement of the grains, as well as the order 
of their final arrangement, expresses negatively, in 
a way, this undivided movement, being the unitary 
form of resistance, and not a synthesis of positive 
elementary actions. For this reason, if the arrange- 
ment of the grains is termed an " effect " and the 
movement of the hand a " cause, 5 ' it may indeed be 
said that the whole of the effect is explained by the 
whole of the cause, but to parts of the cause parts 
of the effect will in no wise correspond. In other 



BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 49 

words, neither mechanism nor finalism will here be 
in place, and we must resort to an explanation of a 
different kind. . . . 

God thus defined, has nothing of the already made ; 
He is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation, so 
conceived, is not a mystery ; we experience it our- 
selves when we act freely . . . that action increases 
as it goes on, that it creates in the measure of its 
advance, is what each of us finds when he watches 
himself act. 



One sees at once that this phase of Berg- 
son's position has a very direct bearing upon 
religious ideas and formulations. God is Him- 
self growing, and while a Bergsonian may be 
able to connect with Him a certain consistency 
of character and a general direction of pur- 
pose, he cannot any longer abide by a purely 
logical interpretation of God's infinity, omni- 
science, omnipotence, and the like, since such 
an interpretation is inconsistent with, and 
meant to be inconsistent with, real growth, 
evolution, or progress. Through this new 
view Bergson claims to have resolved the old 
antinomies of human thought, such as free will 
and predestination, by showing that the prob- 
lems are pseudo-problems. " The problem of 



50 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

freedom has thus sprung from a misunder- 
standing: it has been to the moderns what the 
paradoxes of the Eleatics were to the ancients, 
and, like these paradoxes, it has its origin in the 
illusion through which we confuse succession 
and simultaneity, duration and extensity, qual- 
ity and quantity." 9 Whether Bergson is right 
in this or not, it is refreshing to turn away from 
the lifeless discussions of so much of our ortho- 
dox philosophy and theology towards a phi- 
losophy that seems, at least, to live and move 
and have some being, even if its " being ' be 
" becoming." 

Perhaps we do not need any more of this 
sort of protest in religion just now. We have 
indeed had much of it and very likely we 
should turn to other ways of thinking. If this 
protest of Bergson were merely a protest 
without a positive basis and a correspondingly 
constructive proposal, I should be disposed to 
say that we had had enough. But his is not a 
blind, unreasoned, and purely negative pro- 
test. It is an unusually acute one, and it is 
accompanied by what purports to be a sub- 

9 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will. English transla- 
tion by Pogson, p. 240. 



BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 51 

stitute view. This substitute view is only par- 
tially worked out, but more is to come, if Berg- 
son lives ; and he has already given us some of 
its main features. What has been given 
promises well for a complete view which will 
have a positive and helpful influence upon re- 
ligion, by way of greater vitality, inwardness, 
and progressiveness. 

Religion has had to struggle perennially 
against that form of infidelity which refuses 
to believe that God can take care of Himself; 
which insists on the maintenance of a " Board 
of Guardians," usually selected, of course, 
from the inside circle; which insists that the 
truth of God and of His universe must be pro- 
tected by certain sacred custodians, either in 
the form of a direct personal supervision or in 
the form of codes, firmans, decrees, and creeds, 
made sacrosanct and infallible forever. Those 
who feel, as I do, that the greatest witness to 
the truth and power of religion has been its 
ability to survive the efforts of friends like 
these, will speedily and gratefully recognize 
the possibility, at least, of great religious value 
in a philosophy like that of Bergson, which 
eliminates this kind of thing from life as a 



52 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

whole. As has already been seen, Bergson's 
conception of the Vital Impetus necessarily 
affects a Bergsonian conception of God. The 
Divine Being, so conceived, would not be blind, 
purposeless, and ineffective, as some say. 
There is room for purpose, end, and consist- 
ency of character, but there would also be a 
delicious unexpectedness which would delight 
the vitally minded and dismay, as it ought to 
dismay, the smugly formal. Such a God 
would be hard for an absolutist or a dogmatist 
to believe in. He would require too much faith 
from them and too little assistance. For that 
very reason He might prove the joy of more 
truly religious souls. 

• •••••• 

The originality and utter impartiality of M. 
Bergson, the Protestant, is well illustrated by 
the fact that he turns fiercely also upon some 
of those who gleefully agree with him in the 
protest we have just been discussing. Ma- 
terialism is a word which is used in very dif- 
ferent senses and it may, consequently, be re- 
ferred to very different causes. But practical 
materialism and theoretic materialism are not 
so far apart as they sometimes seem. They 



BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 53 

interact upon each other as cause and effect, 
and both of them are, in the long run, fatal to 
religion. Bergson's whole position is anti- 
materialistic throughout, but, at one point in 
particular, we find him crossing swords with 
the materialist and fighting to the finish. It 
is where he discusses the relation of mind and 
matter. His whole system depends upon a 
successful refutation of parallelism and epi- 
phenomenalism, and we find him devoting 
much attention to those who deny the existence 
of spiritual activity underived from, or inde- 
dendent of, physical changes. 2 



10 



But our distinction between " pure perception " 
and " pure memory " has yet another aim. Just as 
pure perception, by giving us hints as to the nature 
of matter, allows us to take an intermediate position 
between realism and idealism, so pure memory, on 
the other hand, by opening to us a view of what is 
called spirit, should enable us to decide between 
those other two doctrines, materialism and spiritual- 



ism. 11 



. . . For it is possible to sum up our conclusions 
as to pure perception by saying that there is in 

10 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will, Chapter 3. 

11 The translator here appends this note, " The word * spirit- 
ualism ' is used throughout this work to signify any philosophy 
that claims for spirit an existence of its own." 



54 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

matter something more than, but not something dif- 
ferent from, that which is actually given. Un- 
doubtedly conscious perception does not compass 
the whole of matter, since it consists, in as far as 
it is conscious, in the separation, or the " discern- 
ment," of that which, in matter, interests our vari- 
ous needs. But between this perception of matter 
and matter itself there is but a difference of degree 
and not of kind, pure perception standing towards 
matter in the relation of the part to the whole. 
This amounts to saying that matter cannot exercise 
powers of any kind other than those which we per- 
ceive. It has no mysterious virtue, it can conceal 
none. To take a definite example, one moreover 
which interests us most nearly, we may say that 
the nervous system, a material mass presenting cer- 
tain qualities of color, .resistance, cohesion, etc., 
may well possess unperceived physical properties, 
but physical properties only. And hence it can have 
no other office than to receive, inhibit, or transmit 
movement. 

Now the essence of every form of materialism is 
to maintain the contrary, since it holds that con- 
sciousness, with all its functions, is born of the mere 
interplay of material elements. Hence it is led to 
consider even the perceived qualities of matter, — 
sensible, and consequently felt, qualities, — as so 
many phosphorescences which follow the track of 
the cerebral phenomena in the act of perception. 
Matter, thus supposed capable of creating elemen- 



BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 55 

tary facts of consciousness, might therefore just as 
well engender intellectual facts of the highest order. 
It is, then, of the essence of materialism to assert 
the perfect relativity of sensible qualities, and it is 
not without good reason that this thesis, which 
Democritus has formulated in precise terms, is as 
old as materialism. 

But spiritualism has always followed materialism 
along this path. As if everything lost to matter 
must be gained by spirit, spiritualism has never 
hesitated to despoil matter of the qualities with 
which it is invested in our perception, and which, on 
this view, are subjective appearances. Matter has 
thus too often been reduced to a mysterious entity 
which, just because all we know of it is an empty 
show, might as well engender thought as any other 
phenomenon. 

The truth is that there is one, and only one, 
method of refuting materialism: it is to show that 
matter is precisely that which it appears to be. 
Thereby we eliminate all virtuality, all hidden power, 
from matter, and establish the phenomena of spirit 
as an independent reality. But to do this we must 
leave to matter those qualities which materialists and 
spiritualists alike strip from it: the latter that they 
may make of them representations of the spirit, the 
former that they may regard them only as the acci- 
dental garb of space. 



12 



12 Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory. English transla- 
tion by Paul and Palmer, pp. 77-80. 



56 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

Regardless of the validity of Bergson's con- 
structive position, it is encouraging to witness 
his doughty attack upon those psychologists, 
now very numerous, who have practically out- 
lawed the soul from polite psychological so- 
ciety. His summons at least serves as a writ 
of habeas corpus by which the soul will be 
given a fair chance to prove itself innocent of 
the charge of wrongful impersonation. The 
soul is the citadel of religion. If we lose this 
fortress, the campaign is over and uncondi- 
tional surrender alone remains. Bergson pro- 
tests against the necessity of capitulation. By 
counter-attacks he opens the way for rein- 
forcements and re-victualling. No wonder 
the reduced but faithful garrison is heart- 
ened. 

He indicates his general position and even 
hints at his method when he says that the only 
way to refute materialism "is to show that 
matter is exactly that which it appears to be." 
At another time and in another connection it 
would be necessary to follow this lead further. 
It is enough for us here that we remind our- 
selves of Bergson's fundamental insistence 
upon the reality of the soul, upon the fact of 



BERGSON THE PROTESTANT 57 

at least a partial freedom, and upon the essen- 
tially psychic, or spiritual, nature of the whole 
process of evolution. At several points in the 
elaboration of his system, notably in his dis- 
cussion of the reality of the soul and of the fact 
of freedom, he comes into direct conflict with 
materialistic theories. It is therefore quite fair 
to include materialism with scientific deter- 
minism, agnosticism, and dogmatic absolutism, 
in presenting a picture of Bergson the 
Protestant. 



There is religious value, as we have seen, in 
all these protests, looked at merely as pro- 
tests. They are, as a matter of fact, only in- 
cidental as protests. Their main service is to 
level the ground for the positive Bergsonian 
structure. One is therefore led to expect from 
this philosophy a general compatibility with 
the religious viewpoint. It is certain that a 
religious position, closely conformed to the 
Bergsonian philosophy, would yield at least 
some of the age-old religious satisfactions. 
Freshness and piquancy would not be lacking. 
They are lacking in current orthodoxy. Per- 



58 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

haps Bergson may point us out a way — not 
necessarily the way or the only way, but a 
way — by which our religious thought may be- 
come revitalized. 



CHAPTER ni 

HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 

I well remember a discussion with my sister, 
when we were both in early youth, regarding 
the greenness of the grass. She propounded 
to me the baffling question, " You call the 
grass green and I call the grass green, but 
how do we know that your green is the same as 
jny green." 

I fancy that it is unusual to have this philo- 
sophical question posed in such a clear-cut 
form at such an early age, but the thoughtful 
do not need many years of experience in order 
to become aware of the problem of reality and 
truth, not only as between man and man but 
also as between man and all else. The child, 
living in the protected atmosphere of the 
family, sees life through one set of windows 
largely. Later in life other windows open be- 
fore him and, as he gazes through, he sees vis- 
tas hard to piece together into a homogeneous 
landscape. So, in the history of the great hu- 

59 



60 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

man family, questions regarding the nature 
and the possibility of knowledge have been 
" raised by the divergent views to which medi- 
tation on physical and metaphysical questions 
leads. This division raises the question: Is it 
at all possible for the human understanding to 
solve these problems?" 1 

From the age of the Greek sophists the 
question has continually recurred, ' How do 
we know the True and the Real? ' As Locke 
says in his Epistle to the Reader, 2 ' It came 
into my thoughts that we took a wrong course, 
and that, before we set ourselves upon in- 
quiries of that nature (metaphysical inquiries) , 
it was necessary to examine our own abilities, 
and see what objects our understandings were 
or were not fitted to deal with." Since Locke's 
time men have become increasingly sensitive 
regarding the final validity of their mental 
activity. The two extreme notes of the octave 
are still struck no doubt, but there is equally 
little doubt that today the fingers insensibly 

1 Paulsen, Einleitung in die Philosophic, 2nd edition, p. 349. 
Quoted by Pringle-Patterson in his article, " Epistemology," 
in the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, edited by J. 
Mark Baldwin. 

2 Quoted by Pringle-Patterson in the foregoing article, 
" Epistemology." 



HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 61 

glide towards and tend to rest upon the middle 
lower tones of agnosticism, bringing forth a 
series of pronouncedly minor chords. 

Be this as it may, the problem of the validity 
of our knowledge has more and more absorbed 
attention, and rightly so. It is a fundamental 
problem. We must know whether we are liv- 
ing in a world of reality or in one of make- 
believe. Take away the hope and confidence 
which the touch of Finality imparts and what 
is left for man but materialism, utilitarianism, 
stoicism, or at best a 'practical" humanita- 
rianism whose very practicality is nullified by 
its blindness ? 

It would seem as if final realities were more 
and more being consigned to the limbo of dis- 
carded human illusions. We are bid to the 
cult of "the Practical." "Practical," if it 
means anything, means, ' capable of achiev- 
ing a useful end." But of what value, pray, is 
the adjective "useful" in defining the word 
' practical," if there is no such thing as 
'end"? Thus this supposedly theoretical 
question becomes a very practical one. In 
fact, one cannot be fundamentally practical 
without answering it. We are especially in- 



62 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

terested in the effect of this answer upon re- 
ligion, for its effect is immediate and direct. 
But its effect is also as directly felt in the 
sphere of ethics and of everyday morality. 
Thus the answer to our " unpractical " ques- 
tion has to do with those secret springs of life 
whence flow happiness and destiny. 

The untrained man is unaware of such diffi- 
culties as these and unhesitatingly trusts his 
senses. He may cry out at times, " I can hardly 
believe my eyes," but he does believe them, 
year in and year out. You remark that he 
assumes their trustworthiness. Perhaps the 
philosopher will have to do the same. Indeed 
one of them says just this. "It is obvious 
that we cannot sit in judgment upon the cog- 
nitive faculties without employing those very 
faculties, and thereby implying their trust- 
worthiness. The validity of knowledge as 
such is an ultimate and inevitable assump- 
tion. . . ." 3 

" Well," retorts the plain man, " if this be 
so, what is the use of all this philosophical 
pother over a question which is not a question 
but an assumption? " " Much use every way," 

3 Pringle-Patterson, op. cit. 



HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 63 

replies the philosopher. Besides possessing 
other values, " its use is, in the first instance, 
polemical, in answer to the challenge of skep- 
ticism, subjectivism, agnosticism, relativism. 
In this regard, it is the province of episte- 
mology to investigate the nature of the cogni- 
tive relation as such, in order to discover its 
essential conditions, and so to determine 
whether the circumstances of human knowl- 
edge are such as to invalidate its claim to be a 
true account of reality. An agnostic relativism 
condemns knowledge because it does not sat- 
isfy certain conditions. By exposing the in- 
herently contradictory nature of the demands 
made, epistemological analysis deprives such 
criticism of its basis, and restores us to the 
original confidence of reason in itself. Till 
skepticism and agnosticism cease from the 
land, this polemic will necessarily continue to 
be prominent in epistemological literature, 
whichever side may win the greater body of 
adherents." 4 

We see, therefore, that it makes a great deal 
of difference to the average man, in the every- 
daynesses of life, what his theory of knowledge 

4 Pringle-Patterson, op. cit. 



64 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

is ; what sort of knowledge-theory is prevalent 
about him; what theory is nearest the actual 
fact. Likewise, in discussing the religious as- 
pect of a philosophy, it is essential to know 
that philosophy's answer to the question of the 
validity of knowledge ; the theory of knowledge 
which it presents. 

In discussing this interesting and basal ele- 
ment of Bergson's thought, we must impose 
strict limits upon the presentation and exami- 
nation of details. 5 Bergson's theory contains 
difficulties whose resolution would require an 
extended consideration. I refer to such prob- 
lems as the nature and function of " pure per- 
ception," and the exact status of the intellect 
in relation to final truth. But the main trend 
of the theory is clear enough and our task is 
merely to indicate that trend and then draw 
inferences in the direction of religion. 
• •••*•• 

5 There are numerous books and articles in which these mat- 
ters are fully presented. Compare, for example: H. Berg- 
son, An Introduction to Metaphysics; H. W. Carr, " Bergson's 
Theory of Knowledge," Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 
(London, 1909. New Series, Vol. IX, pp. 41-60); A. D. 
Lindsay, The Philosophy of Bergson (London, 1911); Muir- 
head, in the Hibbert Journal (July, 1911, IX: 895-907); 
Edouard LeRoy, A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson (New 
York, 1913). 



HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 65 

The three main theories of knowledge which 
had been advanced prior to that of Bergson 
were: that the mind is a tabula rasa on which 
things impress themselves through sensation; 
that the mind transfers its own forms to the 
outer world; that mind and matter go their 
own separate ways, but conform to each other 
according to a pre-established harmony. The 
tendency of the first theory is towards ma- 
terialism. The second theory, in spite of the 
valuable service it has rendered, has been one 
of the main sources of modern agnosticism. 
The third theory begs the whole question and 
answers nothing. 

Now Bergson holds that our theory of 
knowledge must go hand in hand with our 
theory of life; thus the origin of our intel- 
lectual concepts may be traced and their true 
value determined. 

This amounts to saying that theory of knowledge 
and theory of life seem to us inseparable. A theory of 
life that is not accompanied by a criticism of knowl- 
edge is obliged to accept, as they stand, the concepts 
which the understanding puts at its disposal: it can 
but enclose the facts, willing or not, in pre-existing 
frames which it regards as ultimate. It thus obtains 



66 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

a symbolism which is convenient, perhaps even neces- 
sary to positive science, but not a direct vision of its 
object. On the other hand, a theory of knowledge 
which does not replace the intellect in the general 
evolution of life will teach us neither how the frames 
of knowledge have been constructed nor how we can 
enlarge or go beyond them. It is necessary that 
these two inquiries, theory of knowledge and theory 
of life, should join each other, and, by a circular 
process, push each other on unceasingly. 6 

What has just been said makes it clear that 
we must include Bergson's theory of life in 
our present discussion. Let us, therefore, sur- 
vey this theory briefly: All things may be 
traced back to an original, self-sufficient 
" Vital Impetus," 7 whose inner nature is move- 
ment, growth, change, " duration "; whose one 
goal is ever to create more life. Thus the " will 
to live " is dominant in the organic world 
which this Vital Impetus has evolved. Spread- 
ing like a sheaf, the " elan " achieved different 
results in different directions. Matter repre- 
sents the failure of the Vital Impetus to fulfill 
its destiny and may be described as a kind of 

6 Bergson, Creative Evolution. English translation by Mitch- 
ell. Introduction, p. xiii. 

7 This is the translation of " ilan vital " which Bergson him- 
self prefers. 



HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 67 

condensed " elan/' its lifeless residuum. On 
the other hand, highest success has been at- 
tained in the development of the instinct, best 
seen in the hymenoptera, and in the develop- 
ment of the intellect, best seen in man. 

So we come back ... to the idea we started from, 
that of an original impetus of life, passing from one 
generation of germs to the following generation of 
germs through the developed organisms which bridge 
the interval between the generations. This impetus, 
sustained right along the lines of evolution among 
which it gets divided, is the fundamental cause of 
variations, at least of those that are regularly 
passed on, that accumulate and create new species. 
In general, when species have begun to diverge from 
a common stock, they accentuate their divergence 
as they progress in their evolution. Yet, in certain 
definite points, they may evolve identically; in fact, 
they must do so if the hypothesis of a common im- 
petus be accepted. This is just what we shall have 
to show now in a more precise way. . . . 8 

The evolution movement would be a simple one, 
and we should soon have been able to determine its 
direction, if life had described a single course, like 
that of a solid ball shot from a cannon. But it pro- 
ceeds rather like a shell, which suddenly bursts into 

8 This quotation and those immediately following it are taken 
from Bergson's Creative Evolution, pp. 87-88, 98, 135. 



68 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

fragments, which fragments, being themselves shells, 
burst in their turn into fragments destined to burst 
again, and so on for a time incommensurably long. 
We perceive only what is nearest to us, namely, the 
scattered movements of the pulverized explosions. 
From them we have to go back, stage by stage, to 
the original movement. 

When a shell bursts, the particular way it breaks 
is explained both by the explosive force of the pow- 
der it contains and by the resistance of the metal. 
So of the way life breaks into individuals and species. 
It depends, we think, on the two series of causes: 
the resistance life meets from inert matter, and the 
explosive force — due to an unstable balance of 
tendencies — which life bears within itself. 

. . . But the real and profound causes of division 
(in the case of unorganized matter) were those which 
life bore within its bosom. For life is tendency, and 
the essence of a tendency is to develop in the form 
of a sheaf, creating, by its very growth, divergent 
directions among which its impetus is divided. This 
we observe in ourselves, in the evolution of that spe- 
cial tendency which we call our character. Each of 
us, glancing back over his history, will find that his 
child-personality, though indivisible, united in itself 
divers persons, which could remain blended just be- 
cause they were in a nascent state: their indecision, 
so charged with promise, is one of the greatest 
charms of childhood. But these interwoven person- 
alities become incompatible in course of growth. 



HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 69 

and, as each of us can live but one life, a choice must 
perforce be made. We choose in reality without 
ceasing; without ceasing, also, we abandon many 
things. The route we pursue in time is strewn with 
the remains of all that we began to be, of all that we 
might have become. But nature, which has at com- 
mand an incalculable number of lives, is in no wise 
bound to make such sacrifices. She preserves the 
different tendencies that have bifurcated with their 
growth. She creates with them diverging series of 
species that will evolve separately. 

. . . Vegetative torpor, instinct, and intelligence — ■ 
these, then, are the elements that coincided in the 
vital impulsion common to plants and animals, and 
which, in the course of a development in which they 
were made manifest in the most unforeseen forms, 
have been dissociated by the very fact of their 
growth. The cardinal error which, from Aristotle 
onwards, has vitiated most of the philosophies of 
nature, is to see in vegetative, instinctive, and ra- 
tional life, three successive degrees of the develop- 
ment of one and the same tendency, whereas they are 
three divergent directions of an activity which has 
split up as it grew. The difference between them 
is not a difference of intensity, nor, more generally, 
of degree, but of kind. 



So much for Bergson's theory of life. Re- 
calling his statement that " it is necessary that 



70 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

these two inquiries, theory of knowledge and 
theory of life, should join each other, and, by a 
circular process, push each other on unceas- 
ingly," let us now turn to his theory of knowl- 
edge which, as he maintains, is and must be in 
continuous interaction with his theory of life. 
Bergson maintains that instinct and intel- 
lect are both practical in their function; they 
are aimed at securing more life. But they 
differ in that " intellect deals with relationships 
— instinct with things." 9 Also, instinct uses 
organized means to accomplish its end and in- 
tellect uses the unorganized. That is, intellect 
can fabricate tools while instinct has to depend 
upon the " tools " furnished by nature. Thus 
intellect's conquests of nature have been 
greater than those of instinct, but instinct is 
closer to reality. The latter alone has direct 
contact with reality, but, being unintellectual, 
it will not seek Reality as a Whole. It goes 
blindly at a very small part. Intellect, on the 
contrary, has become disinterested enough to 
seek Reality as a Whole, that is, to speculate, 
but it is cut off by its very nature from that 

9 Cf. Albert Steenbergen, Henri Bergson's Intuitive Philoso- 
phie. Jena, 1909. 



HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 71 

direct contact with reality which alone can pro- 
vide the proper means, basis, and material for 
speculation. " Without our intellect we would 
not speculate. The intellect is the source of 
the need for speculation, but not its instru- 
ment. 5 ' 10 

Man retains in intuition the latent power of 
direct contact with reality which instinct pos- 
sesses so intensely in its limited field. But our 
intuition has been oppressed by the ' homo 
faber " in us, whose intellect, turned ever to- 
wards action, has become dominant. With the 
rise of speculative needs we have carried over 
into the sphere of disinterested metaphysics the 
methods of an instrument meant primarily for 
practical action. As LeRoy states the prob- 
lem, 11 " Our intelligence has become utilitarian 
out of long habit and we must first free it 
from this thraldom. Our realizable knowl- 
edge is at every moment partial and limited 
rather than exterior and relative. To progress 
towards absolute knowledge we must extend 
experience, diversify it by science, correct the 
disturbing effect of action, and quicken all the 

10 From Bergson, through J. C. Meredith, " Critical Side of 
Bergson's Philosophy," Westminster Review, February, 1912. 

11 Edouard LeRoy, A New Philosophy : Henri Bergson, 



72 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

results by an effort of sympathy by which we 
feel the inner wealth of the object." 

But it is not only by inner intuition that we 
touch reality. Perception is, in part, an intui- 
tion of the outer world. It is reality, though 
a limited part of it, which the senses give us. 
Hence, to a degree, intellect and science may 
touch reality. But without these intuitive per- 
ceptions the intellect would be a mere logic- 
chopping machine, a mill without grist from 
the real world. As it is, the intellect gives us 
only cinematograph pictures of a reality which 
is always moving faster than it, and always 
escaping it. Even modern mathematics, with 
its marvelous calculations of motion, only re- 
duces the intervals between the " snap-shots." 
The " New Logic " also, which posits change 
and allows for new appearances, cannot catch 
the actual process by which the new appear- 
ances emerge. 12 Thus it is by intuition alone 
that we touch reality, and by intuition is 
meant instinct become self-conscious, a fusion 

12 Professor Edward G. Spaulding, one of the leaders of the 
school of " New Realism," said to me, " Bergson attacks the 
truth-getting ability of science. This is because he identifies 
all logic with Aristotelian logic, which proceeds on the prin- 
ciple of purely additive relationships. He ignores the " new 
logic ' which allows for new appearances." 



HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 73 

between the instinct of the animal and the in- 
tellect of man. 

But our intuitions can find expression only 
through language, and this means concepts. 
Our concepts, however, should be less rigid, 
more fluid, than they have been ; molded more 
nearly on reality. Concepts are really meta- 
phors, for metaphor is " the chosen instrument 
of philosophic thought." This must indeed be 
the case because reality overflows all the cate- 
gories of the intellect. In the main, however, 
the function of the intellect, working through 
concepts, is a very practical thing. Its func- 
tion is " to enumerate the principal possible at- 
titudes of the thing (that is, the object of 
knowledge) towards us, as well as our best 
possible attitude towards it." 13 

Let me add two or three somewhat extended 
quotations from Bergson himself, that his 
theory of knowledge may be more clear to us : 

. . . An intelligent being bears within himself the 
means to transcend his own nature. 

He transcends himself, however, less than he 
wishes, less also than he imagines himself to do. The 
purely formal character of intelligence deprives it 

18 Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 54. 



74 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

of the ballast necessary to enable it to settle itself 
on the objects that are of the most powerful interest 
to speculation. Instinct, on the contrary, has the 
desired materiality, but it is incapable of going so 
far in quest of its object; it does not speculate. 
Here we reach the point that most concerns our 
present inquiry. The difference that we shall now 
proceed to denote between instinct and intelligence is 
what the whole of this analysis was meant to bring 
out. We formulate it thus: There are things that 
intelligence alone is able to seek, but which, by itself 9 
it will never -find. These things instinct alone could 
find; but it will never seek them. 1 * 

Instinct is sympathy. If this sympathy could ex- 
tend its object and also reflect upon itself, it would 
give us the key to vital operations — just as intelli- 
gence, developed and disciplined, guides us into 
matter. For — we cannot too often repeat it — intelli- 
gence and instinct are turned in opposite directions, 
the former towards inert matter, the latter towards 
life. Intelligence, by means of science, which is its 
work, will deliver up to us more and more completely 
the secret of physical operations ; of life it brings us, 
and, moreover, only claims to bring us, a translation 
in terms of inertia. It goes all round life, taking 
from outside the greatest possible number of views 
of it, drawing it into itself instead of entering into 
it. But it is to the very inwardness of life that intui- 
tion leads us — by intuition I mean instinct that has 

14 Bergson's Creative Evolution. Mitchell's translation, p. 151. 



HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 75 

become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of 
reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it 
indefinitely. 15 

In conclusion, we may remark that there is noth- 
ing mysterious in this faculty (the faculty of intui- 
tion). Every one of us has had occasion to exercise 
it to a certain extent. Any one of us, for instance, 
who has attempted literary composition knows that 
when the subject has been studied at length, the ma- 
terials all collected, and the notes all made, something 
more is needed in order to set about the work of com- 
position itself, and that is an often very painful 
effort to place ourselves directly at the heart of the 
subject, and to seek as deeply as possible an impulse, 
after which we need only let ourselves go. This im- 
pulse, once received, starts the mind on a path where 
it rediscovers all the information it had collected, 
and a thousand other details besides ; it develops and 
analyses itself into terms which could be enumerated 
indefinitely. The farther we go, the more terms we 
discover; we shall never say all that could be said, 
and yet, if we turn back suddenly upon the impulse 
that we feel behind us, and try to seize it, it is gone ; 
for it was not a thing, but the direction of a move- 
ment, and though indefinitely extensible, it is in- 
finitely simple. Metaphysical intuition seems to be 
something of the same kind. What corresponds here 
to the documents and notes of literary composition 
is the sum of observations and experience gathered 



15 



Bergson, op. cit., p. 176. 



76 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

together by positive science. For we do not obtain 
an intuition from reality — that is, an intellectual 
sympathy with the most intimate part of it — unless 
we have won its confidence by a long fellowship with 
its superficial manifestations. 16 

• •••••• 

There are several vital religious values which 
this phase of Bergson's thought conserves and 
fosters. In the first place, for those who ac- 
cept this epistemology, there is an end of 
skepticism and agnosticism — of the radical 
sort, I mean. To be sure Carr holds 1T that, 
on the contrary, this view of the intellect must 
itself end in skepticism. He admits that Berg- 
son himself is not a skeptic but says that " he 
(Bergson) states admirably the argument 
which leads to skepticism — a new Hume — ." 
By skepticism Carr means " the view that our 
ideas and beliefs are due to categories that are 
valid only within the sphere of my activity 
and unable to solve the problem raised by that 
activity itself." 

I do not care to argue the prior question. 
Certainly, if Bergson's intuitive foundation 
breaks down, the superstructure of real knowl- 

16 Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 89-91. 
11 H. Wildon Carr, op, cit. 



HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 77 

edge of the Real will fall with it. But our 
thesis is: " Granted the philosophic sub-struc- 
ture, then what ? ' ' The answer must be, without 
a doubt: The "Day View" of life; a feel- 
ing of confidence in our senses, that they can- 
not all be fooled all the time ; a feeling of con- 
fidence in our intuitions, provided they spring 
out of a wide experience with fact and are 
properly tested by fact and reason; in other 
words, a general confidence in ourselves and 
in our ability to get at the heart and meaning 
of life. 

As we look about us, we do indeed realize 
that nature is more than we can see, and that 
even what we see is colored by the memory of 
past experiences, a memory which fastens it- 
self instinctively upon the practical elements 
of the new experience, ignoring the rest. Still, 
our apprehension of things may be taken much 
as the ' common-sense " view indicates, 
' Things are what they seem " — in the main, 
and so far as our knowledge goes. Our knowl- 
edge of matter is not " relative," with the 
Ding-an-Sich of Reality lurking entirely con- 
cealed and forever concealed behind mere ap- 
pearance — a Spencerian " Unknowable "; our 



78 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

knowledge is merely " limited/' which is quite 
another thing. We cut out of the whole small 
sections suited to our practical needs, but 
within the portions thus cut out we come to 
grips with reality itself, limited and also col- 
ored, but nevertheless real. Thus, in our ordi- 
nary external relationships, we are brought 
back into the realm of confidence, to a reality 
which is ultimate, as far as it goes. 

This spirit of confidence touches also those 
intuitions of a more distinctively inward na- 
ture — those reactions of the whole personality 
which yield insight. Under other circum- 
stances we should have to examine in detail the 
claims of these intuitions to validity and cer- 
tainty. Here we need but remark that Berg- 
son teaches that Truth exists, and that the 
intuition can get at it. Differing from the prag- 
matists here as at other points, Bergson does 
not hold that truth is " what works." Neither 

Bergson does not hold that truth is mutable. That 
evolution has produced intellect does not affect the 
theory of the nature of truth. That intellect is a 
product of life activity is different from saying that 
the understanding makes truth or that truth itself 
is a product of the life activity. 



HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 79 

do we ourselves create truth. As Carr says, 
Thus Bergson combats radical skepticism 
and agnosticism by maintaining that the intui- 
tion enables us to grasp truth directly, even 
though only partially. Certainly there are 
practical tests of logic and of fact that may 
be applied, and Bergson recognizes that such 
tests must be applied. He has said most ex- 
plicitly that, " Notwithstanding his high valua- 
tion of intuition, he thought it should always be 
tested by verification; regarding intuition as a 
valuable guideboard, but one that, like other 
guideboards, might point wrong." 18 Never- 
theless, the truth is self-evidencing, in the 
main, and the " witness of the spirit " not only 
must be trusted but can be trusted. In this 
direction, clearly, Bergson is on the side of 
religion. If one grants that the blow has 
landed, then it is inevitably a death blow to the 
worst enemy of religion among modern edu- 
cated classes. He replaces the pale and hard- 
ening features of the agnostic with the joyous 
freshness of the believer. " Ye shall know the 
Truth, and the Truth shall make you free." 

18 This statement was made by Bergson to Mr. Henry Holt 
during Bergson's lecture tour in the United States. 



80 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

Religion cannot subsist on mere hypotheses, 
cut and dried. It thrives only on a profound 
conviction of the reality of its object. Berg- 
sonism is not only compatible with this con- 
viction but directly fosters it. 

But religion needs not only the conviction of 
the reality of its object. It needs also the con- 
viction that the total reality of God is ever be- 
yond the power of man to embrace. In other 
words, religion thrives in the region between 
complete agnosticism and absolute knowledge. 
If we cannot know God at all, we cannot wor- 
ship. If we should know Him all, we would 
not worship. The religious man is a " mero- 
gnostic." He knows " in part," but only in 
part. Beyond his partial knowledge stretch 
the illimitable regions of awe and mystery. 
If he is truly religious he will have within him, 
to a degree at least, 

A sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, 
And the round ocean and the living air 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man — 
A motion and a spirit, that impels 
All thinking beings, all objects of all thought, 
And rolls through all things. 



HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 81 

As we have seen, it is just this sort of knowl- 
edge, real but partial, which Bergson's theory 
offers to us. In this regard, also, it favors the 
growth of that " sense sublime " which is of the 
very essence of religion. 

In one way this theory of knowledge is even 
more favorable to religion than other theories 
which also profess to lead us to final reality. 
The method of approach to reality, according 
to Bergson, is primarily non-intellectual. We 
need not linger at this point over the charge of 
anti-intellectual and anti-scientific bias. Our 
business now is to bring out the fact that Berg- 
son's philosophical approach to reality is pri- 
marily non-intellectual, and that the religious 
approach to reality (God) is also fundamen- 
tally non-intellectual. It is noteworthy that 
religion periodically breaks out against intel- 
lect and against culture, as if it had an in- 
stinctive sense of danger lurking therein. 
Bergson is charged with a similar outbreak, 
and the charge has a measure of basis to it. 
Surely some kinship must exist here. 

The kinship is between the " intuition " of 
Bergson and the " faith " of the religious man. 
They are not to be identified with one another, 



82 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

but they are clearly related. Widen the chan- 
nel of intuition and personalize fundamental 
reality and you have the essence of religious 
faith. Bergson's influence is on the side of a 
faith which is neither pure intellectual belief 
nor yet mere emotional mysticism. The re- 
ligious faith of a Bergsonian would indeed be 
mystical. What religious faith is not more or 
less mystical? But his mysticism would spring 
out of a wealth of fact, would be filled with 
and supported by fact. It is important to 
recognize at this point the continuous and salu- 
tary relationship which, according to Bergson, 
should exist between intuition on the one hand, 
and science and intellect on the other hand. If 
this rapprochement were carried over into the 
realm of religious faith, it might aid religion 
in realizing the happy mean between anti- 
cultural fanaticism and easy-going worldliness 
or dry intellectualism. 

This kinship between intuition and religious 
faith yields still another result. In it one may 
find a philosophical basis for the validity of 
religious knowledge per se. The religious 
sense is not to be subjected to other phases of 
man's conscious life. It does not derive its 



HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 83 

charter from them. Like the conscience, like 
the reason, it, too, is primal, autonomous, direct 
from the hand of God. Religion's contribution 
to man's whole view of life, of present action, 
and of future destiny, must be reckoned with 
as a fact not to be read out of court unless all 
facts are to be read out of court. Like other 
facts of a different kind — facts of conscience, 
facts of reason — the religious fact must be 
tested before its validity can be judged, but 
its potential validity must be admitted as easily 
as the potential validity of any other class of 
facts. 

This conclusion, inevitable upon the Berg- 
sonian basis, removes the veil which hides from 
many the inherent dignity of religion. Veiled 
religion has been; scarred oftentimes by the 
well-calculated blows of her enemies and the 
ill-calculated blows of her friends ; but the veil 
and the scars serve but to emphasize her long 
and continued existence and her compelling 
charm for man. She charms because Reality is 
beneath her features. If, as Bergson allows 
us to infer, she is not inferior to other phases 
of human experience, not eliminable, then by 
her very nature she must be superior to them, 



84 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

for she bears us up into the region of destiny ; 
and one's view of destiny necessarily becomes 
either a pillar of cloud or a pillar of fire, as one 
treads the path through that portion of destiny 
which we call the human life. Is it too much 
to say, then, that religious knowledge is the 
crown of all knowledge, according to Berg- 
sonian implications? 

I shall draw but one more religious inference 
from Bergson's theory of knowledge. This 
will appear positive or negative, favorable or 
unfavorable, according to one's previous re- 
ligious convictions. It has to do with the place 
and nature of creed and dogma. The nature 
and function of dogma are noon-day clear to 
the Bergsonian. Dogmas are intellectual con- 
cepts adopted by a religious organization as its 
basis. The nature of intellect is such that the 
dogmas it formulates cannot give us the abso- 
lute truth. They are not themselves absolute 
and never can be. They are cinematograph 
views of the truth, which always overflows all 
their clear-cut limits. Yet they may, and prob- 
ably always do, contain truth because they 
usually spring out of real intuitions of the 
final truth. Dogmas are therefore necessarily 



HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 85 

metaphorical in nature and, as a matter of fact, 
should be so ; for metaphors are fluid and there- 
fore best adapted for a progressive represen- 
tation of the living and growing reality which 
dogma seeks vainly to catch. 

A too logical and intellectualistic concep- 
tion of dogma has led to several unfortunate 
results. It has created the false pride of a 
supposed and yet impossible achievement. It 
has generated the inquisitorial method and 
spirit. It has hampered and, in certain quar- 
ters, altogether stopped healthy progress. 
And, most unfortunate of all, it has tended to 
take away the emphasis from vital religion and 
to place it upon an external formulation. The 
greater plasticity of dogma, if molded on 
Bergsonian lines, would, perhaps, enable it to 
portray and embody more nearly the life it is 
supposed to represent. 

In addition to this metaphorical phase of 
dogma, Bergson's teaching would suggest an- 
other phase which some might think more prac- 
tical and important. I can best describe it in 
the very words used by Bergson to describe 
our ordinary knowledge. " To think of an 
object," he says, 



86 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

,. . .in the usual meaning of the word " think" — 
is to take one or more of these immobile views of its 
mobility. It consists, in short, in asking from time to 
time where the object is, in order that we may know 
what to do with it. Nothing could be more legitimate, 
moreover, than this method of procedure, so long as 
we are concerned only with a practical knowledge of 
reality. Knowledge, in so far as it is directed to 
practical matters, has only to enumerate the princi- 
pal possible attitudes of the thing towards us, as 
well as our best possible attitude towards it. 



19 



If, in the above quotation, we substitute the 
word " God " for the words " thing ' and 
" object," we shall have a very good descrip- 
tion of this phase of dogma, according to Berg- 
son. Dogmas are practical formulations de- 
signed to enable men to see and to assume 
life's proper relationships. Being practical, 
they must be suited to the age for which they 
are made. Being suited to the age for which 
they are made, they become unsuited to the 
ages for which they were not made and there- 
fore must undergo periodical remodelling. To 
use the words of Bergson, the function of 
dogma " consists, in short, in asking from time 
to time where the object (God) is, in order 

19 Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 54. 



HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 87 

that we may know what to do with it (Him) ." 
With a few changes this sentence could be 
turned into an ideal definition of dogma — a 
definition and a conception of dogma whose 
absence or denial has cost the Church and 
religion more than man can ever calculate; 
a conception whose hearty and intelligent ac- 
ceptance is one of the crying needs of modern 
organized Christianity. All that fair-minded 
liberals ask of the Church is that she should 
ask anew, " from time to time," where God is, 
in order that we may know (anew) " what to 
do with Him." In an historical religion such 
as Christianity, such a creed would include, of 
course, statements regarding Jesus Christ; his 
place in revealing God's attitude towards man; 
his function as the inspirer of " our best pos- 
sible attitude " towards God. 

Finally, just as intuition is dumb without 
conceptual language, according to Bergson, so 
a Bergsonian faith would need dogma as a 
medium of expression and as an aid to self- 
propagation. Language and concepts are 
part and parcel of the social life of man. 
Similarly, if we are to have organized religion, 
we must have dogma. Sabatier's words cor- 



88 



BERGSON AND RELIGION 



rectly portray the position a Bergsonian re- 
ligionist must take regarding the necessity of 
dogma. " Dogma therefore is a phenomenon 
of social life. One cannot conceive either 
dogma without a Church, or of a Church with- 
out dogma. The two notions are correlative 
and inseparable." 20 With Sabatier, also, a 
Bergsonian would hold that dogmas are 
mutable; that they do not " die fatally the mo- 
ment they are touched by criticism " ; that, 
though necessary to religion, they do not 
" form the essence of religion." 21 

To the symbolic view of dogma, therefore, 
which Sabatier also makes fundamental, the 
Bergsonian dogmatist would add a non-sym- 
bolic and very practical element. His creed 
would " enumerate the principal possible atti- 
tudes of God towards us, as well as our best 
possible attitude towards Him " ; and this for 
the very practical purpose of inspiring right 
faith and action. 



Thus Bergson leads us to a clear-cut theory 
of religious knowledge which places prime 

20 A. Sabatier, Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, Seed's 
translation, p. 229. 

21 A. Sabatier, op. cit., p. 244. 



HOW DO WE KNOW REALITY? 89 

emphasis upon faith, religious experience, and 
religious insight, but also insists upon the place 
and value of dogma when properly conceived. 
Though unsatisfying to extreme dogmatists, 
this view is certainly not anti-religious or even 
anti-dogmatic. There are elements in it 
which ought to appeal to the warm-hearted 
representatives of the " evangelical ' type, 
and, as a whole, it will be welcomed by all true 
religionists who long for God, but are weary 
of some of His dogmatic, self-appointed 
emissaries. 



CHAPTER IV 

CREATIVE EVOLUTION 

Widely accepted as the theory of evolution 
has been for years, its thorough-going appli- 
cation to philosophy has usually been apparent 
rather than real. Hegel and Spencer will be 
summoned to bear witness against this state- 
ment and, it will be contended, Haeckel was 
thorough-going enough to satisfy the most ar- 
dent. But Hegel's Absolute remained un- 
moved and immovable while the drama of life 
unfolded. Manifestations moved, changed, 
"evolved"; but reality itself did not move, 
change, or progress. Spencer, on his part, had 
a picture-block idea of the evolutionary proc- 
ess. As Bergson points out, Spencer merely 
brings together the severed parts of a previous 
plan which he himself had sketched and then 
cut up into bits. Spencerian evolution is, fit- 
ting these bits together again according to the 
preconceived plan. Haeckel's scheme rests 
upon enormous assumptions which stagger the 
minds of the unthinking, but fill the minds of 

90 






CREATIVE EVOLUTION 91 

the penetrating with a deep suspicion that the 
real process of life has escaped him. 

In spite of serious defection, the ranks of 
the Hegelian evolutionists still manifest 
strength, manned largely, if not wholly, by 
representatives of the intellectual aristocracy. 
These are the " vested interests " of current 
philosophy. The more patently mechanical 
views of Spencer, however, and especially those 
of Haeckel, have become, in a degenerate form, 
a popular fetich with consequent far-reaching 
influence. It is such conceptions as these 
which vulgar shouters usually mean by the 
word, ' evolution," and their vociferousness 
has often been quite as offensive to evolution- 
ists as to those who reject evolution. Blind, 
mechanical evolutionism has also become a sort 
of general utility man on the stages of the 
scientist, the historian, and the philosopher, 
and by its use they have often deceived 
themselves, as well as others, regarding 
the validity of their explanations and the 
progress of life and thought. But, as Love- 
joy says, 1 ' Evolution and mechanism are 
really profoundly uncongenial notions." 

1 A. O. Lovejoy, " The Metaphysician of the Life Force," New 
York Nation, September 30, 1909. 



92 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

It is no wonder that evolution has become 
the synonym for Anti- Christ in the minds 
of so many sincere religious people. We 
have all suffered in many ways at the hands 
of its more blatant, coarse, and ignorant ex- 
pounders. The common propagandist, who 
parades the names of Comte, Spencer, and 
Haeckel, usually has not one-tenth the rever- 
ence which Comte had, or which Spencer cer- 
tainly had. But religious believers far more 
intelligent than those I had in mind just now 
have been oppressed, if not actually repelled, 
not merely by unworthy representatives of 
these great evolutionary systems, but also by 
the philosophical systems themselves and by 
their evident effect upon the chosen few as well 
as upon the rabble. Thus a great idea, in 
whose good we all share whether we know it or 
not, whether we like it or not — a great idea 
whose essential truth we shall not be able to 
escape — this idea has been made the chief 
point of attack by many theologians. They 
attack it, believing that it is an idea essentially 
subversive of true religion, being deceived by 
the first attempts to formulate the theory, by 
the shallowness and vulgarity of many of its 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 93 

popular forms, or by their own ignorance of 
the significance of the theory itself. 

But it was not left to theologians alone to 
assail these forms of the evolutionary theory. 
Sudden mutations in the development of 
species, and the rapid appearance of entirely 
new forms of life, challenged the thought of 
the biologists. The " Vitalistic School ' : 
arose, with its distrust of the prevailing the- 
ories. It was not a distrust of evolution itself. 
Far from it. It was rather a distrust of that 
carefully articulated system of deterministic 
evolution by which every successive phase of 
life was thought to be a mere unfolding of 
what had previously existed ; a distrust of that 
theory according to which all life is a mere 
collocation of previously existing elements — a 
collocation whose rise could be adequately ex- 
plained, whose meaning fully fathomed, by 
bare analysis, and a careful resolution of the 
whole into its constituent " parts." 

Further, a reaction from the rarefied air 
of idealism, and a plunge into the stream of 
real men and things, gave rise to the pragmatic 
cult of William James and his disciples. They 
maintain that life is not only unfixed and un- 



94 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

determined, but that the truth — reality itself 
— is whatever the changing fortunes of life 
stamp as ' ' workable." Spontaneity and un- 
expectedness are the fundamental character- 
istics of life, not mechanism and a dead cer- 
tainty. The " New Realists," also, 2 hold that 
the universe is wide open. " The degree of 
unity, consistency, or connection subsisting 
among entities is a matter to be empirically 
ascertained. ... In the present stage of our 
knowledge there is a presumption in favor of 
pluralism . . . there is a present presumption 
in favor of the hypothesis that the world as a 
whole is less unified than are certain of its 
parts." 

It is Henri Bergson who has combined the 
Open Door Theory 3 with a thorough-going 
application of the principle of evolution. In 
Time and Free Will he propounds his theory 

2 " The Program and First Platform of Six Realists," in the 
Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, etc., 1910, vii: 393. Re- 
printed as an appendix to The New Realism. Macmillan, New 
York, 1912. 

3 1 do not mean by this to identify Bergson either with the 
pragmatists or with the new realists. They are not identifiable 
by any means, but they are all alike in their opposition to the 
closed door of mechanical evolution and of absolutistic de- 
terminism. 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 95 

of " Duration," and in Creative Evolution he 
devolops the same idea into a distinctly new 
evolutionary theory, in which the universe is 
pictured as the result of the Vital Impetus 
(the elan vital) at the basis of things. Carr 
thus describes it : 4 

. . . reality is change, not something that 
changes, becoming, not something that becomes, 
duration, not something that endures. When we 
place ourselves in this becoming, time appears 
to us as the very life of things, as fundamental real- 

ity- • • • 

A self-sufficing reality is not a timeless reality. 
Instead of the logical or mathematical conception of 
a being eternally given once for all, a being whose 
other is absolute naught, and which is only defin- 
able in terms that involve this supposed idea, we 
have a reality whose essence is time duration. The 
absolute is psychological, not mathematical nor 
logical in its essence. 

The essential connection between Bergson's 
theory of evolution and his idea of " Dura- 
tion " makes it important that we tarry for a 
moment to make the latter conception clear. 
This may best be done in his own words. 

4 H. W. Carr, "Bergson's Theory of Knowledge," Aristote- 
lian Society Proceedings, 1908-1909. New Series, IX: 45, 52. 



96 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

Pure duration is the form which the succession of 
our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself 
live, when it refrains from separating its present 
state from its former states. For this purpose it 
need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation 
or idea ; for then, on the contrary, it would no longer 
endure. Nor need it forget its former states: it is 
enough that, in recalling these states, it does not set 
them alongside its actual state as one point along- 
side another, but forms both the past and the present 
states into an organic whole, as happens when we 
recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into 
one another. 

Might it not be said that, even if these notes suc- 
ceed one another, yet we perceive them in one another, 
and that their totality may be compared to a living 
being whose parts, although distinct, permeate one 
another just because they are so closely connected? 
The proof is that, if we interrupt the rhythm by 
dwelling longer than is right on one note of the tune, 
it is not its exaggerated length, as length, which 
will warn us of our mistake, but the qualitative 
change thereby caused in the whole of the musical 
phrase. 

We can thus conceive of succession without dis- 
tinction, and think of it as a mutual penetration, 
an interconnexion and organization of elements, each 
one of which represents the whole, and cannot be 
distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract 
thought. Such is the account of duration which 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 97 

would be given by a being who was ever the same and 
ever changing, and who had no idea of space. 5 

We should therefore distinguish two forms of mul- 
tiplicity, two very different ways of regarding dura- 
tion, two aspects of conscious life. Below homo- 
geneous duration, which is the extensive symbol of 
true duration, a close psychological analysis dis- 
tinguishes a duration whose heterogeneous moments 
permeate one another ; below the numerical multi- 
plicity of conscious states, a qualitative multiplicity ; 
below the self with well-defined states, a self in which 
succeeding each other means melting into one another 
and forming an organic whole. 6 

These quotations clearly show that, accord- 
ing to Bergson, nothing at all is static, unless 
it is absolutely dead. Everything that lives 
also moves and grows, though it may move in 
two directions, that is, towards the inert or 
towards more life. Duration is this continual 
movement, change, life, progress. Upon this 
substructure rests the Bergsonian theory of 
evolution. Let us summarize it. 7 

5 Bergson, Time and Free Will. English translation by Pog- 
son, pp. 100-101. 

•Bergson, op. cit., p. 128. Cf. also pp. 228-229. 

* Cf. Bergson, Creative Evolution, passim. The following 
summary is largely, in fact almost entirely, in Bergson's own 
language, but I have not used quotation marks because of the 
way in which sentences and phrases have been cast together. 



98 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

The cause of evolution is not adaptation to 
environment, either in the sense which ascribes 
to the environment the controlling power, that 
is, natural selection, or in the sense which 
seeks the explanation of the resulting phe- 
nomena in an effort put forth by the individ- 
ual organisms; nor is evolution due, as the 
finalists say, to an original plan (and Plan- 
ner) which foresees every detail and plans 
each modification with an end in view. In 
all these ideas there is some truth, but the 
real cause is the Vital Impetus, the life 
impulse, which forces itself into matter as an 
arm may be thrust into a mass of iron filings 
which are thus rearranged by the movement. 
The new arrangement of the filings due to new 
movements of the arm is, of course, in a broad 
sense, the result of this vital " Cause," but the 
position and relations of each particular filing 
are not planned in the sense that each par- 
ticular effect corresponds to a particular cause. 

Much less can it be said that the nature and 
structure of the organism, which is propelled 
by the Vital Impetus, are controlled by the 
surrounding conditions, though they are 
doubtless affected by them. The Vital Im- 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 99 

petus, or life impulse, is the controlling factor. 
Thus neither mechanism nor finalism explains 
evolution. The outside conditions limit the 
form and motion of the organism but the driv- 
ing power is from within. This inner life 
power does not foresee or plan the particular 
effects it will produce. In fact it cannot. It 
drives ahead to unforeseen and unforeseeable 
results. The mystery of the universe comes 
from the fact that we want it all created at one 
stroke or the whole of matter to be eternal. 
The root of the difficulty is that we think the 
Absolute can have no place in concrete time. 
Once this prejudice is eradicated, the idea of 
creation becomes more clear, for it is merged 
in that of growth. But, then, we must not 
speak of the universe in its totality, for the 
universe is not made, but is being made con- 
tinually. In vital activity we see a reality 
which is making itself in a reality which is un- 
making itself. 

The life of the body is on the road that 
leads to the life of the spirit. The current of 
life flows on, subdividing itself into individ- 
uals, creating new souls continually which, 
nevertheless, in a certain sense pre-existed, 



100 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

little rills into which the great river of life 
subdivides itself, flowing through the body of 
humanity. A self-sufficient reality is not nec- 
essarily a reality foreign to duration. We 
must strive to see in order to see and no longer 
to see in order to act. Then the Absolute is 
revealed very near us and, in a certain meas- 
ure, in us. It is of a psychological and not of a 
mathematical or of a logical essence. It lives 
with us. It endures. Time is necessary to 
growth, to creation, and we realize that there 
is a progressive growth of the Absolute and, in 
evolution, a continual invention of forms ever 
new. 

Bergson stoutly upholds the validity of the 
general idea of evolution, concluding a discus- 
sion of this point in these words : 

Will it not, therefore, be better to stick to the 
letter of transformism as almost all scientists pro- 
fess it? Apart from the question to what extent the 
theory of evolution describes the facts and to what 
extent it symbolizes them, there is nothing in it that 
is irreconcilable with the doctrines it has claimed to 
replace, even with that of special creations, to which 
it is usually opposed. For this reason we think the 
language of transformism forces itself now upon all 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 101 

philosophy, as the dogmatic affirmation of transform- 
ism forces itself upon science. 8 

Our author holds that the real cause of evo- 
lution lies deeper than any mere adaptation 
to environment, although adaptation has a 
large part to play. He says : 

The truth is that adaptation explains the sinuosi- 
ties of the movement of evolution, but not its general 
directions, still less the movement itself. The road 
that leads to the town is obliged to follow the ups 
and downs of the hills ; it adapts itself to the acci- 
dents of the ground ; but the accidents of the ground 
are not the cause of the road, nor have they given it 
its direction. At every moment they furnish it with 
what is indispensable, namely, the soil on which it 
lies ; but if we consider the whole of the road, instead 
of each of its parts, the accidents of the ground 
appear only as impediments or causes of delay, for 
the road aims simply at the town and would fain be 
a straight line. Just so as regards the evolution of 
life and the circumstances through which it passes — 
with this difference, that evolution does not mark 
out a solitary route, that it takes directions without 
aiming at ends, and that it remains inventive even 
in its adaptations. 9 

The following quotation indicates clearly 

8 Creative Evolution. English translation, pp. 24-26. 

9 Op. cit., p. 102. 



102 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

Bergson's teleological position. This bears so 
directly upon certain phases of the religious 
problem that it should receive most careful 
attention. 

It must not be forgotten that the force which is 
evolving throughout the organized world is a limited 
force, which is always seeking to transcend itself and 
always remains inadequate to the work it would fain 
produce. The errors and puerilities of radical final- 
ism are due to the misapprehension of this point. It 
has represented the whole of the living world as a 
construction analogous to a human work. All the 
pieces have been arranged with a view to the best 
possible functioning of the machine. Each species 
has its reason for existence, its allotted place; and 
all join together, as it were, in a musical concert, 
wherein the seeming discords are really meant to 
bring out a fundamental harmony. In short, all 
goes on in nature as in the works of human genius, 
where, though the result may be trifling, there is at 
least perfect adequacy between the object made and 
the work of making it. 

Nothing of the kind in the evolution of life. 
There, the disproportion is striking between the work 
and the result. From the bottom to the top of the 
organized world we do, indeed, find one great effort ; 
but most often this effort turns short, sometimes 
paralyzed by contrary forces, sometimes diverted 
from what it should do by what it does, absorbed by 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 103 

the form it is engaged in taking, hypnotized by it 
as by a mirror. 10 

Bergson's mysticism, with a touch that al- 
most suggests pantheism, pervades the suc- 
ceeding sentences: 

From our point of view, life appears in its entirety 
as an immense wave which, starting from a center, 
spreads outwards, and which on almost the whole of 
its circumference is stopped and converted into oscil- 
lation: at one single point the obstacle has been 
forced, the impulsion has passed freely. It is this 
freedom that the human form registers. Everywhere 
but in man, consciousness has had to come to a stand ; 
in man alone it has kept on its way. Man, then, con- 
tinues the vital movement indefinitely, although he 
does not draw along with him all that life carries in 
itself. On other lines of evolution there have traveled 
other tendencies which life implied, and of which, 
since everything interpenetrates, man has, doubtless, 
kept something, but of which he has kept only very 
little. It is as if a vague and formless being, whom 
we may call, as we will, Man or Superman, had 
sought to realize himself, and had succeeded only by 
abandoning a part of himself on the way} 1 

After inveighing against the view which 
seeks to make the spiritual life immune from 

10 Op. tit., pp. 126-127. 

11 Op. cit., p. 266. 



104* BERGSON AND RELIGION 

attack by removing it from the world of reality, 
Bergson says of the great questions — freedom, 
the existence of the soul, the supremacy of 
man, and personal survival, 

All these questions will remain unanswered, a 
philosophy of intuition will be a negation of science, 
will be sooner or later swept away by science, if it 
does not resolve to see the life of the body just where 
it really is, on the road that leads to the life of the 
spirit. But it will then no longer have to do with 
definite living beings. Life as a whole, from the 
initial impulsion that thrust it into the world, will 
appear as a wave which rises, and which is opposed 
by the descending movement of matter. On the 
greater part of its surface, at different heights, the 
current is converted by matter into a vortex. At 
one point alone it passes freely, dragging with it the 
obstacle which will weigh on its progress but will not 
stop it. At this point is humanity : it is our privi- 
leged situation. 

On the other hand, this rising wave is conscious- 
ness, and, like all consciousness, it includes potentiali- 
ties without number. . . . Thus souls are continu- 
ally being created, which, nevertheless, in a certain 
sense pre-existed. They are nothing else than the 
little rills into which the great river of life divides 
itself, flowing through the body of humanity. 12 

• ••••• 

12 Op, cit., pp. 268-270. 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 105 

This is Bergson's idea of the ultimate reality 
of the universe, and it is to this idea that we 
must adjust our conception of God if we are 
to be both religious and Bergsonian. Can this 
be done? That is the question. 

It must be remembered that Bergson has 
not yet discussed the idea of God in its re- 
ligious aspects. He has thus far chiefly sought 
to find out the underlying nature and explana- 
tion of biological facts. The moral and re- 
ligious nature of man, his social history and 
arrangements, have not yet been Bergson's 
concern, that is, in his hitherto published 
works. Therefore, I take it, we would be un- 
fair to Bergson himself should we attempt to 
identify the Vital Impetus, as thus far ex- 
pounded, with the God of religion. The ques- 
tion presents itself rather in this form : Is this 
philosophical explanation of the facts of exist- 
ence compatible with belief in the existence 
of a God who would satisfy the cravings of a 
religious heart? And further: Does this philo- 
sophical conception suggest or compel, in one's 
thought of God, any modifications which a 
religious man might consistently accept, 
or even welcome? If so, what are these 



106 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

modifications and what is their practical 
significance? 

Now there are difficulties which the religious 
man feels at once when he understands clearly 
the meaning of this philosophy. Some may 
feel with Corbiere 13 that 

Bergson ascribes to God consciousness and liberty 
but only in a vague way. . . . Life alone is clear 
and God is hardly more than the central hearth of 
the universe's energy. . . . He is entirely imma- 
nent. . . . Bergson's conception leads to pantheism. 

Corbiere admits that Bergson's thought marks 
a reaction against the positivist, the agnostic, 
and the atheist, but holds that his evolutionary 
monism is, in the end, destructive of belief in a 
personal God. Pluralism, and not monism, is 
the correct answer. 

In the minds of many others, Bergson has 
indeed been associated with current forms of 
pluralism. Sir Oliver Lodge, in an article in 
which he discusses Bergson very sympatheti- 
cally, 14 says, 

13 Charles Corbiere, " Le dieu de M. Bergson," Revue de thto- 
logie, 1910. 

14 Sir Oliver Lodge, " Bergson's Intuitive Philosophy Justi- 
fied," Current Literature, April, 1912. 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 107 

I am impressed with two things — first, with the 
reality and activity of powerful but not almighty 
helpers, to whom we owe guidance and management 
and reasonable control: and next, with the fearful 
majesty of still higher aspects of the Universe, in- 
finitely beyond our utmost possibility of thought. 

Sir Oliver seems to find in Bergson support 
for his pluralistic views. 

In a very acute and discriminative article, 
Muirhead says, 15 

[There is no] conclusive ground for identifying M. 
Bergson with an out-and-out pluralism. . . . That 
there is a pluralistic side to Professor Bergson's 
philosophy has been already admitted to the full. He 
is the champion of process. He carries on an incessant 
war against the conception of a " bloc universe." . . . 
If all is this movement, "incessant life, action, lib- 
erty," what room is there for the fixed thoughts and 
purposes that theists attribute to the Creator, or for 
the all-embracing and therefore all-limiting absolute 
of the pantheist? Pluralistic, too, is his conception 
of the two currents within this creative movement. 
Life, we are told, is one movement, matter is the in- 
verse movement; each is simple and individual in 
itself. . . . But we have already seen reason to be 

15 Muirhead, Review of Bergson's work, in the Hibbert Jour- 
rial, July, 1911. 



108 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

on our guard against the mere form of expression in 
so many-sided a writer. ... So far from resting in 
any facile pluralism, he is led by the very depths of 
his own monism to reject the current statements of 
it. His philosophy may be said to be in reality an 
appeal from a shallower to a deeper form of unity. 

It is easy to see the practical dualism of 
Bergson's distinction between mind and mat- 
ter, but it is also perfectly clear that both mind 
and matter owe their existence, according to 
him, to the Vital Impetus. As Muirhead says, 
" Yet there is unity under all." Bergson him- 
self has said, "It is probable that matter and 
consciousness have a common origin. Neither 
can be explained by itself." In my judgment, 
Bergson is more open to the charge of being 
a monistic pantheist than to that of being a 
pluralist. But I hold with Corrance 16 that 
" Bergson's Creator is immanent in nature, but 
not, like the God of pantheism, identical with 
it." 

LeRoy, the modernist defender and inter- 
preter of Bergson, says, referring to Berg- 
son's thought, 



16 



H. C. Corrance, " Bergson's Philosophy and the Idea of 
God," Hibbert Journal, January, 1914. 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 109 

We cannot regard the source of our life otherwise 
than as personal. We cannot regard Him as imper- 
sonal. We seek in Him our personality. God is 
personal in that He is the Source of our personality. 
He is immanent in us but also transcends us and 
also the world. 17 

Bergson himself says, 18 

The considerations set forth in my " Essay on the 
Immediate Facts of Consciousness " (Time and Free 
Will) are intended to bring to light the fact of lib- 
erty; those in Matter and Memory touch upon 
the reality of the spirit; those in Creative Evolu- 
tion present creation as a fact. From all this we 
derive a clear idea of a free and creating God, pro- 
ducing matter and life at once, whose creative effort 
is continued, in a vital direction, by the evolution of 
species and the construction of human personalities. 

The most definite word on this subject, from 
Bergson himself, has been given to us through 
the interview secured by Louis Levine. 19 

This source of life (God) is undoubtedly spiritual. 
Is it personal? Probably. There are not sufficient 
data to answer this question, but Professor Bergson 

17 Cf. Nicholas Balthaser, " Le probleme de dieu d'apres la 
philosophic nouvelle," Revue neo-scolastique, November, 1907, 
and February, 1908. 14:449-489. 15:90-124. 

18 Cf. letter of Bergson in Annals of Christian Philosophy. 
Quoted by LeRoy in A New Philosophy : Henri Bergson. 

19 Louis Levine, in the New York Times, February 22, 1914. 



110 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

is inclined to think that it is personal. It seems to 
him that personality is in the very intention of the 
evolution of life, and that the human personality is 
just one mode in which this intention is realized. 

It is, therefore, very probable that the spiritual 
source of life whence our personality springs should 
be personal in itself. Of course, personal in a dif- 
ferent way, without all those accidental traits which 
in our minds form part of personality and which 
are bound up with the existence of the body. But 
personal in a larger sense of the term — a spiritual 
unity expressing itself in the creative process of evo- 
lution. 

This language is clear, so far as it goes. 
The question is, does it indicate compatibility 
with a theistic view of the world? Kant said, 
' The deist believes that there is a God ; the 
theist that there is a living God." The former 
is purely rational, the latter is connected with 
revelation. The theist thinks of God "as a 
Being who, by intelligence and freedom, as 
originator of the cosmos, contains within Him- 
self the ground of all things. He thinks of 
God as entering into personal relations with 
men; as the Controller of the world whose 
course He directly affects." 20 

20 Cf. Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy, article on 
" Theism." 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 111 

Unless by " intelligence " we must mean de- 
terministic finalism, it may unhesitatingly be 
said that Bergson's position is in general con- 
formity with the description of theism just 
given. Nevertheless, a recent re-reading of 
certain portions of Creative Evolution has 
impressed me afresh with the ready adapta- 
bility of much of Bergson's language to the 
uses of the pantheist. We need but to think 
of some of the paragraphs already quoted: 

Life as a whole, from the initial impulsion that 
thrust it into the world, will appear as a wave which 
rises . . . this rising w T ave is consciousness . . . On 
flows the current, running through human genera- 
tions, subdividing itself into individuals . . . Thus 
souls . . . are nothing else than the little rills into 
which the great river of life divides itself, flowing 
through the body of humanity. 

But one must always remember Muirhead's 
caution about driving Bergson's language too 
hard. We must judge the language of 
Creative Evolution in the light of its ma- 
terial and of its aim. Without the introduc- 
tion of unwarranted theological terminology, 
we could not expect to have in such a work a 
description of the Vital Impetus in terms that 



112 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

would clearly avoid the possibility of pan- 
theistic interpretation. Bergson may event- 
ually come out in behalf of pantheism, but the 
implicates of the principles he has already laid 
down, as well as his own occasional state- 
ments, point in a more theistic direction. 
Again, we must bear in mind the continual 
polemic Bergson wages not only against views 
which are clearly antagonistic to religion but 
also against views which have hitherto been the 
chief props of theistic religion, such as those 
of the radical finalists. This polemic affects 
his language and must be taken into account in 
interpreting his words. 

Still, one must readily grant that Bergson's 
doctrine leads to a mystic faith which is not 
entirely dissimilar to certain aspects of panthe- 
ism; but should we not ask, at the same time, 
whether there is not some truth in pantheism, 
in spite of its defects? No religious thinker 
today should refuse to allow that the panthe- 
istic faiths of the East present phases of truth, 
good, and beauty which have too generally 
escaped occidentals — spiritual emphases which 
we sorely need. One of those religious lessons 
for which the West needs to go to school to 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 113 

the East again, has to do with the central re- 
ligious conception of incarnation. No doubt 
the extreme emphasis of each hemisphere is 
wrong in its extremeness. Certainly the un- 
christian character of so much of our western, 
so-called " Christian," civilization has been due 
in part to a failure to realize, even in theory, 
the exact nature of the Christian revelation. 
It is my confident belief that oriental Chris- 
tians will prove to be not mere recipients of 
the Gospel, but active interpreters of it, and 
that western conceptions of the Christian in- 
carnation will be the richer therefor and truer 
to the original type. At any rate, we have of 
late been learning again from the East and 
modifying our too rigid and unvital concep- 
tions. 

Bergsonism avoids both extremes, the In- 
dian and the Scholastic, and through the doc- 
trine of an Absolute which is not foreign to 
duration may prepare the way for a re-state- 
ment of this central concept of religion. It 
is a fair question, however, whether the neces- 
sary inferences from Bergson's thought in this 
direction, valuable as they may be by way of 
suggestion and criticism, will be acceptable to 



114 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

a Christian believer. Certainly incarnation 
must be conceived of by a Bergsonian as quali- 
tative and not quantitative. His position is 
clearly incompatible with a belief in the com- 
plete, quantitative incarnation of the Abso- 
lute in a single historical being. But there is 
a far more serious difficulty. The consistent 
Bergsonian must ever keep open the possibility 
of future incarnations which would surpass 
those already given. To most Christian be- 
lievers the thought of a future improvement 
upon Christianity is thoroughly repugnant. 

We are evidently face to face with some- 
thing that cuts deep. Still, the case against 
Bergsonian compatibility with Christianity in 
this particular is not as simple as some would 
make it, although this depends, of course, upon 
one's idea of what is essential to Christianity. 
Let us look at the matter from several angles. 
In the first place, this conception of evolution, 
unlike others more dogmatic, does not make 
the passing of present norms inevitable. As 
far as positive prediction goes, one must be 
agnostic about the developments of the future. 
Granted a Bergsonian's acceptance of the 
Christian norm as regards the present, if, while 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 115 

admitting the possibility of a more complete 
norm in the future, he believed in the improb- 
ability of the rise of such a norm, we could 
hardly deny him the name " Christian." 

But would this not be a position incom- 
patible with Bergsonism? Not necessarily. 
The fundamental Bergsonian attitude towards 
the future is not one of the possibility of this 
or the probability of that but, as far as definite 
knowledge and prediction are concerned, one 
of agnosticism. Might not a Bergsonian 
Christian consistently do what we all have to 
do in any case, namely, maintain a faith in the 
finality of the Christian revelation by basing 
it on trust in the character of God as thus far 
revealed to us? But let us examine the most 
extreme case, that of the Bergsonian who, im- 
pressed by the theory that life is " becoming," 
believes in the probability of the rise of new 
and superior religious norms in human life. 
If he gives his present adherence to the Chris- 
tian norm, he should, I suppose, be called a 
Christian ; and if his present norm is based on 
truth, we might conceive of the new norm not 
as excluding the present one but as including 
and expanding it. In such a case, while a new 



116 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

historic center might, and probably would, 
create new names and forms, it would not 
thereby be necessarily incompatible with the 
old. The very principle of Christian growth 
itself might be summoned in support of such 
a position. 21 Our conclusion, then, would be 
that even this extreme position might be con- 
sidered compatible with Christianity, pro- 
vided the norm-to-be supplanted the existing 
norm in an inclusive way. 

• •••••• 

The foregoing discussion raises the whole 
question, hinted at a few moments ago, of in- 
telligence and finalism, and we shall have to 
push our thought further on before we can 
decide whether the Bergsonian conception of 
evolution is compatible with theism, and espe- 
cially with Christian theism. 

According to Bergson, 22 the great Life 
Power, the Vital Impetus, is neither omniscient 

21 " Except a grain of wheat fall into the earth and die, 
it abideth by itself alone; but if it die, it beareth much fruit." 
John 12:24. 

(Consider also the essential compatibility between Chris- 
tianity and the highest achievements of the Hebrew Prophets; 
a compatibility insisted upon, in fact overemphasized, by 
orthodox Christianity from the beginning.). 

22 Cf. Creative Evolution, Chapter I. 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 117 

nor omnipotent. Evolution is not due, as the 
finalists say, to an original plan (and Plan- 
ner) which foresees every detail and plans each 
modification with an end in view. Nor is it 
due to mere adaptation to environment. In 
such ideas there is, of course, some truth, but 
the real cause of evolution is the Vital Impetus. 
To be sure, everything is, in a broad sense, the 
' result " of this vital " cause," but the posi- 
tion and relations of particular things are not 
planned in the sense that each particular effect 
corresponds to a particular cause, or individ- 
ual thought. Thus neither mechanism nor 
finalism explains evolution. The outside con- 
ditions limit the form and the motion of the 
organism, but the driving power is from 
within. This inner Life Power does not fore- 
see or plan the particular effects it will pro- 
duce. In fact, it cannot. It drives ahead to 
unforeseen and unforeseeable results. There 
is a progressive growth of the Absolute itself 
and, in evolution, a continual invention of 
forms ever new. 

God is unceasing life, action, freedom. He had 
no beginning nor can we conceive of His having any 
end. He is not omnipotent ; He is doing the best He 



118 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

can with stubborn substance. He has not created 
the world yet; it is being created under our very 

eyes. 23 

Now there is no doubt that this viewpoint 
is very disturbing to customary religious feel- 
ing; to many it will seem downright blas- 
phemous. If there be no omniscience any- 
where in the world, how can we be sure that 
" all things work together for good/' even " to 
them that love God?" Even if there were 
omniscience, but without omnipotence, how 
could we be sure that the omnisciently wise 
plan could be carried out? We are so per- 
plexed and uncertain ourselves oftentimes, 
not only about the future but also about the 
present, that it has been a great comfort to 
take refuge in the thought that God knows all 
from the beginning and that even all the de- 
tails are in His hands. The remembrance of 
an all-wise and all-powerful Providence has 
undergirded our prayers and made us feel that 
their answer was certain. The thought of the 
unchangeable God, " the same yesterday, to- 
day, and forever," has been a rock of defense; 
the thought of Him as " infinite in His being 

23 Cf. Current Literature, May, 1911. 50:518-520. 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 119 

wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, 
and truth," a source of solace and of strength 
to the humble worshiper conscious of his own 
finiteness, limitation, and weakness. 

If God grows, does He not become too like 
ourselves to command the final homage of the 
heart? If God grows, how can we ever tell 
j ust what He is ? Where are fixity of character, 
permanence of purpose, clearness of aim and 
end ? Is not all final truth and certainty placed 
in jeopardy and our religious pyramid turned 
upon its apex? Such are the fearsome 
thoughts which assail us as we consider this 
phase of Bergson's teaching, and here many 
who might otherwise go with him will depart 
from him. Those who have all their days 
trusted in the omnipotence and omniscience of 
God can at most say: If this be true, at least 
give us time to make our readjustments lest all 
go down in wreck during the transition. 

Let us try to look at the matter calmly and 
honestly. The prevailing theory has not been 
without its difficulties. It lays everything at 
the door of Providence, the good and the bad 
alike. In so doing it has been obliged to es- 
cape from a difficult dilemma. Either God is 



120 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

the author of evil, at the least particeps 
criminis, or He is not omnipotent. The usual 
way of avoiding the dilemma has been to hold 
that God was not the " author " of evil but 
" permitted " it, preserving his omnipotence 
by " overruling " it for His ends. We have 
all seen good come out of evil, or so-called evil, 
and we are, therefore, familiar with the prin- 
ciple. Some have even risen with Paul to the 
point of " rejoicing in tribulation." Nor do I 
mean by that the common malingering of the 
ailing egotist. I mean the rare and easily 
abused, and as easily misunderstood, quality of 
a more than resigned acceptance of pain, hard- 
ship, and sorrow — an even glad acceptance of 
it — not merely in the faith that an inscrutable 
Providence " doeth all things well," but in the 
firm, and often partially verified, conviction 
that " truth heals the wounds which she her- 
self hath made " ; that pain and suffering build 
the path to the higher life, to the divine life 
itself. 

Still, even the most believing sometimes ex- 
perience difficulty in trying to cover existing 
evils with the mantle of a faith in an all-wise 
and all-powerful, not to say all-loving God. 



^CREATIVE EVOLUTION 121 

At such times they would be relieved to be 
able to put aside that faith in favor of one 
which did not ascribe so much to God ; in favor 
of a faith which, at the same time, continued 
to picture Him as the active and successful 
foe of evil, a protagonist who summons men 
to struggle rather than to mere acquiescence. 
I do not say that we should be relieved of the 
dilemma indicated, but I can understand the 
advantage possessed at times by one who could 
be so relieved. 

The belief in a Providence which maps out 
every detail of our life is undoubtedly a be- 
lief full of energizing power and, to many, a 
vital thing. On the other hand, it is matter of 
common observation that it often results in a 
practical fatalism which induces laziness and 
a general irresponsibility necessitating extra 
activity and care on the part of those most 
nearly in contact with the " believers." Gen- 
eral earnestness and initiative, and a sense of 
personal responsibility, are often displayed by 
those who have this faith, but seemingly at 
the expense of their logic. A faith that would 
not easily allow men to make religion an 
excuse for laziness, or a substitute for 



122 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

personal responsibility, would have its ad- 
vantages. 

Then, too, belief in the existence of a divine 
plan, complete in all its details, has constantly 
engendered, as a corollary, faith in certain 
men's ability to acquire secret and relatively 
complete information regarding this plan, 
especially as regards impending events, or even 
those of the far distant future, including de- 
tailed knowledge of the lot and activities of the 
souls of men in the next world. This faith 
needs but its common accompaniment, an " ex- 
aggerated ego," to blossom out into the sur- 
reptitious or openly avowed assumption of 
omniscience by these men. They alone are the 
appointed channels for the dissemination of 
inspired information regarding the details of 
God's future plans. Sow the seed of this un- 
sound theory of revelation in the fertile soil of 
credulity, still so marked a characteristic of 
the mass of religious believers, and there re- 
sults a harvest of unlovely dogmatism, tyran- 
nical domination, crass superstition, weakened 
will-power, and religious deterioration. 

Belief in a Providence which consciously and 
purposely embraces every detail of existence 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 123 

has also widely influenced the prayers of re- 
ligious people, and not always helpfully. Be- 
lieving in such a Providence, worshipers have 
not been content with a reverent acquiescence 
in the divine plan. They often besiege the 
Throne with a mass of petty petitions, seeking 
to overbear the divine will in favor of their de- 
sires. The Christian view of God does not 
banish petitionary prayer, but the kind just 
described is not Christian but pagan. This 
pagan view is nourished by a conception of 
revelation which finds ready rootage in the 
orthodox theory of Providence. This theory, 
also, is partly responsible for the spectacle 
regularly presented in times of war. Oppos- 
ing warriors thank Providence for results that 
are manifestly incompatible, results also which, 
from any aspect, are often entirely abhorrent 
to neutrals who long for the Kingdom of God 
and pray that peace may speedily come, win 
who may. 

I do not mean to imply that the question of 
war prayers is an easy question to answer, nor 
do I think the problem of prayer in general, 
from an intellectual standpoint, a simple one. 
I do not purpose here to discuss this matter in 



124 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

itself. Nor do I need to do so. This phase of 
religion is introduced merely to illustrate my 
main point. It is my strong conviction that 
detailed petitions have their place, and will al- 
ways have their place, in truly religious prayer ; 
but if prayer and religion can be maintained 
on a vital basis and at the same time be freed 
from the narrowness, selfishness, superstition, 
and rank paganism of some forms of petition- 
ary prayer, religion " pure and undefiled " will 
truly be the gainer. Whatever may be said 
against it, the Bergsonian view of Providence 
(and the conception would not be entirely 
lacking) would encourage a kind of prayer 
which would concern itself chiefly, if not solely, 
with the central spirit of life. It certainly 
would not encourage the nagging spirit so 
characteristic of paganism and so evident even 
in the prayers of many Christians. 

Further, the thought of an omnipotent, 
omniscient, and unchanging Being is one that 
leaves us cold. That this feeling has been gen- 
eral is clear from the fact that men have al- 
ways manifested an increased interest in go- 
betweens, mediators, some way of bringing 
God nearer and of making Him more human, 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 125 

whenever the thought of Him has tended to- 
wards these abstract extremes. Who has not 
sometimes had the feeling that it was a little 
unfair for the omnipotent and omniscient God 
to judge human beings created by Him, apart 
from their own choice, in a state of compara- 
tive ignorance and weakness? The immeasur- 
able gap between us and God, so conceived, has 
sometimes interfered with religious commun- 
ion rather than helped it. The history of post- 
exilic Judaism, to quote but one example, is a 
proof of this fact. 

Now Bergson's idea of a growing God — one 
w T ho has His limitations, battles, and even de- 
feats — has its own difficulties to meet and is 
novel to our ordinary thought, but it is an 
idea which we occasionally wish were true. In- 
stead of being a lapse from truly religious 
thinking, it may possibly be on the road to new 
truth. Mayhap the loss of grandeur (though 
we must not think that God, thus conceived, 
would be without power and grandeur, or 
without the elements of awe and mystery) 
might be offset by a greater sense of sympathy, 
companionship, and cooperation. God would 
actually need our help and our help would 



126 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

count vitally; the Christian thought that " we 
are co-workers with God " would then exist in 
fact and not merely in name. Yet the last 
control would remain with Him and, while He 
would not be all-powerful, He would be the 
most powerful — powerful enough. Would 
such a conception harm religion, or would it 
help it? 

All these offsets make us see that we can- 
not cavalierly dismiss the possibility of a vital 
religious faith being maintained upon this 
Bergsonian basis. But still the lack of plan 
and purpose remains to plague us. How can 
we think of God as God at all if He does not 
know what the end is? The interest so many 
of us have in the omnipotence and the omnis- 
cience of God is due to a very natural longing 
for stability in life. Our knowledge is limited 
and often faulty. We are painfully aware of 
our impotence in the face of many an obstacle, 
in the face of evil, pain, disease, and death. 
We seek a faith which will enable us to put our 
feet upon a rock. To many, if not to most, 
that rock has been the omnipotence and the 
omniscience of God. He knows even if we do 
not know. He can accomplish even if we can- 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 127 

not accomplish. Take away this rock and we 
shall be plunged into the ever-moving waves 
of uncertainty and aimless flux. The waves 
may ebb or they may flow. It does not mat- 
ter much. They do not, in either case, bear us 
any whither. 

Is this true? If so, then we must dismiss 
Bergson from the ranks of those who are on 
the side of religion. Certainly, if Bergson en- 
tirely eliminated the teleological element from 
life, it would be impossible for us to hold that 
his thought is compatible with religion. But 
he states clearly that he does not do so. He 
does not deny the truth of finalism, only of a 
certain kind of finalism. To be sure, the kind 
of finalism which he denies is that which is cur- 
rent among us, that which makes every detail 
a part of the pre-arranged divine plan or, con- 
versely, subsumes every detail under the goal 
to be reached. Both of these, Bergson says, 
are the same scheme, the one being merely the 
inverse of the other. They are both mechani- 
cal, he holds ; indeed they are contrary to fact 
and involved in great difficulties both theo- 
retical and practical. 

But, contrary to common opinion of him, 



128 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

Bergson does not put mere flux in the place of 
these two discarded theories. He says, 

... we try on the evolutionary progress the two 
ready-made garments that our understanding puts 
at our disposal, mechanism and finality; we show 
that they do not fit, neither the one nor the other, 
but that one of them (finality) might be recut and 
resewn, and in this new form fit less badly than the 
other. 24 

Yet finalism is not, like mechanism, a doctrine with 
fixed rigid outlines. It admits of as many inflections 
as we like. The mechanistic philosophy is to be 
taken or left: it must be left if the least grain of 
dust, by straying from the path foreseen by me- 
chanics, should show the slightest trace of sponta- 
neity. The doctrine of final causes, on the contrary, 
will never be definitely refuted. If one form of it 
be put aside, it will take another. Its principle, 
which is essentially psychological, is very flexible. 
It is so extensible, and thereby so comprehensive, 
that one accepts something of it as soon as one re- 
jects pure mechanism. The theory we shall put for- 
ward . . . will therefore necessarily partake of 
finalism to a certain extent. 25 

Radical as our own theory may appear, finality is 
external or it is nothing at all. 

24 Cf. Creative Evolution. English translation, Introduction, 
p. xiv. 

25 Op. cit., p. 40. 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 129 

Consider the most complex and the most harmo- 
nious organism. All the elements, we are told, con- 
spire for the greatest good of the whole. Very well, 
but let us not forget that each of the elements may 
itself be an organism in certain cases, and that in 
subordinating the existence of this small organism 
to the life of the great one we accept the principle 
of an external finality. The idea of a finality that is 
always internal is, therefore, a self-destructive no- 
tion. 26 

Such is the philosophy of life to which we are lead- 
ing up. It claims to transcend both mechanism and 
finalism ; but, as we announced at the beginning, it is 
nearer the second doctrine than the first. . . . Like 
radical finalism, although in a vaguer form, our phi- 
losophy represents the organized world as a harmoni- 
ous whole. But this harmony is far from being as 
perfect as it has been claimed to be. . . . Harmony, 
therefore, does not exist in fact ; it exists rather in 
principle ; I mean that the original impetus is a com- 
mon impetus, and the higher we ascend the stream of 
life the more do diverse tendencies appear complemen- 
tary to each other. ... It would be futile to try to as- 
sign to life an end, in the human sense of the word. To 
speak of an end is to think of a pre-existing model 
w T hich has only to be realized. It is to suppose, there- 
fore, that all is given, and that the future can be 
read in the present. It is to believe that life, in its 
movement and in its entirety, goes to work like our 

26 Op. cit., p. 41. 



130 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

intellect, which is only a motionless and fragmentary 
view of life^ and which naturally takes its stand out- 
side of time. Life, on the contrary, progresses and 
endures in time. Of course, when once the road has 
been traveled, we can glance over it, mark its direc- 
tion, note this in psychological terms, and speak as 
if there had been pursuit of an end. 27 

These quotations are, I think, fairly rep- 
resentative of Bergson's position in this mat- 
ter. Regarding that position Corrance makes 
the following comment : 28 

It has been said that Bergson's view of freedom 
destroys the belief in all finalism whatever. This is 
not so. It is true that his view does preclude any 
finalist scheme which is an absolute forecast of re- 
sults. . . . His system as a whole is far more a vivid 
and original apologetic for theism than a criticism 
of the grounds on which it has previously been main- 
tained. . . . The popular mind contains all the ele- 
ments of philosophy in confuso, as is necessarily the 
case considering that the great realities of experi- 
ence, which is the only sure ground of philosophy, 
are the same for all. Therefore, it contains and 
recognizes the element of change as well as abiding- 
ness. There can be little doubt, however, that the 

27 Op. cit., pp. 50-51. 

28 H. C. Corrance, " Bergson's Philosophy and the Idea of 
God," Hibbert Journal, January, 1914. 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 131 

latter tendency has been exaggerated through Pla- 
tonic and Christian idealism sinking down, in the 
course of many generations, into the general con- 
sciousness by means of popular teaching and hymns. 
. . . Besides, it has been identified with the moral 
ideals of Christianity, with all that is implied by 
religious and moral sentiment, which gives it great 
strength and prestige. . . . 

Yet, the strong, instinctive desire in mankind for 
stability and permanence must have some cause and 
seek some satisfaction. Surely this will be found, if 
Bergson 5 s contentions are right, no longer in static 
concepts, but in the deep and abiding sense of the 
identity and permanence of personality. 

Bergson speaks of " tendency " in life, and 
even of " intention." The Vital Impetus is de- 
scribed as seeming to have the " intention " of 
developing spiritual life, personality, man. 
Bergson tells us that we can at least fathom 
this tendency, or intention, as far as it has al- 
ready gone. It has been beyond the scope of 
his work, hitherto, to discuss such things in de- 
tail. He expects to do so in time. When he 
does, he will doubtless use not only biology, 
but also history in all of its phases. From the 
varied past of nature and of man he will prob- 
ably form an estimate of the character of the 



132 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

great, primal Force — that is, of God. This 
estimate could then form a basis for a forecast 
regarding the probable future, a future con- 
sistent with the character of such a Force, such 
a God. That future could not be known in 
detail, but its general nature and trend might 
be forecasted from the past so that faith, in 
adjusting itself to the character of God, could 
adjust itself definitely to the future as well, 
carrying action with it. The future would not 
be inconsistent with the past, but still would 
differ from it. As a matter of fact, is not this 
exactly what we are now obliged to do, what- 
ever our theory? 

In other words, God might be subject to 
growth and change and still be the ground of 
stability and permanence. He might change 
without being changeable. There would still 
be, in spite of change and growth, a perma- 
nence and identity of personality and of char- 
acter which could attract the faith and trust of 
the religious worshiper without necessarily in- 
volving the postulates of omniscience and 
omnipotence. As Lyman Abbott says, 2 

29 Lyman Abbott, " Bergson, the Philosopher of Progress," 
The Outlook, February 22, 1913. 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 133 

Identity of personality and stability of character 
do not mean unchangeability. God has not created 
the world. He is creating it. What is the End? 
There is no end. " Eternal Life," "Everlasting 
Life," mean eternal growth. Against Bergson are 
scientific and theological fatalism. The latter as- 
sumes that God once formed a completed plan of life. 
Both agree in a thing which creates and things which 
are created. This creating thing is not a living 
God. 

According to this view, then, there is a sense 
in which God may be thought of as changing 
and growing, and yet remaining " the same 
yesterday, today, and forever." As Muirhead 
remarks : 30 

There is unity of direction in the creative impulse, 
even if no definable end. He (Bergson) insists on 
the inexhaustibleness and, with it, the unsearchable- 
ness of the riches of creative life ; but this is not lack 
of intelligible direction, much less essential vacilla- 
tion or ambiguity. 

Therefore, in spite of a hesitancy which, in- 
deed, may be due to the unearned increment 
of mere custom, we may safely conclude that 
Bergson's philosophy is generally compatible 

80 Muirhead, in the Hibbert Journal, July, 1911. 



134 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

with theism; that it avoids some of the re- 
ligious dilemmas favored by other systems; 
that it has some distinct advantages of its own 
in relation to religion. 

• •••••• 

But one naturally raises the question: Is 
Bergsonism compatible with Christian theism? 
The important point here is, whether any limi- 
tation of knowledge and power in God would 
be compatible with the Christian idea of God. 
And by the Christian idea of God I mean that 
idea which emerges, crystal clear, from the 
teaching of Christ himself ; not the more meta- 
physical idea elaborated by the Church in her 
historic creeds. 

An adequate discussion of this matter would 
have to consider carefully the content of 
Jesus' special name for God — " Father." It 
is easy to see its chief meanings, however. It 
emphasizes love, and yet a love which involves 
the sternness, hardness, and suffering inescap- 
able in the practice of righteousness. It em- 
phasizes, too, the nearness of God and the 
directness of His spiritual relationship with 
man. The " Father " has a purpose and a plan 
which Jesus describes under the title, ' The 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 135 

Kingdom of Heaven." A noteworthy feature 
of Jesus' references to the Kingdom is a re- 
serve regarding details, when it is a question 
of future developments. " No one knoweth," 
is his caution to his interlocutors. Those nota- 
ble sections of Jesus' reported teaching regard- 
ing the future, in which we do find no little 
detail, are seriously open to question regard- 
ing their genuineness, at least as they now 
stand. They seem to contradict his teaching 
and practice elsewhere and are also the very 
phase of his teaching whose report would most 
easily be affected by current ideas among the 
early Christians in the direction of Jewish 
eschatology. But let us allow these teachings 
to stand as they are. Even so they do not 
vitally affect the main issue. Certainly, ac- 
cording to Jesus, the main thing is not the 
knowledge of, or even the existence of, a fully 
detailed plan for the future. His thought is 
mostly busy elsewhere. Consequently we do 
not find a predominant emphasis in Jesus' 
teaching upon the omniscience and omnipo- 
tence of God. To be sure, he says that " the 
Father knoweth," but, this statement to the 
contrary, it is fair to say that, in Jesus' teach- 



136 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

ing, the certainty of the future of " the King- 
dom ' is grounded in the character of the 
" Father." Undoubtedly he did accept and 
teach an omnipotence and omniscience of God, 
as for instance, where he says, " With God all 
things are possible." This fact, however, does 
not settle our present question, which is pri- 
marily metaphysical. Apart from the diverse 
content of the terms, then and now, any such 
dogma in Jesus' teaching would be religious 
rather than metaphysical. Indeed I see no 
reason why a Bergsonian also could not 
consistently express himself religiously in 
the language of omniscience and omnipo- 
tence. 

The decision in this matter depends, nat- 
urally, upon one's view of the essence of 
Christianity, and particularly upon one's 
conception of Christ. If we accept the 
foregoing sketch of Christian teaching, I 
do not see that we shall find essential 
incompatibility between it and an idea of God 
based upon Bergson's conception of the Vital 
Impetus. I do not contend that Bergson is 
right. Nor do I say that his philosophical posi- 
tion is more favorable to religion than other 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 137 

philosophical systems are. The main point 
that we have been seeking to determine is, 
whether Bergson's doctrine of evolution is 
compatible with religion, with theism in gen- 
eral. We have decided that it is so. In addi- 
tion, I venture the opinion that it is also 
compatible with Christian theism; though 
not compatible, of course, with all that goes 
under the name of Christian theism. 

Perhaps the best test would be to hold in 
mind, as vividly as possible, a conception of 
God which conforms to the Bergsonian posi- 
tion. Then repeat slowly the petitions of the 
' Lord's Prayer, 55 and note whether there 
arises any feeling of incongruity between the 
petitions of the prayer and the character of 
God so conceived. In order to make the test 
more clear and concrete, I shall reproduce here 
the words of the familiar prayer. 31 

Our Father who art in heaven, 

Hallowed be thy name. 

Thy kingdom come. 

Thy will be done, 

As in heaven, so on earth. 

16,1 Cf. Matt. 6:9-15. American Revised Version. Cf. also 
Luke 11:2-4. I have given the more inclusive form of the 
prayer, which is the one most commonly used. 



138 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

Give us this day our daily bread. 

And forgive us our debts, 

As we also have forgiven our debtors. 

And bring us not into temptation, 

But deliver us from the evil one, 

For thine is the kingdom, and the power, 

And the glory. Amen. 

Try sincerely to enter into the original mean- 
ing and spirit of this sublime prayer, a difficult 
task even for one who may fortunately com- 
bine a devout spirit with deep historical ap- 
preciation; then place the impression along- 
side the Bergsonian conception of God. I do 
not think that a feeling of incongruity will 
necessarily arise. If such a feeling does not 
arise, the conclusion follows that a Bergson- 
ian may consistently be not only a theist but 
also a Christian theist. Do not mistake my 
meaning. Bergson does not present us with 
a theistic position, much less with a Christian 
position. The contention is merely that he 
gives to those who may wish it a philosophical 
basis which is compatible with theism ; and with 
Christianity also, at least as regards the point 
now under consideration. 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 139 

Bergson's conception of evolution has, in 
my judgment, a peculiarly helpful suggestive- 
ness when brought into connection with the 
idea of development in religion, and with the 
problems of comparative religion. It is not 
philosophy and academic historical study alone 
which have banished from informed minds the 
thought of a mutual and complete exclusive- 
ness between religions. The direct experience 
of the progressive missionary, whose sym- 
pathy and practical aims have led him to open 
his own eyes and those of others as well, sup- 
ports in the strongest fashion the contention 
that there is a " family of religions. 55 But, of 
course, problems have thereby been multiplied. 
What do we now mean by " revelation 55 and 
"salvation 55 ? What should be the goal of 
our missionary work, the claims of essential 
Christianity upon our plans for propaganda? 
What right have we to hold to any essential 
distinction between " revealed 55 Hebraism- 
Christianity and unrevealed "heathenism 55 ? 
Even if one religion is not " as good as an- 
other, 55 is there not such a thing as religious 
comity by which the value and legitimacy of 
each religion in its own habitat may be recog- 



140 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

nized and respected, even to the extent of non- 
interference and the abandonment of all mis- 
sionary work? Will not a God worthy the 
name know and call His own in His own way? 
These questions are pressed upon us insistently 
today. On both practical and theoretical 
grounds, they cry out for answer. Does Berg- 
son give us any help? 

Whatever may be said of other evolutionary 
systems, it cannot be said of the Bergsonian 
idea that it is unfavorable to practical religion 
or inconsistent with the facts of comparative 
religion now so well known. The Spencerian 
system, and others similar to it, tended to re- 
duce religion and the development of religion 
to factors of a non-religious nature. The 
Hegelian philosophy pictured a fictitious de- 
velopment which overrode facts and ended by 
reducing religion to an idea. On the other 
hand, recall to mind Bergson's illustration of 
the process of evolution by means of his well- 
known sheaf figure, or again, by the figure of 
a succession of explosive shells. These illustra- 
tions indicate clearly the striking congruity be- 
tween his theory and the facts of religious de- 
velopment. Let us follow up the shell figure 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 141 

a little more in detail. In spite of its destruc- 
tive associations it will serve us well. Out of 
the original Vital Impetus, the ground of all 
and itself a spiritual explosive, comes a burst 
of spiritual explosives each one of which, ex- 
ploding in turn, produces a new group of 
bursting units ; and so on, in an infinite series. 
Not all of these explosive units explode, and, 
for those which do not explode, further life, 
development, and usefulness are past. Others 
produce more numerous and more far-reaching 
results than their neighbors so that it is pos- 
sible for us now, by tracing the history of the 
explosions, to determine that here rather than 
there, along this line of development rather 
than that, the greatest amount of the original 
propulsion has gone, producing in its train the 
greatest development, the greatest promise. 
By tracing any pair of explosive tracks one 
may discover similarities and differences. 
They differ in the amount of original explosive 
power and in the kind and amount of deflecting 
opposition they have had to meet in their re- 
spective environments. They agree in the 
kind of explosive even where the amount is 
very diverse; and they agree in having the 



142 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

same origin. If one is not a mere dilettante, 
but is truly interested in determining the exist- 
ence of the explosive power in question and in 
making practical use of it, common sense 
would dictate special attention to and primary 
use of the main explosive track. 

Need I draw the moral or adorn the tale? 
There is truth in all religions which are alive; 
which still burst, even though languidly, with 
their inherited charge. All go back to the same 
original Source and in this fact they find what- 
ever unity they may possess. It is, however, 
not only possible but, in the nature of things, 
very likely that a few lines of explosive energy 
will stand out — the great ethnic faiths — and, 
among these few, one which may be adjudged 
supreme — may we say, Christianity? The 
tolerant or, rather, the brotherly attitude 
necessitated by this recognition of kinship with 
other religions will not diminish the sense of 
superiority arising from greater accomplish- 
ment. Revelation is here rather than there, 
but it is not exclusively here and totally absent 
there. It is the more versus the less. The be- 
ginnings of salvation, also, may be made in 
one or another of the less vigorous lines of re- 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 143 

ligious evolution, but progress towards com- 
plete salvation, however that may be conceived, 
must follow the main trail — shall we say the 
trail blazed by Christian explosives? Is not 
this a basis good enough for a lifetime of mis- 
sionary work? It does not predict the future 
in detail, and thus it makes large drafts upon 
our faith; but religion is supposed to do that, 
is it not? 

Here again we meet the bogey of future un- 
certainty. As if we did not meet it every- 
where in life. Inability to foretell the future 
lies against religion no more than against any 
other human activity. A faith that there is a 
future, be it what it may in detail, is enough 
to satisfy one religion or another ; a faith that 
the future is connected " in principle ' with 
the present of what we call the Christian life, 
should be enough to satisfy the Christian. In- 
deed, the greatest prophets of the Hebrew- 
Christian development have always been com- 
paratively reticent about the future. They 
speak much of the future, to be sure, but in 
general terms ; they believe in the future, they 
work for it, they connect its life-to-be with the 
life of the present; but the details are either 



144 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

vague or obscure, or they are left where they 
really belong, to the future itself. Jesus' con- 
trolling attitude in this respect is indicated by 
the words he himself spoke, referring to this 
very matter, " No man knoweth the day or the 
hour." 

• •••••• 

Finally, a word should be added regarding 
the bearing of Bergson's conception of evo- 
lution upon the idea of the soul. Since the ad- 
vent of the so-called " psychology without a 
soul," we have had so much trouble in believ- 
ing that we had a soul at all that we have 
usually neglected the further possibilities of 
the case. Whether the soul grows and pro- 
gresses, or remains static in the permanence of 
its original nature, is of minor consequence so 
long as we are fearful for, or doubtful of, its 
very existence. The recent vitalistic trend, and 
other similar tendencies, have had their effect, 
however, and what McDougall 32 calls ' an- 
imism " is again stoutly defended. McDougall 
means by " animism " belief in the existence 
within us of a " soul " which is not reducible 
to matter or to mechanism. He says — and 

92 William McDougall, Mind and Body, London, 1911. 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 145 

rightly, I think — that religion depends upon 
the truth of some form of this " animistic " 
position. 

This is, in general, just the position which 
Bergson holds. For him the soul is a reality 
and cannot be reduced to terms of matter and 
motion. But what I wish to make clear at 
this point is that the " soul," according to 
Bergson, shares in the creative evolution of 
which God is the center and source. The soul 
also creates. It grows. It is being made and 
remade continually. And yet it persists, it 
' endures," and (probably) will endure be- 
yond the existence of its bodily shell. 33 

There are vital religious and ethical values 
in this doctrine of the soul. We are building 
our own souls all the time. Each one of us has 
a part in his own creation. Nothing is unim- 
portant. While the mechanical views of cer- 
tain psychologists, as well as the crude lit- 
eralistic views of certain theologians, are 
untenable, it is still true in a very real sense 
that a man must give account for every 

33 The basic discussion on which these conclusions rest is to 
be found in Bergson's Matter and Memory, passim. Com- 
pare, for example, pp. 195-197 in the English translation. Cf. 
also, Creative Evolution, pp. 268-271. 



146 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

thought, word, and deed ; that none of them is 
essentially forgotten or lost; the " pure mem- 
ory," the soul, the character, preserves them 
all. The development of the soul may, and 
therefore should, be fostered by a conscious 
and vital relationship between the individual 
and its source, namely, God — the religious re- 
lationship. The individual may and should 
feel himself at one with his Creator in the task 
of producing a " more abounding life," and in 
overcoming the obstacles which bar this, the 
only true progress. The task is one of over- 
coming the ever present tendency towards ma- 
teriality and inertness, and includes war 
against outside foes as well as against the foes 
that reside within the house of the soul itself. 
....... 

Bergson's thorough-going idea of evolution 
cuts both ways. It contains religious and 
ethical values which are stimulating and vital. 
On the other hand, it cuts across some of the 
dominant religious conceptions of the past and 
present. There are those who will decide 
against the philosophy solely because of its 
drastic religious implicates. They should not 
be unwilling, however, to recognize its pos- 



CREATIVE EVOLUTION 147 

sible religious value for others. Even those 
who are convinced of the essential weakness of 
the philosophy in itself, will have to grant the 
possibility of maintaining a religious and even 
a Christian faith in accord with its postulates. 
Still others, religiously or philosophically dis- 
contented with existing systems, may find here 
a satisfying basis for their religious thought. 
At any rate, our final answer is that the Berg- 
sonian theory of evolution is compatible with 
religion and with a Christian faith. 



CHAPTER V 

INTUITION AND THE PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 

The primacy of spiritual energy in the uni- 
verse was not seriously questioned among men 
until the nineteenth century began to mani- 
fest a new emphasis in thought. To be sure, 
the daily behavior of man has always registered 
the close and inescapable connection existing 
between human life and material things. But 
in theory, at least, both the masses and the 
classes, a few notable exceptions apart, ac- 
cepted as basic facts the superiority of the 
psychic over the material and the non-deriva- 
bility of the inner life from any material cause. 
The existence of God as an independent spirit- 
ual reality; the real and distinct existence of 
the individual soul; the primacy, in the uni- 
verse, of God and of the soul; these things 
were not fundamentally doubted by many. 

The nineteenth century, however, was 
marked by the enthronement of law as its god ; 
the law of the uniformity of nature, of the con- 

148 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 149 

servation of energy, of the indestructibility of 
matter, of evolution. Under the rigorous and 
vigorous pressure of a scientific ideal, enthu- 
siastically held and unremittingly applied, 
everything could be explained. Everything 
would be explained when we knew enough. 
By " explanation " was meant the tracing out 
of proximate and remote causes in nature, or 
in history, these causes constituting the " de- 
termining " causes of the things thus supposed 
to be " explained." 

The zeal and effectiveness with which this 
scientific determinism was taken up and ap- 
plied exerted an immense influence upon phi- 
losophy, upon men's fundamental views of life. 
Widespread doubt and disbelief arose regard- 
ing the existence and worth of spiritual real- 
ities independent of and underivable from ma- 
terial elements. Champions of idealistic and 
of specifically religious views of life attempted 
to come to honorable and satisfactory terms 
with the new tendency, seeking to harmonize 
the situation by accepting a deterministic proc- 
ess, but interpreting it in an idealistic way. 

Towards the end of the century, however, 
breaks began to appear in the iron ring of de- 



150 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

terminism encircling human life. These 
breaks were caused by blows delivered from 
various angles and by different kinds of ham- 
mer-wielders. Among them were vitalistic 
biologists, pragmatic philosophers, and those 
psychologists who believed in and applied the 
doctrine of the subconscious self. The con- 
viction grew that we must draw a clearer line 
of demarcation between organic and inor- 
ganic science; between the physical and the 
social sciences. It was seen with increasing 
clearness that determinism has its limits and 
that deterministic theories must be made to 
keep their place. 

• •••••• 

The outstanding protagonist of this more 
recent viewpoint is assuredly Henri Bergson. 
He represents primarily just this spontaneous 
reaction against extreme scientific and philo- 
sophical intellectualism. Years ago he came to 
feel that the exaltation of determinism had, in 
opposition to many stubborn facts, reduced 
free-will to an illusion, and spiritual activity 
to a mere puppet-show. 

This revulsion of feeling on Bergson's 
part was due largely to his biological studies. 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 151 

He saw that, in the formation of philosophical 
systems, the physical and the mathematical sci- 
ences had always played the dominant role. 
His thesis, on the other hand, was that life 
would be better understood by approaching 
it through the sciences of life rather than 
through the sciences whose subject-matter is 
inorganic, or which rest on pure logic. Thus 
his philosophy, up to the present, rests upon 
biology and psychology rather than upon 
physics and mathematics as, for example, was 
the case with Kant. The result has been his 
exaltation of intuition, free-will, and the 
primacy of spiritual force. 
As Rene Gillouin says: 

Bergson holds that we live in the Absolute, 
whether by thought or by intuition. In its own do- 
main, matter, science touches the Absolute. In its 
own domain, life, intuition touches the Absolute. 
Determinism is an excellent method, within certain 
limits. It has been extended beyond its proper limits 
and has been made ruinous by being set up as a 
fundamental doctrine. . . . Bergson ends with a 
gnosticism at once new and traditional — new in its 
means and methods, traditional in its ambitions, for 
the common ambition of philosophers has been to 
transcend the conditions of human life. 



152 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

Bergson himself says: 

The reasons that determine us are determining 
only when the act is accomplished — the creation and 
the free-will are in the process by which these reasons 
have become determining. 1 

• •••••• 

Strange as it may seem to the casual reader 
of Bergson, he has been charged with ma- 
terialistic tendencies. These, of course, must 
be unconscious tendencies, for Bergson's own 
language is explicit enough. It is maintained 
that one center of this unconscious material- 
ism is his theory of " pure perception." This 
is the theory by which, in picturing the build- 
ing up of conscious life, he brings, or tries 
to bring;, mind and matter together. It is 
held that the process Bergson here postulates 
leads straight to a materialistic explanation 
of mental phenomena. 2 

Bergson admits gladly the important part 
the material universe plays in the development 
of consciousness, but I can not see in his 
theory of " pure perception " any suspicious 
trace of a materialistic view of the origin of 

1 H. Bergson, in an article entitled, " Liberty," in Reports 
of the French Philosophical Society. 
3 Cf. Bergson's Matter and Memory. 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 153 

consciousness. Besides this there are weighty 
considerations which fall on the other side of 
the balance. 

Karl Bornhausen, who has given us one of 
the sanest and most illuminating of the many 
discussions brought forth by Bergson's phi- 
losophy, makes this charge clearly and ex- 
plicitly. 3 On religious grounds he is sym- 
pathetic with much that Bergson says, and yet 
he voices a warning which has to do with a 
concealed materialism. 

Bornhausen says: " This philosophy is sig- 
nificant for the grounding of religion, for re- 
ligion represents in a special way that phase 
of life which is accessible to intuition alone." 
He quotes Bergson's answer to a question 
put by Frederic Charpin: " Religion is a 
simple, unique element of life, and will not 
disappear since it is more feeling than think- 
ing, and its object in part resides within it- 
self, as effect as much as cause." Again 
Bornhausen says: " His idea of intuition is 
of great significance for religion, but to make 
the life impulse the object of religion is to 

3 Karl Bornhausen, " Die Philosophic H. Bergsons und ihre 
Bedeutung fiir den Religionsbegriff," Zeitschrift fur Theologie 
und Kirche, 1910. 



154 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

kill religion. We must exercise great caution 
in the face of this philosophy lest we lose 
our individual superiority over nature, our 
freedom, and the subjectivity of our personal 
faith." 

These statements contain a criticism best 
expressed in the phrase, " lest we lose our in- 
dividual superiority over nature." Here I 
must remind my readers that we are not 
engaged in a critique of Bergson's philosophy. 
I take up this point merely because the fear 
Bornhausen here expresses is, as a matter of 
fact, a fear of materialism. If his fear is 
justified, he himself should modify the favor- 
able estimate of Bergson's religious influence 
which he gives elsewhere in the same treatise. 
If this fear is justified, then, no matter what 
Bergson himself may say or think, his real 
emphasis is not upon the primacy in life of 
an original, spiritual Force; his ultimate in- 
fluence will make against it. 

I do not think the fear is justified. Is it 
true that " to make the life impulse the object 
of religion is to kill religion"? As a matter 
of fact, the god of every religionist is looked 
upon by him as the life impulse and is often 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 155 

worshiped mainly as such. What Bornhausen 
probably means is, that Bergson makes the 
life impulse, conceived of as physical, the ob- 
ject of religion. If this were true, then the 
result would indeed be materialism, and the 
loss of any higher form of religion. But it 
is not true. 

We must remember that Bergson's ideas 
are, as yet, only partially worked out — or, at 
least, only partially published. Thus far 
they have been grounded almost exclusively 
upon biological and psychological phenomena. 
The biological basis of Creative Evolution 
accounts for the physical emphasis so promi- 
nent in that book. The future works which 
are promised us will have to give greater 
attention to the sciences of human life, espe- 
cially to the science of history. In estimating 
Bergson this situation must always be borne 
in mind. 

But it can not be said that, even in his 
already published works, the Vital Impetus 
has been identified with a purely physical life 
impulse. Bergson tells us that he considers 
life possible on other planets and in other 
solar systems. This non-earthly life would 



156 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

use chemical elements different from those 
utilized by us, and hence would differ in form 
from our known forms of life. He considers 
this inference a fair one because life depends 
upon the Vital Impetus; and not upon the 
chemical changes utilized. In fact, he says, 
life might dispense with organized bodies, 
properly so-called. 4 

These ideas convey a pronounced non- 
physical implication, but they do not com- 
pletely prove my point. What does prove it 
is Bergson's repeated insistence that this life 
impetus, on which all these forms of life 
depend and from which they arise, is psy- 
chical. Let us put the matter in Bergson's 
own language: Supra-consciousness is at the 
origin of life. Man owes his superiority in- 
deed to his superior brain, his powers of 
language, and his social system which stores 
effort as language stores thought; but all 
these are themselves only the external mani- 
festations of an inner and spiritual achieve- 
ment. They are the servants of the Vital 
Impetus, and the Vital Impetus is essentially 

4 Cf. Bergson's Creative Evolution. English translation by- 
Mitchell, pp. 255-257. Also Bergson's " Presidential Address " 
before the Society for Physical Research. 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 157 

a spiritual force. The success of man is a 
spiritual success. In this sense, man is truly 
the end of evolution. That is, he alone 
achieves that freedom which is its goal. The 
real evolutionary process is a psychic process 
of which the evolution of organic forms is 
merely one result, although a very important 
result. It is as if a Superman, that is, a 
supernatural, cosmic Being, had sought to 
realize himself. Thus the destiny of human 
consciousness and of the human soul is not 
bound up with the destiny of cerebral matter. 
This is Bergson's position. To identify his 
' Vital Impulse " with a purely physical prin- 
ciple is thus clearly a violation of plain fact. 
Whatever we may think of the theory, the 
theory itself is clear; at least in its main out- 
lines. Mind and matter alike go back to one, 
great, original source which Bergson himself, 
over and over again, characterizes as spiritual 
and psychic. 

We have from Bergson a number of in- 
teresting statements regarding belief in im- 
mortality, and they support our thesis in a 
very clear and emphatic way. I shall quote 
only two of these statements. He says : 



158 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

If we can prove that the role of the brain is to fix 
the attention of the mind on matter and that by far 
the greater part of mental life is independent of the 
brain, then we have proved the likelihood of survival : 
and it is for those who do not believe it to prove that 
they are right, not for us to prove that they are 
wrong. 5 

On the other hand, when we see that conscious- 
ness, whilst being at once creation and choice, is also 
memory, that one of its essential functions is to 
accumulate and preserve the past, that very prob- 
ably (I lack time to attempt the demonstration of 
this point) the brain is an instrument of forgetful- 
ness as much as one of remembrance, and that in pure 
consciousness nothing of the past is lost, the whole 
life of a conscious personality being an indivisible 
continuity, are we not led to suppose that the effort 
continues beyond, and that in this passage of con- 
sciousness through matter (the passage which at the 
tunnel's exit gives distinct personalities) conscious- 
ness is tempered like steel, and tests itself by clearly 
constituting personalities and preparing them, by 
the very effort which each of them is called upon to 
make, for a higher form of existence? 

If we admit that with man consciousness has 
finally left the tunnel, that everywhere else conscious- 
ness has remained imprisoned, that every other species 
corresponds to the arrest of something which in man 
succeeded in overcoming resistance and in expanding 

6 Bergson, in The Literary Digest, March 1, 1913. 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 159 

almost freely, thus displaying itself in true person- 
alities capable of remembering all and willing all 
and controlling their past and their future, we shall 
have no repugnance in admitting that in man, though 
perhaps in man alone, consciousness pursues its path 
beyond this earthly life. 6 

Do these statements point in the direction 
of materialism or in the opposite direction? 

Again, Bergson recognizes the practical 
dualism existing between mind and matter ; 7 
between soul life and brute things. He also 
traces the presence of this dualism far back, 
almost, but not quite, to the very beginning 
of things. This dualism is early, but not ulti- 
mate. It resolves itself into an ultimate unity 

6 Bergson, " Life and Consciousness," The Hibbert Journal, 
October, 1911. 

7 1 do not agree with those who hold that Bergson's theory 
of matter is somewhat Kantian. The categories of the in- 
tellect do not create phenomenal matter; matter exists inde- 
pendently of the intellect, but in a more fluid, less clear-cut 
form than that in which we ordinarily think of it. For prac- 
tical reasons, according to Bergson, the intellect cuts out cer- 
tain cross-sections of the actual material world, sharpens their 
outlines, and solidifies their content. These cross-sections are 
like cinematograph pictures, held fixed for observation and for 
practical manipulation. Matter itself overflows these intel- 
lectual pictures and is more fluid than they. Still, in com- 
parison with the "elan vital/' it is relatively fixed and tends 
continually towards greater inertness. This is the matter of 
which I am speaking. 



160 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

in that both elements originally spring from 
one source; and that source is psychic. 9. 
He is also reported to have said : 9 

This source of life is undoubtedly spiritual. Is it 
personal? Probably. There are not sufficient data 
to answer this question. Professor Bergson is in- 
clined to think it is. It seems to him that personal- 
ity is in the very^ intention of the evolution of life, 
and that the human personality is just one mode in 
which this intention is realized. It is, therefore, he 
thinks, very probable that the spiritual source of 
life whence our personality springs should be per- 
sonal itself. Of course, personal in a different way, 
without all those accidental traits which in our mind 
form part of personality and which are bound up 

8 In view of recent theories of matter, I may be unwise in 
making the following observation. Also, I am not unmind- 
ful that ignorance of the " how " of a supposed fact does not 
necessarily damn the fact. But I must confess that I do not 
see how Bergson gets his matter out of this original, spiritual, 
psychic force. It is difficult to understand how the original 
jet of spiritual spray (to use Bergson' s own figure) con- 
densed into matter. Why did it not merely dry up or, per- 
haps, simply go on spraying? However, I wish to repeat that 
we are not attempting a criticism of the philosophy as such. 
Whether or not we understand his " how " or agree with his 
" what," Bergson resolves all into the original life impulse and 
characterizes that impulse as spiritual, psychic, conscious. In 
this regard, therefore, we see that the Bergsonian philosophy 
upholds the primacy of the spirit. 

9 Louis Levine, " Interview with Bergson," New York Times, 
February 22, 1914. 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 161 

with the existence of the body. But personal in a 
larger sense of the term — a spiritual unity express- 
ing itself in the creative process of evolution. 



But there is another point at which Bergson 
upholds the primacy of the spiritual quite as 
strongly as he does in accounting for the origin 
of evolutionary processes. That is, where he 
maintains the distinct existence of the soul of 
the individual. Mechanistic, deterministic 
science has driven all forms of spiritism or, as 
McDougall 10 calls it, " animism," into the out- 
of-the-way caves of human belief. The " psy- 
chology without a soul " has been almost 
triumphant, leaving us psychology but no 
soul. As McDougall says, this issue is crucial 
for religion. No soul, as a distinct spiritual 
entity, no religion. 

It is Bergson's theory of memory which 
comes under consideration here, for his doc- 
trine of the reality of the soul's existence is 
based upon this theory. Whatever we may 
think of it, the theory at least gives us further 
proof of Bergson's insistence upon the funda- 
mental primacy of the spiritual element in all 

10 William McDougall, Mind and Body. Introduction. 



162 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

life. Let us briefly sketch its essential fea- 
tures. 11 

Perception and memory differ in nature and 
kind. The past is only idea; the present is 
ideo-motor. We know matter only in part, 
but we know it directly. Hence matter can 
not exercise powers different in kind from 
those we perceive ; and hence it can not create 
consciousness. The only way to refute ma- 
terialism is to show that matter is precisely 
what it appears to be, and hence the spiritual 
life of man is an independent reality. Memory 
is in principle a power absolutely independent 
of matter. The brain is the advancing point 
of past representations pushing into the future. 
Destroy the brain and these representations 
are not destroyed, but their action over matter 
is gone. 

Bergson distinguishes three kinds of mem- 
ory; "habit memory," which is largely phys- 
ical, the result of motor reactions ; " represent- 
ative memory," which is conscious, and plays 
a large part in directing action; and "pure 
memory," which is really an unconscious 
psychic state. This last is really our " soul * 

11 Cf. Bergson's Matter and Memory. 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 163 

and is what we often describe as our li char- 
acter." It gathers up all that is significant in 
our past, like a rolling snowball, and is always 
present in all our decisions, whether we are 
conscious of it or not. That is why it is fair 
and useful to follow the common sense rule 
of " judging a man by little things." This 
6 pure memory " or ' the soul," as distin- 
guished from what we often call " memory," 
is essentially independent of matter ; is power- 
ful over matter through the medium of brain 
and body ; and will probably survive the body. 
Through it communication takes place between 
man and the Supra- Soul of the universe, for, 
as Bergson puts it, 

Pure Memory: Spirit:: Perception: Matter. 

According to Bergson, therefore, the soul of 
man is a reality. It is a towering citadel of 
spirituality. It is essentially independent of 
matter and superior to it. It is also distinct 
from the Supra- Consciousness, or Vital Im- 
petus, as well as from other individual souls. 
In spite of the separateness of these lesser in- 
dividualities from one another and from the 
Cosmic Soul — a separateness due probably 



164 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

to the action of opposing forces — the Cosmic 
Soul is the ultimate source of all. Thus 
Bergson again sounds the note of the primacy 
of the spirit in no uncertain way. The in- 
dividual soul is; it is not subject to matter or 
derived from it; it points back to a great, 

original, psychic origin. 

. ...... 

The phases of Bergsonian thought which 
we have been considering have evident religious 
and ethical value. W. Scott Palmer draws 
from them the following inferences: 

Permeation, communication, the gift of the Spirit 
and the mutual giving of God and of men is the 
world's truth ; all else is mere expediency for action. 
. . . There is no real isolation between the spirits 
of men or between God and man. . . . (The streams 
of life) come from God, they are of Him, though 
each has its personal owner. . . . God Himself is 
" closer to each than breathing, nearer than hands 
and feet." . . . But He is not immanent in the 
stream. He is transcendent to it and personally re- 
lated with it. 12 

In various ways many other men are reach- 
ing similar conclusions based on Bergsonian 

12 W. Scott Palmer, " A Christian Study Aided by Bergson. 
Presence and Omnipresence," Contemporary Review. 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 165 

data. Bergson himself has once or twice broken 
the silence he has usually maintained regarding 
religious topics. To Levine he expressed the 
opinion that " the individual can not be guided 
by social ethics alone (i.e., utilitarianism) and 
the craving for religious experience will re- 
main and probably grow stronger as time goes 
on. The religious feeling is the sense of not 
being alone in the world; the sense of a re- 
lationship between the individual and the 
spiritual source of life." 13 

Let me repeat. It is undeniable that the 
elements of Bergson's thought which we have 
been discussing are clearly compatible with 
religion; in so far, then, they are com- 
patible with the Christian religion also. His 
conclusions not only lend themselves to 
a theistic interpretation of life, they almost 
force it upon one. Alongside of his tendency 
towards theism lies his marked emphasis upon 
the spiritual distinctness of the individual; 
upon the reality of the soul. It only remains to 
bring these two together — the spiritual fountain 
head and the individual will — and religion is 
assured. This might be done without violence, 

18 Louis Levine, in the New York Times, February 22, 1914. 



166 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

and without necessarily departing from a 
Bergsonian basis, even if there were no corre- 
sponding principle of connection in Bergson's 
system. There is such a principle, however, 
and it constitutes one of the most striking and 
important features of the whole philosophy — 
the principle of intuition. 

But before we turn to this new phase of the 
subject, I wish to add a word regarding the 
ethical value of Bergson's doctrine of the soul. 
The soul, like human freedom, is to a large 
extent achieved. It is being built up bit by bit 
with every new development of the individual's 
life. Nothing essential is lost; and the soul is 
really the compounded spiritual result of this 
whole process. It begins almost as a bare 
capability, and it ends — where? We know 
not ; but it may grow towards purer and purer 
spirit. 

It is evident that the part played by individ- 
ual choice, in this matter of soul-building, is 
very great. The stream of spirit life is there 
to be drawn on, but a vast, inert mass of matter 
is also present. Like the Vital Impetus itself, 
each individual must meet obstacle after ob- 
stacle. The quintessence of this fight is the 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 167 

struggle for more soul; for soul- freedom over 
against mechanism and formalism. As " pure 
memory " is connected with " habit memory " 
through conscious " representative memory," 
so the soul is connected with the inert mass of 
dead matter through the inevitable activity of 
the present. A let-down — inertia, laziness, 
deliberate rejection of the higher — means the 
increased materialization of the soul; its 
diminution; its loss. Thus, in a sense, accord- 
ing to Bergson, one has a soul from the very 
beginning of life. In another sense, equally 
real, one must acquire his soul by active, 
idealistic effort. In every way the ethical 
appeal of this conception rivals in force the 
religious appeal already seen to be so 
powerful. 

• •••••• 

As Bornhausen says, " Bergson's idea of 
intuition is of great significance for religion." 
In itself and through its natural consequences 
it is perhaps the most significant phase of 
Bergson's thought in the direction of religion. 
The discussion of this fundamental Bergsonian 
doctrine may well be prefaced by the words of 
Goethe, " Animated inquiry into cause does 



168 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

infinite harm "; 14 and by Plato's characteriza- 
tion of metaphysics, " It can not be put into 
words as can other inquiries, but after long 
intercourse with the thing itself, and after it 
has been lived with, suddenly, as when fire 
leaps up and the light kindles, it is found in 
the soul and feeds itself there." 15 
According to Lindsay : 

Plato and Bergson both insist that true knowledge 
must dispense with symbols — it is immediate appre- 
hension, an act of the spirit. They differ in that 
Plato took the mathematical universal as the type 
of all universals and hence denied the reality of time 
and change. Kant and most modern thinkers con- 
cern themselves with applied science and for them 
the test of truth is not in its own apprehension, but 
in results, coherency, usefulness. Bergson follows 
Plato in this regard. In the sciences of life, the un- 
predictable individual compels a greater use of intui- 
tion and the subordination of the mathematical. But 
this does not mean giving up science and falling back 
on feeling. Intuition must supplement and not dis- 
pense with science. Metaphysics differs from science 
in that it attempts to apprehend reality for itself 
and not for any practical use. This requires the 
sympathy of long experience (op. cit.). 

14 The quotation, as given, is from Chamberlain's Founda- 
tions of the Nineteenth Century, 

16 Cf. Plato's Epistles, VII: pp. 341, 344. Quoted by 
Lindsay in his Philosophy of Bergson. 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 169 

And again, 

Intuition is not a method practised by turning 
away from the sciences, but somehow by completing 
them. Bergson says, " If by mysticism be meant a 
reaction against positive science, the doctrine which 
I defend is in the end only a protest against mysti- 
cism " (op. cit.). 

These quotations serve not only to silence 
those who accuse Bergson of anti-scientific 
bias, but also to indicate the true nature of in- 
tuition in the Bergsonian sense. He himself 
has illustrated it by means of the experience of 
an author who, after long study and investiga- 
tion (scientific research), seeks to put himself 
at the heart of his subject by a supreme act 
of concentrated sympathy and imagination. 
Bergson also rightly points out the essential 
part played by intuition, thus understood, in 
the progress of science. In fact, all new dis- 
coveries, all progress, have been due to this 
gift. It is fruitful, however, only when it 
springs out of a wide and intimate knowledge 
of fact. Otherwise it is empty, barren, and 
purely emotional. Bergson's own words are: 
" Intuition and intellect do not oppose each 
other, save where intuition refuses to become 



170 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

more precise by coming into touch with facts 
scientifically studied, and where intellect, in- 
stead of confining itself to science proper, com- 
bines with this an unconscious and inconsistent 
metaphysic which in vain lays claim to scientific 
pretensions." 16 

All great philosophical systems have sprung 
out of great intuitions. Too often, however, 
their real source has been forgotten, and they 
have been explained solely on the basis of the 
intellectual elaborations necessary for the sake 
of presentation and defense. Thus, while 
Bergson maintains that dialectic is necessary 
to put intuition to the proof and to break it up 
into concepts for the sake of propagation, he 
also insists that intuition is more fundamental. 
It is really instinct become self-conscious. In- 
stinct, as seen in the hymenoptera, prolongs the 
work of organic organization and is next to 
very life itself. Make this instinct conscious, 
that is, turn it into intuition, and we can think 
life. Otherwise not. 

As Carr describes it : 

Philosophy deals with life which undergoes real 

changes in time. If we had intellect alone, life would 

16 Bergson, " Life and Consciousness," Hibbert Journal, 
October, 1911. 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 171 

be unknown and unknowable. We must install our- 
selves in the life process and use intuition instead of 
intellect. . . . This is not mysticism. It is based 
on fact and its philosophical analysis is interpreta- 
tion of ordinary experience. According to Bergson, 
this intuitive faculty lies in the fringe of conscious- 
ness surrounding our intellect, which is limited to 
practical purposes. 17 

The method, therefore, by which alone we 
may get direct contact with the real of the 
whole, is the same as that by which we come 
into contact with fragments of reality in sep- 
arate spheres of investigation. The method of 
the author with his subject, the scientist with 
his science, is the method to be followed by the 
man seeking the final reality of the universe. 
He can not neglect facts. His intellect must 
busy itself collating, analyzing, applying. 
Without this all would become empty emo- 
tionalism. But this alone will not lift a man 
above his bare facts. By intuition he must 
plunge into the stream of fact and ' get the 
feel of it." This is not the blind instinct of the 
animal. The " feel " of the animal is vivid, but 
so limited as to be useless for any purpose like 
that now under consideration. It is man alone 

17 H. W. Carr, in the Hibbert Journal, July, 1910. 



172 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

who, sharing instinct and intellect, can con- 
sciously apprehend a wide range of fact, and 
thus get a survey broad enough to enable him 
to formulate views regarding the final real. 
We have atrophied our gift of instinct by over- 
emphasis of intellect. We must now exalt the 
despised faculty without losing what intellect 
has gained for us. 
Jacks asks: 

Must the meaning of life always be expressed in 
words? Is it not often expressed by action? by be- 
ing? We do not want a photograph of experience. 
We want our experience enlarged and deepened. 
But we need philosophy to expose false philosophies 
and to lay bare the ultimate fact. Its function is to 
enforce the attitude of meditation — not to capture 
reality, but to free it from captivity. Start with the 
notion that it is you who explain the object, and not 
the object which explains itself, and you are bound 
to end in explaining it away. It is one thing to dis- 
cover fixity in experience, but another thing to con- 
fer fixity on experience by a form of words. Reality 
must be left to tell its own story in its- own way. 18 

This, I take it, is truly Bergsonian. It is a 
sort of philosophic quietism, but, with Bergson, 
it is superimposed upon a very active and ar- 

18 L. P. Jacks, The Alchemy of Thought. 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 173 

duous intellectual task and in itself requires a 
herculean spiritual effort. One feels, in con- 
sidering Bergson's theory of intuition, that 
fusion of realism and idealism which he claims 
to effect. It is not only real work, but a real 
object directly and actually apprehended. 
And yet, this is not accomplished " without 
idealism in the soul," as Bergson says, and the 
product is an ideal, a spiritual product. " To 
get a pure perception of reality, we must have 
a certain immateriality of life, i.e., idealism. 
Realism is in the work when idealism is in the 
soul." 19 

• ••••«• 

It has already become evident that Berg- 
son's teaching regarding intuition has points 
of contact with mysticism. Muirhead says, 
' Bergson has a practical emphasis, and yet 
the principle of spirit is a will to know — not by 
logic, to be sure, but by intuition. Here he is 
more in line with Plotinus and the gnostics 
than with the pragmatists." 20 Slosson points 
out that the study of Bergson has turned his 

19 Quoted from Bergson by E. E. Slosson in his " Prophets 
of Today — Bergson," The Independent, June 8, 1911. 

20 Muirhead's review of Bergson's work in the Hibbert Jour- 
nal, July, 1911. 



174 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

modernist Catholic admirers to a study of the 
saints of mysticism. Mories remarks: " How- 
ever we may name the eternal principle of the 
universe, we ourselves (according to Bergson) 
are part and parcel of it and, therefore, in most 
direct contact with it. This is against all 
' relativism/ and is full of constructive promise 
for religion. The whole trend of recent 
thought has been toward an attitude more 
fundamental than formal religion, that is to- 
wards mysticism. Lay the spirit open. . . * 
Bergson gives an exposition of the empirical, 
psychological basis of ecstasy." 21 To quote 
Macintosh: " Bergson is especially sympathetic 
with religious mysticism. Bergson says, ' The 
true metaphysic will be an immediate vision of 
reality and the mystical experience is certainly 
that.' " 22 

Listen to Bergson's own words as reported 
by Levine : 23 

" Is it not remarkable," Bergson asked, " that the 
mystics throughout the ages, without knowing one 

21 A. S. Mories, " Bergson and Mysticism," Westminster Re- 
view, June, 1912. 

22 Macintosh, " Bergson and Religion," Biblical World, Jan- 
uary, 1913. 

23 Levine's interview in the New York Times, February 22, 
1914. 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 175 

another, came to such similar conclusions merely on 
the basis of their inner experience? Now what the 
mystics tell us about themselves is extremely interest- 
ing and of great value for the understanding of the 
life of the spirit. It is ridiculous to dismiss all this 
with a shrug of the shoulders,, as so many are in- 
clined to do in our so-called positive age. On the 
contrary, their clue should be taken up and followed, 
and the chances are that the deeper we plunge into 
our inner experience, the greater the treasures we 
shall discover there." 

There is a mystic element in all religion. In 
fact, the religious act itself is essentially mys- 
tical. This naturally appears more markedly 
in those of an emotional temperament than in 
those of the practical or of the intellectual type, 
But it is present with these also, even if under 
cover, provided real religion is there. If this 
be granted, it is also evident that a philosophy 
which, by common consent, leans strongly to- 
wards mysticism, must be not merely com- 
patible with religion, but also highly favorable 
to it in this respect at least. 

Such is the case with M. Bergson's philos- 
ophy. The way in which the individual soul, 
according to Bergson, grasps the Ultimate 
(the Vital Impulse), is the very way by which 



176 BERGSQN AND RELIGION 

the same soul seeks and finds its religious goal 
— God. " Oh! that I knew where I might find 
Him!" "Lift up your eyes unto the hills. 
From whence cometh my help? My help 
cometh from the Lord who made heaven and 
earth." " As the hart panteth after the water- 
brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God." 
" He giveth power to the faint ; and to him that 
hath no might he increaseth strength. Even 
the youths shall faint and be weary, and the 
young men shall utterly fall; but they that 
wait for Jehovah shall renew their strength; 
they shall mount up with wings as eagles ; they 
shall run, and not be weary; they shall walk, 
and not faint." " In Him we live and move 
and have our being." 

Faith, defined in a way compatible with the 
Bergsonian position, could be no formal thing, 
no merely intellectual proposition. It would 
be an act, or rather an attitude, of the whole 
life, by which the soul would become fused with 
its spiritual source and Creator, though re- 
maining consciously distinct from that source. 
The good element of pantheism would thus be 
preserved, in that the all-pervasiveness of 
divine life would be recognized ; but the harm- 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OP SPIRIT 177 

ful identification of God with nature in toto 
would be cast aside. 

" I am the vine. Ye are the branches: he 
that abideth in me and I in him the same bear- 
eth much fruit: for apart from me ye can do 
nothing." Applying these words to the re- 
lationship between man and God, a religious 
Bergsonian could honestly repeat them ; in fact 
they would express his position completely. 
The filial relationship between man and God, 
pictured by Jesus in his teaching, is one of trust 
and communion as between son and father; 
this teaching is thoroughly compatible with 
Bergson's doctrine. Paul's mystical nature is 
well known and his conception of faith is ex- 
actly this mystical fusion between the believer 
and his object of worship. 

• •••••• 

But many will grant all this and yet mis- 
trust Bergson and his religious influence just 
because of this pronounced mystical emphasis. 
These critics would point out the weaknesses 
of religious mysticism — its vagaries; its self- 
centeredness ; its flight from the world; 
its unethical or even anti-ethical tend- 
encies. This objection is similar to that 



178 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

leveled at Bergson's supposed anti-scien- 
tific trend. According to that criticism, his 
doctrine of intuition is opposed to intellect and 
to all science. According to this criticism, the 
effect of Bergson's influence will be an un- 
fortunate obscurantism; a return to a riot of 
mystical raptures which will be harmful to re- 
ligion in the long run, because unbalanced and 
possibly anti-ethical. 

I have already indicated, somewhat at 
length, how groundless these extreme charges 
are. Doubtless those who make them divine 
correctly a tendency in Bergsonism which 
should be watched and controlled. But Berg- 
son himself is keenly alive to this need. His 
repeated emphasis upon the necessity of scien- 
tific investigation is supported by his own ex- 
tended labors in the scientific field. His whole 
philosophy rests upon the basis of carefully 
investigated scientific fact. He knows that the 
" inner light" is often deceitful above all things, 
and he is insistent that intuitions shall spring 
out of fact and not out of abnormal imagination 
merely. These intuitions, also, must be tested 
and verified by long and arduous scientific ap- 
plication to things as they are. While on his 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 179 

lecture tour in the United States, " he said 
most explicitly that, notwithstanding his high 
valuation of intuition, he thought it should al- 
ways be tested by verification; regarding in- 
tuition as a valuable guide-board, but one that, 
like other guide-boards, might prove wrong." 24 

Over-subjectivism in religion would not be 
an inescapable corollary of Bergsonism. His- 
tory would necessarily have an important place 
in any truly Bergsonian religious viewpoint. 
The way by which Bergson himself arrived at 
his u intuition " of creative evolution was the 
way of natural history. As Loveday says, 
' The original Impulse may be understood 
by taking a synoptic view of its actual de- 
velopments. The complete interpretation of 
ultimate reality presupposes a complete nat- 
ural history and Bergson does not pretend to 
do more than sketch the general outlines of the 
scheme." 25 

For these reasons we are safe in predicting 
that Bergson's promised discussion of religion, 

24 1 am indebted to Mr. Henry Holt for this particular 
statement, which Bergson made to him personally. Compare 
also Mr. Holt's book, On the Cosmic Relations, Vol. I, page 
454. 

26 T. Loveday, " Evolution Creatrice," in Mind, 



180 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

when it comes, will be largely historical. The 
faith he will at least allow, and will probably 
plead for, will not be a mystic faith of a purely 
subjective kind; but a mystic union with an 
object of worship increasingly made clear in 
the development of human history. The Berg- 
sonian mystic would and should have a scien- 
tific filling for his mysticism. His mystic in- 
tuition, or faith, must spring out of facts and 
be tested carefully by them. 

Against this sort of mysticism there is no 
valid objection. In fact, it is just this element 
we now so sorely lack and need. It is the only 
thing which can enliven the soberness and 
soften the hardness of those who are too ex- 
clusively intellectual, or too predominatingly 
practical. Besides, mysticism has always been 
an antidote for legalistic and absolutistic stag- 
nation. The reaction against it has resulted 
in part from the lack of balance of the old-style 
mystics. This reaction has cut off some from the 
Church, and others from religion itself. For 
still others it has diminished the real solace and 
stimulus derived from their professed faith. 
Bergson's philosophy smoothes the way for a 
revival of mysticism in religion, but, if his own 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OF SPIRIT 181 

method be sincerely followed, it will be a con- 
trolled mysticism whose subjective ecstasy will 
be directed, modified, and restrained by objec- 
tive considerations of a scientific and historical 
nature. 

In addition, it is gratuitous to assume that 
this Bergsonian religion will necessarily be 
predominatingly theological and correspond- 
ingly non-ethical or anti-ethical. Just how 
Bergson will ground his ethical system can not 
now be said with certainty. We may safely 
assert, however, that a Bergsonian ethic will be 
forthcoming; that the nature of his thought 
excludes the probability that this ethic may be 
fundamentally utilitarian ; finally, that it is im- 
possible to conceive how this ethic can escape a 
certain degree of fusion with religion, espe- 
cially in the development of the religious 
idea. 

There is room in the Bergsonian view for 
the " categorical imperative." The Vital Im- 
pulse is under the necessity of propagating it- 
self. Nay more, being psychic and conscious, 
this necessity gives rise to a feeling of ought- 
ness, for " ought " is the psychic counterpart 
of the more physical " must." According to 



182 BERGSON AtfD RELIGION 

Bergson, the Vital Impetus can not help ex- 
panding and extending its influence. It is also 
a growing thing, not static, finished, complete. 
Therefore, Bergson holds, it is compelled by 
inner necessity to reach out for more ; towards 
a larger and a fuller life for itself. Since the 
Vital Impulse is also, at the same time, psychic 
and conscious; and since "ought' is the 
psychic counterpart of the physical ' must," 
may we not conclude that the Vital Impulse, 
this Cosmic Soul, has necessarily a funda- 
mental feeling of oughtness in two definite 
directions : first, in the direction of self -propa- 
gation and, second, in the direction of self- 
development? 

Now the individual soul, according to Berg- 
son, is made of the same cosmic stuff; and, 
therefore, we may conclude that it shares the 
compulsions of this same inner imperative. 
The individual, qua individual, knows that he 
ought to mantain and to increase his own 
spiritual life; he knows also that he ought to 
maintain and to increase spiritual life as such, 
in others as well as in himself. Thus room is 
made for a social ethic, and one is reminded of 
Kant's pronouncement that the test of good- 



INTUITION AND PRIMACY OP SPIRIT 183 

ness is the possibility of its universal applica- 
tion. 

This formal principle of oughtness, accord- 
ing to Bergsonian teaching, would have to re- 
ceive its vital, concrete content from experi- 
ence; not the experience of the individual, 
merely, but of the race as well, that is, from 
history. Kant said: " The only good thing in 
the world is a good will." But what is a good 
will, ultimately? Bergson would say, " The 
will which seeks to maintain and to increase the 
Vital Impetus in its work of freedom and 
spirituality." Then, just as history — the ex- 
perience of the individual and of the race — is 
showing us what the nature of the Vital Im- 
petus is, so history (in the same sense) must 
show us what concrete relations must be set up 
in order to realize this good will and make it 
effective. In other words, the conscience can 
and must be educated through the knowledge 
and consideration of concrete fact. The re- 
sulting concrete relations will constitute posi- 
tive Bergsonian morality, the ground of whose 
goodness is the Vital Impetus itself. The 
Bergsonian religionist, therefore, who identi- 
fies his God with the Vital Impetus can not 



184 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

separate his religion from his ethics without 
being inconsistent and without doing serious 
damage to both. 

In conclusion, then, I take it that they alarm 
themselves unnecessarily who imagine that the 
Bergsonian trend towards religion, through 
emphasis on intuition and the primacy of the 
spirit, is likely to prove unethical or anti- 
ethical. While this trend is not inescapably 
Christian, on either its religious or its ethical 
side, it is not inevitably non- Christian. In- 
deed, as far as the phases here discussed are 
concerned, Bergsonism is not only compatible 
with Christianity, but even favorable towards 
it. 



CHAPTER VI 
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 

If we were inescapably shut up to a belief in 
the freedom of the will, we should be irrevo- 
cably shut out from freedom itself and from 
the possibility of establishing our belief on 
rational grounds. But we are not thus obliged 
to believe in it even though the full tide of 
human hope, judgment, and action sets that 
way. Indeed, once the idea is suggested to us 
that we are not free ; that in some subtle way, 
known only to materialistic philosophers or to 
physiological psychologists, our thoughts, pur- 
poses, ideals, and affections are only sparks 
which fly where the wheels of matter grind to- 
gether in the brain; we become tormented by 
the thought. And there is much in life that 
supports the latter theory and confirms our 
fears. Perhaps our sense of freedom, and with 
it our sense of duty, responsibility, and per- 
sonal value, are illusions; at any rate we will 

185 



186 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

cling to our illusions for they are sweet. We 
shall be none the worse off at the end, and in 
the meantime we may be cheered by them, ex- 
cept in the bad quarter-hours when we can not 
keep our eyes shut. At the end, when the 
ship goes down, we will stand at attention, fly 
the colors, play the band, sing the anthem, and 
die like men. 

Such is the brave resolve of many victims of 
the Great Disillusionment. But most of us 
are not disillusioned ; at least not so thoroughly 
as to make of despair a conscious and con- 
firmed theory. We believe still. In fact, 
among the mass of us, in whom the surge of 
life runs strong, whose springs have not yet 
been choked up by the sands of a timorous 
speculation, — among the mass of us, I say, 
there is still a supreme confidence in freedom. 
The popular idea is that one is completely the 
" captain of his soul." May I not do as I 
please ? Am I not free, absolutely free, to con- 
tract habits or to break them off? It is only 
the submerged minority that cannot " stop at 
any time." Who does not feel within himself 
the capability of at least a small amount of 
new and original endeavor? The conventions 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 187 

of life bind one, of course, but only because 
one willingly accepts them. He knows they 
are often foolish, but they save time and 
trouble and, on the whole, make for harmony 
and efficiency of life. If they become unduly 
oppressive, a burden instead of a crutch, then 
one can easily shatter them to bits. In fact, 
who does not occasionally do so? So the 
average believer in freedom. 

On the other hand, one of the commonest 
facts of life, at every level, is a frank recog- 
nition of the power of habit, custom, " circum- 
stances." Wrong-doing is excused or ex- 
plained by ' ' circumstances," birth, up-bring- 
ing, environment. ' Outside compulsion " is 
the ready excuse of those who have something 
to explain away. The poor as well as the rich 
recognize and observe distinctions of birth and 
circumstance and usually condemn marriage 
out of one's rank, whether it be " marrying 
up ' or " marrying down." Nature is uni- 
versally recognized as setting fixed limits to 
the effort and ambition of man, and the signifi- 
cance of so-called " acts of God " is not lost, 
even on the least intelligent. To the great 
mass of men, who necessarily live from hand 



188 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

to mouth, death comes even closer than to those 
of larger means; and the impartiality of its 
activity as well as the inevitableness and far- 
reaching nature of its effects, direct and in- 
direct, are fully realized. Such are the facts 
which sober, if they do not crush, belief in free- 
dom. 

An unusual experience of facts like these, 
whether in one's personal life or through wide 
observation of the poor and unfortunate, often 
tends to offset the natural belief in freedom 
and to establish the conviction that there is 
no such thing. This conviction speedily finds 
theoretical support in the conclusions of de- 
terministic science, spread abroad in a form 
that is popular, but often very crude and ob- 
jectionable. Besides, the scientists themselves 
act and talk (indeed, as scientists, they have 
to) as if all were absolutely determined; and 
a large proportion of them are convinced that 
determinism is not merely a working hypoth- 
esis, of practical value and possibly of limited 
validity, but a fact of universal applicability. 
It is not strange that, under these circum- 
stances, many have adopted the view that there 
is no such thing as metaphysics ; no spirit-life, 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 189 

no freedom, no real responsibility ; nothing but 
an all-embracing determinism. 

Many do not know, or they lose sight of, 
the limits and the assumptions of science ; and 
the hard knocks of experience have driven un- 
der their ability to appreciate the validity and 
significance of those other experiences whence 
arises faith in one's self, in spirit, freedom, God. 
They do not know, in the first place, that the 
claims of determinists are met by counter- 
claims which challenge certain scientific as- 
sumptions, at least in so far as they are dog- 
matically asserted to be universally binding. 
Let me give one of these challenges by way of 
illustration. It is now frequently maintained 
that " the reality which we call physical reality, 
and which we ordinarily mean when we speak 
of reality, is not the physical reality of life but 
the schematical reality of things. So when we 
say there are no things, there are only actions, 
we are denying the ultimate nature of that 
form of reality with which physical science 
deals. We are declaring that it is derived and 
not original. The necessity on account of 
which it exists, the purpose it serves, is the 
activity that constitutes our life, but it is not 



190 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

itself the reality of that life. The mode of 
our activity is intellectual, and the work of 
the intellect is to form for us a scheme or dia- 
gram against which to present the world as a 
sphere of our activity and to enable us to have 
a grasp or hold upon it. Physical science is 
the apprehension of reality in a schematical 
form. We have come then to the essential 
meaning of the principle that living action not 
scientific knowledge is the key to the solution 
of metaphysical problems." x 

Furthermore, the average man, carried away 
by the cheap determinism of a crude, popular- 
ized science, forgets also that there is no proof 
that " the brain secretes thought as the liver 
secretes bile "; that, in fact, there are weighty 
reasons against it. Carr says : 2 

There are two reasons that must make it seem to 
every one who studies the problem impossible to sup- 
pose that the brain can produce the mind in any way 
that is analogous to the secretion of a gland or the 
functioning of an organ. One reason concerns the 
nature of scientific explanation, the other the content 

1 H. Wildon Carr, The Philosophy of Change, London, 1914, 
pp. 130-1. I have taken the liberty of italicizing certain words 
in order to bring out the meaning a little more clearly. 

2 Carr, op. cit., pp. 45, 52. 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 191 

of consciousness. The first reason is that it is im- 
possible to explain anything as a consequence or 
effect of another thing unless there is some common 
measure that we can apply to each, and there is no 
common measure that we can apply to mind and 
brain. And the other reason is that the conscious- 
ness which arises in connection with cerebral process 
is not consciousness of the cerebral process but of 
something which is independent of it, something 
existing in a different part of space, it may be thou- 
sands of miles away from the brain, and something 
existing at a different time, it may be ages before 
or even after the moment in which the accompanying 
cerebral process is taking place. . . . 

These two reasons are, as I have said, unanswer- 
able. The first may be summed up by saying that 
the chain of causes and effects in the physiological 
process of which the brain is the centre is complete 
without the intervention of the psychical process, 
while the psychical process of consciousness, though 
a connected series of events,, is not a relation of 
effects to causes but an association of ideas which 
involves no conversion of physical energy. And the 
second may be summed up by saying that knowledge, 
if it is knowledge of what is outside the brain, cannot 
be manufactured by a process inside the brain. 

Besides failing to appreciate the objections 
to a thorough-going scientific determinism, 
those who have given up their faith in freedom 



192 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

often forget, or fail to cultivate, those phases 
of life which mean most to us but which lose 
all value if pressed into a deterministic mold. 
The sense of duty is fundamentally a faith, 3 
but a faith without which life would be impos- 
sible. This faith requires an ideal, or object 
of faith, objectively existent, for " one cannot 
hang a coat on the idea of a peg." Real life, 
too, is proportionate to the love which this 
ideal, this object of faith, engenders in the 
heart. These are the things men live by, and 
failure to live by them cuts us off from the 
laboratory where alone we may test competing 
theories of life. Now scientific determinism 
is not controlling in the sphere of these realities 
and, in fact, if it exceeds its proper limits in 
this direction, it becomes a destroyer of the 
highest things in life. 

It is natural, therefore, that those who are 
most keenly interested in these things should 
hold most strongly to belief in freedom. Con- 
sequently, we are not surprised to find religious 
people shouting the praises of freedom, in this 
connection at least, and eyeing with suspicion 

8 fimile Boutroux, Science et Religion, cf. the final chapter, 
whence I have taken the thought of this part of the paragraph. 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 193 

a science whose tendency has hitherto been 
predominantly deterministic. With Paul they 
cry, " But the Jerusalem that is above is free, 
which is our mother. . . . Wherefore, brethren, 
we are not children of a handmaid, but of the 
free woman. For freedom did Christ set us 
free." 4 And yet, religious believers have often 
held views quite inconsistent with a belief in 
real freedom. There have been, and still are, 
religions and religious sects in which freedom 
is either explicitly or implicitly denied. In the 
naturalistic religions of primitive times, in 
Islam, in Calvinism, necessity and determinism 
supplant freedom. But, in order to progress 
in accordance with the demands of other prin- 
ciples also strongly held, the principle of free- 
dom has had to be admitted in some form or 
other. In fact, no genuinely religious system 

can deny it altogether. 

• ••*••• 

The fact that Bergson is on the side of free 

will is, in so far, a promise that he is also on 

the side of religion. In Time and Free Will 

he pleads ably for the fact of freedom. As 

Carr says, 5 

4 Galatians iv: 26, 31. v: 1. 

5 Carr, op. cit., pp. 195-196. 



194 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

What then is the attraction that this philosophy 
exercises? What is there of supreme value that it 
assures us? The answer is freedom. 

It does not seem so. Our whole life is regulated 
by automatisms. The life-process from beginning 
to end seems to be the formation of habits, and 
habits are only broken by new habits. Wherever w T e 
look, whether at the constant supply of daily needs 
or at the higher generalizations of science and phi- 
losophy, all advance seems dependent on regular or- 
derly obedience to rule, all seems part of a universal 
determinism. Our philosophy shows us the ground 
of this determinism in the intellectual nature -of our 
activity, and at the same time reveals to us in the 
intuition of life the underlying reality of an essen- 
tially free activity. The very essence of life is un- 
ceasing creation, and our human form seems 'to regis- 
ter the greatest freedom that life has* secured under 
the limitations of its existence. 

Bergson himself says : 6 

We can now formulate our conception of freedom. 
Freedom is the relation of the concrete self to the 
act which it performs. This relation is indefinable, 
just because we are free. For we can analyze a 
thing, but not a process ; we can break up extensity, 
but not duration. . . . Thus, any positive definition 
of freedom will ensure the victory of determinism. . . 

6 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will. English translation 
by Pogson, pp. 219, 220, 221. 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 195 

To sum up ; every demand for explanation in re- 
gard to freedom comes back, without our suspecting 
it, to the following question : M Can time be ade- 
quately represented by space?" To which we an- 
swer: Yes, if you are dealing with time flown; No, 
if you speak of time flowing. Now, the free act 
takes place in time which is flowing and not in time 
which has already flown. Freedom is therefore a 
fact, and among the facts which we observe there is 
none clearer. 

Bergson's strong assertion of the fact of 
freedom has led to much misunderstanding of 
his position. He does not conceive of freedom 
as without limits. Far from it. He says : 7 

. . . the outward manifestation of this inner state will 
be just what is called a free act, since the self alone 
will have been the author of it, and since it will ex- 
press the whole of the self. Freedom, thus under- 
stood, is not absolute, as a radical libertarian philoso- 
phy would have it ; it admits of degrees. . . 
. . . Here will be found, within the fundamental 
self, a parasitic self which continually encroaches 
upon the other. Many live this kind of a life, and 
die without having known true freedom. 

And again : 8 

Hence there are finally two different selves, one of 



Bergson, op. cit., pp. 165-166. 
Bergson, op. cit., pp. 231-232. 



196 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

which is, as it were, the external projection of the 
other, its spatial and, so to speak, social representa- 
tion. We reach the former by deep introspection, 
which leads us to grasp our inner states as living 
things, constantly becoming, as states not amenable 
to measure, which permeate one another and of which 
the succession in duration has nothing in common 
with juxtaposition in homogeneous space. But the 
moments at which we thus grasp ourselves are rare, 
and that is just why we are rarely free. The greater 
part of the time we live outside ourselves, hardly 
perceiving anything of ourselves but our own ghost, 
a colorless shadow which pure duration projects into 
homogeneous space. Hence our life unfolds in space 
rather than in time; we live for the external world 
rather than for ourselves ; we speak rather than 
think ; we " are acted " rather than act ourselves. 
To act freely is to recover possession of one's self, 
and to get back into pure duration. 



We see, therefore, that Bergsonian freedom 
is far from mere license and that it is rep- 
resented as having, in actual life, very definite 
and extensive limitations. But let us now pre- 
sent the doctrine in a more complete fashion: 
Bergson holds that the difficulty we have in 
preserving our naive belief in human freedom 
lies in the tendency we have acquired, in the 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 197 

development of our intellectual life, of carry- 
ing over into our picture of mental life a con- 
ception of time which is applicable only in the 
realm of physical science, that is, to the inert. 
According to this conception, time is a quan- 
titative thing, a succession of moments which 
are distinct from one another. But the time 
of the inner life, for which Bergson prefers the 
word " duration," is not a succession of sep- 
arate moments, quantitatively measured, but 
an interpenetration of qualitative states which 
become indivisibly fused in the actual life of 
the mind. The quantitative time of our ordi- 
nary thought is indeed merely mathematical, a 
symbol of the reality not the reality itself, and 
results from the practical needs of science and 
of our everyday life, in the task of handling 
and of overcoming physical nature. 
He says : 9 

An inner life with well distinguished moments and 
with clearly characterized states will answer better 
the requirements of social life. Indeed, a superficial 
psychology may be content with describing it with- 
out thereby falling into error, on condition, however, 
that it restricts itself to the study of what has taken 

9 Bergson, op. cit., p. 139. 



198 BERGSbN AND RELIGION 

place and leaves out what is going on. But if, pass- 
ing from statics to dynamics, this psychology claims 
to reason about things in the making as it reasons 
about things made, if it offers us the concrete and 
living self as an association of terms which are dis- 
tinct from one another and are set side by side in a 
homogeneous medium, it will see difficulty after diffi- 
culty rising in its path. And these difficulties will 
multiply the greater the efforts it makes to overcome 
them, for all its efforts will only bring into clearer 
light the absurdity of the fundamental hypothesis 
by which it spreads out time in space and puts suc- 
cession at the very center of simultaneity. We shall 
see that the contradictions implied in the problems 
of causality, freedom, personality, spring from no 
other source, and that, if we wish to get rid of them, 
we have only to go back to the real and concrete self 
and give up its symbolical substitute. 

The wrong use of this physical, symbolical 
conception of time gives rise to a wrong appli- 
cation of the words " causality " and " deter- 
minism " to psychic phenomena. Bergson 
says : 10 

Nevertheless it will be worth while to dwell on this 
latter form of the determinist argument (namely, 
that " the action having once been performed, any 
other action is seen, under the given conditions, to 

10 Bergson, op. cit., pp. 201-202. 






INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 199 

have been impossible "), even though it be only to 
explain from our point of view the meaning of the 
two words " determinism " and " causality." 

In vain do we argue that there cannot be any ques- 
tion either of foreseeing a future action in the way 
that an astronomical phenomenon is foreseen, or of 
asserting, when once an action is done, that any 
other action would have been impossible under the 
given conditions. In vain do we add that, even when 
it takes this form : " The same causes produce the 
same effects," the principle of universal determina- 
tion loses every shred of meaning in the inner world 
of conscious states. The determinist will perhaps 
yield to our arguments on each of these points in 
particular, will admit that in the psychical field one 
cannot ascribe any of these three meanings to the 
word determination, will probably fail to discover a 
fourth meaning, and yet will go on repeating that 
the act is inseparably bound up with its antecedents. 
We thus find ourselves here confronted by so deep- 
seated a misapprehension and so obstinate a preju- 
dice that we cannot get the better of them without 
attacking them at their root, which is the principle 
of causality. 

Continuing, Bergson maintains X1 that " cau- 
sality, as ' regular succession,' does not apply 
to conscious states and cannot disprove free 
will"; that " causality, as the prefiguring of 

" Bergson, op. cit., cf. pp. 202-215. 



200 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

the future phenomenon in its present condi- 
tions, in one form destroys concrete phenomena 
— it cannot bind the future to the present 
without neglecting duration " ; that " the neces- 
sary determination of phenomena implies non- 
duration, but we endure and are therefore 
free " ; and, finally, that " prefiguring, as hav- 
ing an idea of a future act which we cannot 
realize without effort does not involve neces- 
sary determination." 
He then concludes : 12 

It follows from this two-fold analysis that the 
principle of causality involves two contradictory 
conceptions of duration, two mutually exclusive 
ways of prefiguring the future in the present. Some- 
times all phenomena, physical or psychical, are pic- 
tured as enduring in the same way that we do: in 
this case the future will exist in the present only as 
an idea, and the passing from the present to the 
future will take the form of an effort which does not 
always lead to the realization of the idea conceived. 
Sometimes, on the other hand, duration is regarded 
as the characteristic form of conscious states; in 
this case, things are no longer supposed to endure 
as we do, and a mathematical pre-existence of their 
future in the present is admitted. 

Now, each of these two hypotheses, when taken by 
12 Bergson, op. cit., cf. pp. 215-216. 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 201 

itself, safeguards human freedom ; for the first 
would lead to the result that even the phenomena of 
nature were contingent, and the second, by attribut- 
ing the necessary determination of physical phe- 
nomena to the fact that things do not endure as we 
do, invites us to regard the self which is subject to 
duration as a free force. Therefore, every clear con- 
ception of causality, where we know our own mean- 
ing, leads to the idea of human freedom as a natural 
consequence. Unfortunately, the habit has grown up 
of taking the principle of causality in both senses at 
the same time, because the one is more flattering to 
our imagination and the other is more favorable to 
mathematical reasoning. 

Bergson points out that our immediate 
problem is merely one phase of a larger con- 
flict between two rival systems of nature, 
mechanism and dynamism. 

Dynamism starts from the idea of voluntary ac- 
tivity, given by consciousness, and comes to repre- 
sent inertia by gradually emptying this idea : it has 
thus no difficulty in conceiving free force on the one 
hand and matter governed by laws on the other. 
Mechanism follows the opposite course. It assumes 
that the materials which it synthesizes are governed 
by necessary laws, and although it reaches richer and 
richer combinations, which are more and more diffi- 
cult to foresee, and to all appearance more and more 



202 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

contingent, yet it never gets out of the narrow circle 
of necessity within which it at first shut itself 
up. 13 

But neither side can rest content with a mere 
recognition of this fundamental difference in 
point of view. The apostle of freedom must 
establish his position through defense and at- 
tack, or it will be won from him. Bergson 
says: 14 

A posteriori, however, definite facts are appealed 
to against freedom, some physical, others psycho- 
logical. Sometimes it is asserted that our actions 
are necessitated by our feelings, our ideas, and the 
whole preceding series of our conscious states ; some- 
times freedom is denounced as being incompatible 
with the fundamental properties of matter, and in 
particular with the principle of the conservation of 
energy. Hence two kinds of determinism, two ap- 
parently different proofs of universal necessity. We 
shall show that the second of these two forms is re- 
ducible to the first, and that all determinism, even 
physical determinism, involves a psychological hy- 
pothesis : we shall then prove that psychological de- 
terminism itself, and the refutations which are given 
of it, rest on an inaccurate conception of the multi- 
plicity of conscious states, or rather of duration. 

13 Bergson, op. cit., p. 140 f . 

14 Bergson, op. cit., pp. 149-143. 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 203 

Thus, in the light of the principles worked out in 
the foregoing chapter, we shall see a self emerge 
whose activity cannot be compared to that of any 
other force. 

Bergson then proceeds to show 15 that " if 
the principle of the conservation of energy is 
universal, physiological and nervous phe- 
nomena are necessitated, but perhaps not con- 
scious states "; that " to prove conscious states 
determined, we should have to show a neces- 
sary connection between them and cerebral 
states and there is no such proof " ; that, there- 
fore, " physical determinism, when assumed to 
be universal, postulates psychological deter- 
minism." He says 16 that " we must not over- 
rate the part played by the principle of the 
conservation of energy in the history of the 
natural sciences. In its present form it marks 
a certain phase in the evolution of certain 
sciences; but it has not been the governing 
factor in this evolution and we should be wrong 
in making it the indispensable postulate of all 
scientific research." Further, " it implies that 
a system can return to its original state. It 

15 Bergson, op. cit., cf. pp. 145-150. 

16 Bergson, op. cit., cf. pp. 150-155. 



204 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

neglects duration and hence is inapplicable to 
living beings and to conscious states." 

Thus " the so-called physical determinism is 
reducible at bottom to a psychological deter- 
minism " which " depends on an associationist 
conception of the mind " which, in turn, " in- 
volves a defective conception of the self 
Bergson concludes: 



?3 17 
IHJCjJtlUIl Ul tllC SC11. 

18 



Therefore it is only an inaccurate psychology, mis- 
led by language, which will show us the soul deter- 
mined by sympathy, aversion, or hate as though by 
so many forces pressing upon it. These feelings, 
provided that they go deep enough, each make up 
the whole soul, since the whole content of the soul is 
reflected in each of them. To say that the soul is 
determined under the influence of any one of these 
feelings is thus to recognize that it is self-deter- 
mined . . . the outward manifestation of this 
inner state (that is, a state of mind reflecting the 
whole personality) will be just what is called a free 
act, since the self alone will have been the author of 
it, and since it will express the whole of the self. 
Freedom, thus understood, is not absolute, as a radi- 
cal libertarian philosophy would have it ; it admits of 
degrees. . . . Here will be found, without the funda- 
mental self, a parasitic self which continually en- 

17 Bergson, op. cit., cf. pp. 155-165. 

18 Bergson, op. cit., pp. 165-166. 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 205 

croaehes upon the other. Many live this kind of life, 
and die without having known true freedom. 



Finally 



19 



... we are free when our acts spring from our 
whole personality, when they express it, when they 
have that indefinable resemblance to it which one 
sometimes finds between the artist and his work. It 
is no use asserting that we are then yielding to the 
all-powerful influence of our character — our charac- 
ter is still ourselves; and because we are pleased to 
split the person into two parts so that by an effort 
of abstraction we may consider in turn the self which 
feels or thinks and the self which acts, it would be 
very strange to conclude that one of the two selves 
is coercing the other. Those who ask whether we are 
free to alter our character lay themselves open to 
the same objection. Certainly our character is alter- 
ing perceptibly every day, and our freedom would 
suffer if these new acquisitions were grafted on to 
our self and not blended with it. But, as soon as 
this blending takes place, it must be admitted that 
the change which has supervened in our character be- 
longs to us, that we have appropriated it. 

In a word, if it is agreed to call every act free 

19 Bergson, op. cit., pp. 172-173. I would apologize for giv- 
ing so much detail in presenting Bergson's doctrine of free- 
dom, were it not for the general difficulty of the subject and, 
especially, that I feel constrained to make such a presentation 
in order to establish more clearly the validity of the inferences 
I am about to draw. 



206 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

which springs from the self and from the self alone, 
the act which bears the mark of our personality is 
truly free, for our self alone will lay claim to its 
paternity. It would thus be recognized that free 
will is a fact, if it were agreed to look for it in a 
certain characteristic of the decision which is taken, 
in the free act itself. 

• •••••• 

Such are the nature and the grounds of the 
Bergsonian doctrine of free will. What are 
its religious values? They are direct and evi- 
dent and, to my mind, connect helpfully with 
the basal religious conceptions of human kin- 
ship, communion, and cooperation with God. 
In one form or another, explicitly or implicitly, 
logically or illogically, these three ideas have 
always accompanied religion, to a greater or 
less extent. Indeed, they seem to be essentially 
bound up with it. 

In considering the religious conception of 
kinship with God, we must distinguish be- 
tween the " theanthropic " and the " theo- 
cratic " tendencies of religions. The former 
tendency emphasizes the idea of a natural kin- 
ship between man and God; the belief that 
' God created man in his own image, in the 
image of God created He him." Upon the 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 207 

basis of this presupposition, religion is merely 
coming into one's own, a growing up into " the 
measure of the stature of the fulness " of the 
divine life already sown in the soul. This is 
religion of the " once-born " type. The latter 
tendency, however, (namely, the "theocratic") 
emphasizes the " natural enmity " between 
man and God. With Paul it pits the " natural 
man " against the " spiritual man " in an in- 
tense struggle which can only be ended by 
divine intervention of a drastic sort. Here 
kinship, if it comes at all, is acquired, or rather, 
it is imparted by the bestowal of supernatural 
grace and power in a marked way. We must 
note, however, that even here there is a recog- 
nition of implicit kinship in the assumption 
that humanity is capable of " receiving the 
Spirit." The difference between these two 
types of religion is one of emphasis and of in- 
terpretation, due to varying types of per- 
sonality, with consequent differences in the 
nature and processes of religious experience. 
There is no abysmal cleft between the two and 
neither should be looked upon as exhausting 
the possibilities of religious truth to the exclu- 
sion of the opposing type. Both have made 



208 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

large contributions to the religious advance of 
humanity and will doubtless continue to do so. 

Now Bergson's doctrine of freedom looks in 
both directions and affords a fair basis for both 
these varieties of religious experience. The 
soul of man, the only truly free thing on earth, 
is of the same stuff as the Vital Impetus itself ; 
comes from it ; is, indeed, in a sense part of it, 
and shares its native freedom and creative 
power. This is a spiritual kinship of the most 
intimate kind, seeming to need scant, if any, 
elaboration in order to become the religious 
conception of a natural, spiritual relationship 
between man and God. In fact, the kinship 
may be carried still further, too far for some. 
Man and God are alike in the fact of limitation 
as well as in the fact of freedom and power; 
but of course not by any means alike in the 
degree of either power or limitation. A great 
difference between man and God remains. If 
not, it would be idle to speak of any compati- 
bility between Bergsonism and religion. But 
this difference is not one of kind, but of de- 
gree of freedom, creative power, and spirit- 
uality. Thus the fact of kinship is clear. 

But, on the other hand, Bergson holds that, 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 209 

due to matter and the development of human 
intellect towards supremacy over matter, man 
has had his soul increasingly bent towards mat- 
ter, towards inertness and materiality. As a 
consequence, it is hard to live on the spiritual 
side of our nature. It takes a wrench, a right- 
about-face, a plunge into the interior of our 
true being away from superficiality, determin- 
ism and lifelessness. According to Bergson, 
life, in order to be truly life, must be for most 
of us, in the very nature of the case, a fierce 
struggle between the " natural man " and the 
" spiritual man." In short, our author pre- 
sents us with a philosophical basis for " theo- 
cratic " as well as for " theanthropic " interpre- 
tations of religion, for the " twice-born " type 
as well as for the ' once-born " type. Both 
may be retained and sanctioned as legitimate. 
There is great value in this. Representatives 
of the two types have tended towards mutual 
exclusiveness, suspecting the reality or scorn- 
ing the value of a religious experience vary- 
ing from the form acceptable to them. Each 
has insisted that all should be saved in his way 
or not at all. ' Orthodoxy is ' my doxy ' and 
heterodoxy is ' your doxy.' " In this particu- 



210 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

lar instance Bergson makes for an intelligent 
" live-and-let-live " attitude, but not neces- 
sarily for an indifferent tolerance. According 
to his view it is a matter of life, not of toler- 
ance merely. There should be regard for per- 
sonality, individuality, " varieties of religious 
experience," but at the same time this defer- 
ence would have necessary limits due to the in- 
tense longing of the soul for a spiritual result. 

• ••••• a 

Unless we wish to divest the word religion 
of all distinctive meaning, we must hold that 
its essential characteristic, at least in its higher 
forms, is a spiritual communion between per- 
sons. However difficult it may be to conceive 
personality in God, and however divine per- 
sonality may be interpreted, crudely or more 
philosophically, it is a plain fact that historic 
religious experience has always rested upon a 
belief in the reality of a personal communica- 
tion between God and man. To reduce reli- 
gion to anything less, or to transform it into 
anything else, is to reduce it to nothing or to 
transform it away. Religion may include the 
sense of unity, and as a matter of fact usually 
does, but it is not merely a sense of unity. It 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 211 

may include the good and the beautiful — often 
it has not done so — but it is not merely the 
recognition of ideal good and beauty. To say 
that it is the recognition of values, as Hoff ding 
does, is to confuse the fact rather than to de- 
scribe it. Such a conception would eliminate 
the very center from which, according to the 
religious man's own experience, all value flows. 
It is another doctrine of Bergson — the 
doctrine of intuition — which touches most 
closely the phenomenon of religious commun- 
ion. In fact, Bergsonian intuition is as nearly 
a counterpart of this fundamental religious act 
as anything purely philosophical could be. 
But the doctrine of freedom is closely con- 
nected with it also. Without freedom as a 
postulate it would be impossible to argue in 
behalf of intuition, as Bergson understands 
that word. In like manner, freedom is the 
necessary postulate of religious communion. 
All true social relationships of an inward na- 
ture are based on freedom. No inward rela- 
tionship is possible between a man and a stone, 
even when poetic imagination is most at work. 
Indeed, in the approximative social relation- 
ships, namely, between man and the higher 



212 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

animals in whom, to be sure, we do find a rela- 
tive degree of freedom, a great deal of the 
social result — though not all, by any means — 
is due to the poetic transference to the animal 
of human motives and thoughts. Bergson him- 
self has pointed out 20 that our sense of the 
comic in animals is due largely to this en- 
dowment of human qualities which we bestow 
upon them. 

It is in our human relationships alone that 
we may truly speak of " soul knit to soul," and 
this soul union can take place only in the at- 
mosphere of freedom. We have all observed 
the f ruitlessness of the effort of those who force 
their attentions on others, and cases of ap- 
parent success are due to the admixture of 
elements other than that of mere persistent 
pressure. The substitution of compulsion for 
free choice has strewn the world with the 
wreckage of individuals, organizations, and 
states. The life of friendship and of love is 
one of free choice. We cannot force it or 
compel it. It comes, or it does not come. It is 
born in spontaneity or not at all, and the very 
cradle of this spontaneity is freedom. 

20 Cf. his "Essay on Laughter." 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 213 

What is true of human relationships is pre- 
eminently true also of the relationship between 
man and God. It is significant for religion, 
therefore, that more than any other philoso- 
pher, Bergson insists on freedom as funda- 
mental. God is a free, creative Being sending 
out His streams of free life into the universe. 
Man's soul is a " tiny rill " from this great 
wave ; not wholly free, as we have seen, but free 
nevertheless. These two, God and man, are 
the only existences in which even an appre- 
ciable amount of freedom is observable. Hence 
it is only between man and man, and between 
man and God, that communion can take place ; 
and this is so because of the fact of freedom. 
Besides, this very freedom tends to establish 
communion. In fact, Bergson's idea of evolu- 
tion is that of a spiritual development in which 
there is increasingly free interaction between 
the Vital Impetus and those individual off- 
shoots from it which constitute our human per- 
sonalities. Now it is in this very freedom of 
communion — alike religious, between God and 
man, and ethical, between man and man — that 
the heart of religion is centered. Other things 
being equal, therefore, a philosophy which in- 



214 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

sists on the fact of freedom and, indeed, makes 
it central, is in so far favorable both to re- 
ligious and to ethical development. 

• •••••• 

The kind and degree of cooperation between 
man and God, taught and practised in any given 
religion, depends upon the kind and degree of 
freedom it postulates. All religion seems to im- 
ply a certain amount of cooperation. No matter 
how much may be ascribed to God, man must 
do something, or there is no religion. Even 
in the " nature religions " of primitive times, 
whose adherents were born into the religious 
relationship as into the tribe, and thought of 
it as a relationship of physical necessity, the 
devotee had to cooperate with his inescapable 
master, or suff er ;and in Islam, fatalistic though 
it be, the thought of human cooperation is not 
absent. In some religions it may be present 
by virtue of a lack of logic, but present it al- 
ways is, more or less. In the higher forms of 
religion, the element of cooperation is always 
prominent. Sectarian differences may produce 
variation in the kind and amount of the em- 
phasis, but they do not eliminate it. Predes- 
tinarian Calvinism, for instance, has exercised 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 215 

a tremendous social influence through its spirit 
of cooperative responsibility as, for example, 
in its relation to the rise of industrialism and 
capitalism. 

Now freedom may indeed be so conceived 
as to destroy the thought and spirit of coopera- 
tion, but, on the other hand, it is not possible 
to conceive of any real cooperation, much less 
to actualize it, without presupposing freedom. 
Cooperation is not mere physical togetherness. 
The latter may be due entirely to compulsion, 
or to mere chance. Cooperation is a together- 
ness of spirit in effort, and results only from 
the free choice of two or more beings who 
may or may not make that choice. The 
meaning and value of cooperation lies in 
this very thing, that men wish to work 
together and do work together — with God, or 
with their fellows — though they need not. It 
is hard to think of anything worthy the name 
of religion which does not include this char- 
acteristic. Certainly we may not take this 
feature out of the Christian religion and ex- 
pect to find the latter recognizable. Christ 
taught his disciples to do this or that, " that ye 
may be the sons of your Father which is in 



216 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

Heaven," The essential difference between 
the " sheep " and the " goats," in the famous 
parable, lay precisely in this, that the " sheep ' 
cooperated and the " goats " did not. The 
apostle Paul continually urges his hearers to 
become " co-workers with God." Ini short, 
Christianity's preeminent claim to superiority 
has been its inherent tendency towards coope- 
ration, with the beneficent social and individual 
results which issue therefrom. 

Bergson's philosophy might as fairly be 
called " The Philosophy of Freedom " as " The 
Philosophy of Change." Certainly freedom 
is one of its foundation stones. But freedom 
is also the essential foundation of true coopera- 
tion which, in turn, as we have seen, is in the 
very center of the religious structure itself, es- 
pecially in the case of the higher religions. 
The direct and essential relation of this Berg- 
sonian doctrine to the welfare of religion and 
to the progress of morality, is evident. In fact, 
the whole Bergsonian theory makes the rela- 
tion of action to development very close and 
fundamental. In spite of his tendency towards 
mysticism, or rather, because of the special way 
in which he conceives the more or less mystical 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 217 

act of intuition, Bergson may be said to teach 
that we must do in order to be. Indeed he 
holds that we most truly exercise the special 
birthright of our being in a certain kind of act , 
namely the act in which our whole personality 
finds expression — the free act par excellence. 
• •••••• 

In addition to these three ideas which, as 
we have seen, find a favoring basis in Berg- 
son's emphasis on freedom, there are several 
other religious values which suggest them- 
selves. The very idea of freedom itself finds 
a ready response in the heart of the truly re- 
ligious. Politicians, and all guardians of 
' things as they are," have always reckoned 
with and feared religious sentiment because 
it has always displayed a notorious willingness 
to break out against " things as they are " for 
the sake of " things as they ought to be." Like 
mankind at war, religion has often developed a 
free carelessness regarding the existing order. 
The defects of this quality should not blind us. 
When a man, a race, or a religion loses the 
power or the desire to push through existing 
opposition, then life itself departs. Bergson's 
idea of freedom does not frown upon the legiti- 



218 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

macy of such profound and fundamentally 
non-rational uprisings. Some think that the 
chief weakness of the philosophy lies in the pos- 
sible encouragement it may give to this very 
kind of action. 

We need not here discuss the relative value 
to human progress of emotional movements 
on the one hand, and rational guidance on 
the other hand. I merely wish to point out that 
a religious freedom molded on Bergsonian 
lines would not be, and could not be, mere 
caprice. His conception of human freedom is 
very far from that of wilfulness or capricious- 
ness. In the first place, it is neither complete 
nor continuous, even in the best of us. In fact, 
moments of real freedom are rare. We are 
most of the time in the grip of forces which we 
can not change or control. We live for the 
most part on the superficial plane of habit and 
we are bound by external realities which we 
can not ignore. Great emotional crises in in- 
dividuals, fateful emotional movements among 
men, can only be occasional. They are indeed 
very rare. But rare though they be, are they 
not capricious and harmful when they do come ? 
And does not Bergson's theory legitimatize 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 219 

this harmful element in life? Wilful action 
is doubtless afforded favorable opportunity by 
such great upheavals but, on the contrary, his- 
tory shows that the best we have has often come 
in this way. It is as if men, individually or 
as a race, had taken unconscious counsel with 
their deeper selves and had risen in the might 
of the resultant conviction to heights other- 
wise unattainable. Whether this be true of all 
movements of this kind, it is certainly very 
largely true of many of them, especially those 
of a religious nature. 

To say that Bergson's doctrine of freedom 
legitimatizes these movements is, therefore, not 
tantamount to saying that it fosters caprice 
and license. Its emphasis is rather upon the 
fact and right of such deep -going and far- 
reaching spiritual forces, the guerdon of whose 
freedom is the very human progress we all ac- 
claim. Certainly religion can not but wel- 
come as favorable a philosophic idea so gen- 
erous towards its greatest moments. It is only 
the timidly conventional, or the selfish up- 
holders of ' things as they are/' who should 
be troubled by this kinship. In their foolish 
wisdom they try either to discredit religion 



220 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

per se, or so to emasculate it as to render it 
harmless and unfruitful. Bergson's theory of 
freedom would do neither, and that is why 
many do not relish it. 

But there is, I think, still more to be said. 
Freedom has always been conceived by religion- 
ists as freedom through subjection, as, for in- 
stance, in Paul's epistle to the Galatians which 
is, of course, our classic source regarding " the 
freedom of the Christian man." Now Paul 
was charged by his opponents with exerting 
just the sort of immoral and destructive influ- 
ence whose shadow has just been flitting across 
our apprehensive minds — the immorality and 
destructiveness of unrestrained freedom. But 
Paul justifies by its fruits the freedom he has 
been inculcating, characterizes it as the free- 
dom of subjection to the spirit of Christ, and 
urges his followers to " stand fast in the liberty 
wherewith Christ hath made them free." It is, 
indeed, characteristic of religious freedom 
that it is a freedom of voluntary subjec- 
tion to a Higher Power who enters into 
inward and vitalizing relations with the 
worshiper. 

Now, the moral caliber of the freedom will 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 221 

depend entirely upon the moral character of 
this power. Bergson, of course, does not carry 
his discussion into this field and we are there- 
fore dependent upon reasonable inference 
from what he does say. But the nature of free- 
dom and the process accompanying the free 
act, according to his account, are strikingly 
parallel to the nature and process of religious 
freedom as just described. There is the same 
plunge into the depths of the inner life, the sub- 
ordination of the outward and the superficial 
to the inward and the fundamental; there is 
the intuitive act, by which the life of reality 
itself — the Vital Impetus — pours into the soul 
with all its own freedom; there is the same 
resolution of difficulties, the overcoming of 
obstacles, and the freedom of oneness with 
reality — an inner and an outer harmony. As 
in religion, so here the moral content of the 
freedom depends upon the moral content of 
the inpouring reality itself. Bergson has said 
that we can note the direction of the tendency 
we call life — the Vital Impetus — by studying 
its past results. How else has religion come 
to appreciate the moral character of its God? 
The Bergsonian doctrine of freedom, there- 



222 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

fore, is not necessarily divorced from the so- 
called restraints of morality. Unless the Vital 
Impetus is immoral, or a-moral — and we have 
reason to think that, in Bergson's idea, it is 
neither — we need not especially fear the influ- 
ence of Bergsonian freedom. Certainly reli- 
gion need not fear it. 

• •••••• 

Bergson's doctrine of freedom also affords 
interesting parallels to the religious doctrine of 
conversion. To my mind, conversion is a fun- 
damental element of religion. I do not mean 
to identify the word merely with those ex- 
tremes of emotional reaction which embody ob- 
jectionable and un-religious features. Still, 
for one of a strong, decided nature, whose life 
has been proceeding rapidly and energetically 
in an immoral direction, a change is apt to be 
just as rapid and just as decided, a " right- 
about-face," if change comes at all. But even 
in the u decent " man, whose life, in spite of 
its decency, has been supremely selfish, a real- 
ization of a soul-hardened state may produce, 
and has produced, a great emotional reaction 
with a sudden change of life-direction. More 
difficult to observe, but none the less real, are 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 223 

the innumerable little " conversions " which 
mark the life even of those whose general trend 
is upward. In what, pray, does this upward 
trend consist, if not in turning the back upon 
the lower motives which tempt or win us, and 
in turning the face towards the opposite mo- 
tives and ideals ? The fact of conversion, then, 
is, I hold, fundamental to all religious life of 
a higher sort. 

We must consequently expect a philosophy 
to be favorable to the phenomena of conver- 
sion, if it is to be deemed compatible with re- 
ligion. Bergson's philosophy is so, as we have 
already suggested. Freedom, according to 
Bergson, is both something achieved and some- 
thing which is presented to us. It is some- 
thing to be achieved in that we must turn our 
backs upon the indolence, inertness, and ma- 
teriality which shadow our life. If I may em- 
ploy religious language, we must " become 
sons of God " by a deliberate act of the will. 
No easy sliding from stage to stage, by an 
unconscious or semi-unconscious process. 
Heroism, rather, is demanded. 

To quote Bergson's own words : 21 

21 Bergson, Time and Free Will, pp. 169-170. 



224 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

Moreover we will grant to determinism that we 
often resign our freedom in more serious circum- 
stances, and that, by sluggishness or indolence, we 
allow this same local process to run its course when 
our whole personality ought, so to speak, to vibrate. 
When our most trustworthy friends agree in advis- 
ing us to take some important step, the sentiments 
which they utter with so much insistence lodge on the 
surface of our ego and there get solidified in the 
same way as the ideas of which we spoke just now. 
Little by little they will form a thick crust which 
will cover up our own sentiments ; we shall believe 
that we are acting freely, and it is only by looking 
back to the past, later on, that we shall see how much 
we were mistaken. 

But then, at the very minute when the act is going 
to be performed, something may revolt against it. 
It is the deep-seated self rushing up to the surface. 
It is the outer crust bursting, suddenly giving way 
to an irresistible thrust. Hence in the depths of the 
self, below this most reasonable pondering over most 
reasonable pieces of advice, something else was go- 
ing on — a gradual heating and a sudden boiling over 
of feelings and ideas, not unperceived, but rather un- 
noticed. If we turn back to them and carefully 
scrutinize our memory, we shall see that we had our- 
selves shaped these ideas, ourselves lived these feel- 
ings, but that, through some strange reluctance to 
exercise our will, we had thrust them back into the 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 225 

darkest depths of our soul whenever they came up 
to the surface. 

This very quotation also shows that, in a 
sense perhaps even more fundamental than 
that of achievement, freedom is something 
which is presented to us — a gift from without, 
or " from above." Certainly, according to 
Bergson, the ultimate source of our ability to 
aim for and to achieve freedom is outside our- 
selves. It is the Vital Impetus, coming into us 
and urging us on. And, when freedom is 
achieved in any instance, it is merely that we 
have merged our life more completely in the 
Vital Impetus ; we have captured more of it for 
our very own. For this very freedom itself 
means, sharing in the creative power of the 
great Source of life. May we not call it God? 
Also, the path to this freedom is a turning from 
the lower to the higher self or, as Bergson pre- 
fers to put it, a plunge from the superficial self 
down into the deeper self, by intuition. In 
the Pauline sense of the word, this is an act 
of vital ' faith " — not merely faith in one's 
self but faith in the Source of life also. 



226 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

But we may go a step farther and find still 
another interesting parallel. From one point 
of view, salvation is the be-all and end-all of 
religion. Whether it be thought of as an 
escape from something evil or as the bestowal 
of something good, or both, salvation is the 
heart-cry of religion. " The harvest is past, 
the summer is ended, and we are not saved'* 
cries the discouraged believer. That is, the 
main object of his religion has not yet been 
attained. We need not discuss the variety of 
detail embroidered upon this conception in the 
course of religious history. Suffice it to say 
that the general tendency has been to represent 
salvation as a matter both of the present life 
and of the beyond, the latter emphasis usually 
predominating. But what interests us now is 
that, in either case, in some way or other, sal- 
vation has always meant joy and freedom 
through union with, or subjection to, God, the 
Source of all joy and freedom. 

According to Bergson, the goal of evolution 
is freedom, achieved, though only partially 
achieved as yet, in man alone. This freedom 
is the very life of the Final Reality itself — 
the Vital Impulse — for which Bergson himself 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 227 

does not hesitate occasionally to use the word 
God, though not in a specifically religious 
sense, of course. In other words, the goal of 
life is the freedom of glad creativeness, a free- 
dom from the bondage of the inert, through 
union with and, may we not fairly say, sub- 
jection to the Source of life. As has been said, 
this goal has been attained by man, but only 
in part and rarely. But the whole philosophy 
of ' Creative Evolution ' breathes the hope 
and expectation of more — more freedom, more 
life, a glorious future. Indeed, in personal 
conversation and in occasional writings and ad- 
dresses, Bergson has given definite expression 
to an open-mindedness, not to say a hope, re- 
garding life after death, and even in his more 
formal writings he has gone out of his way to 
give an occasional hint in that direction. 

Here again, as elsewhere, the concrete com- 
patibility of these ideas and suggestions with, 
for instance, the Christian idea of salvation, 
depends upon the character that may be as- 
signed to the Vital Impetus — the ground of 
these facts and hopes. Bergson has declared 
that we may understand the Vital Impetus, 
and trace its tendency hitherto, by means of 



228 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

the facts of life itself. In addition to this, cer- 
tain definite statements assure us that his con- 
ception of it is not divorced from the moral and 
spiritual development of mankind. If this be 
so, it would be quite possible, within the sphere 
of Bergson's influence, to maintain a highly 
ethical and spiritual doctrine of salvation. In 
certain ways, in fact, the Bergsonian teaching 
would stimulate such a doctrine. Bergson's 
influence would certainly be against any doc- 
trine of salvation which consisted in " World- 
Flight " merely. The " world " is not to be 
ignored. It cannot be. In fact, it is good, for 
it is a necessary element in the achievement of 
the goal. Matter is indeed an enemy, but it is 
also a challenge; and the "world 5 is to be 
transcended, not ignored or escaped. In 
other words, while purely mystic religions of 
contemplation may find much sympathy in 
Bergson, legal religions will find none; and, in 
this particular at least, Bergsonism will favor 
that union of mysticism and active participa- 
tion in the world as it is, which is so marked 
a characteristic of Christianity. 

A Bergsonian could consistently conceive of 
salvation as a continual growth in spiritual 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 229 

life — a life beginning in this world, but con- 
tinuing in " the next world." Whether death 
would mean the entire elimination of bodily 
factors, or merely a change in their form 
(either would be possible, on this basis), it 
would still be an incident of life, and not life's 
necessary terminus. No abyss would separate 
the sphere of salvation here from the sphere be- 
yond. They would remain morally and spirit- 
ually continuous. The Bergsonian philosophy 
would not only sanction such a doctrine as this ; 

it would seem actively to suggest it. 

• •••••• 

One feature of Christianity which is an im- 
portant element in its superiority, is the value 
which it places upon the individual, and the 
consequent sense of personal worth which it 
thus arouses. Religions that tend towards 
pantheism, whose goal is absorption in the In- 
finite, lack this energetic and valuable factor; 
and even the legal religions, such as Judaism 
and Islam, which do indeed stimulate per- 
sonal activity of a sort, tend to lessen in- 
dividuality by subjecting it to external rules. 
Judaism, of course, possesses powerful coun- 
ter-forces, inherited from Hebrew Prophetism, 



230 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

which offset this tendency, but Islam, on the 
other hand, suffers even further in this direc- 
tion because of its thorough-going fatalism. 
A sense of personal worth is essential to the 
development of the highest life, and is often 
essential to life itself ; it is also essential to the 
development of the highest type of religious 
experience. However we may explain it, this 
quality is found in Christianity above all other 
religions. 

Bergson's doctrine of freedom is quite in 
line with this phase of Christian emphasis. 
The increasing freedom, in the development of 
organic life, through vegetative torpor and the 
lower animals to the higher, wide-ranging ani- 
mals, results in greater and greater individua- 
tion. In man individuality is most marked 
and, in a new sense, it may again be said that 
man is the center of the universe. He alone 
can achieve inner freedom, and that triumph 
of personality elevates him to genuine fellow- 
ship with the reality of the universe, in whose 
creative power he shares. What he does, as a 
free man, counts — eternally counts — and, 
waiving for the moment all thought of a pos- 
sible future existence, even if his personal ac- 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 231 

tivity is limited to this life alone, he must have 
a sense of its eternal significance and of his 
own permanent value as an active and self- 
determining participator in the destiny of the 
universe. A philosophy which did not sup- 
port this feeling of personal worth might be 
compatible with certain religions, but it would 
surely not be compatible with Christianity. 
On the other hand, a philosophy in which this 
sense of individuality and of personal value is 
inherent, would seem in so far to be more 
compatible with Christianity than with any 
other religion. " Bergson holds the essentially 
Christian view that man is the chief concern of 
God. ' I see in the whole evolution of life on 
our planet an effort to arrive ... at some- 
thing which is only realized in man. 5 

• •••••• 

Finally, there are several by-products of 
Bergson's doctrine of freedom which we should 
note. In the first place, without real freedom 
there can be no real morality. " The essence 
of morality is in deciding new issues for which 
we have no past to guide us — the vanguard of 

22 Cf. article on Bergson in Current Literature, February, 
1912. 



232 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

the development of the moral code." 23 
" Morality is a voluntary rise to a higher level 
. . . a new, original, creative, unprecedented 
act." 24 Physical duress changes the legal 
status of an act. Duress of any sort, inward or 
outward, not only changes the moral status of 
an act. It abolishes it. They who are afraid 
of such doctrines as those of Bergson need to 
be reminded that the very values for whose 
existence they fear have been created by free- 
dom and are maintained by it. " Safety zones ' 
may do for momentary stopping places en 
route j but one must leave the " zone " to get 
across the street in either direction, else night 
will fall and one will remain under its shadow 
and that of a policeman. 

In the fight for freedom Bergson gives us a 
" moral equivalent for war." Matter is our 
enemy and we must overcome it. We can, 
therefore we must. Some do, therefore others 
try to follow them. We may become the mas- 
ters of our fate, the " captains of our souls," 
hence we are responsible and ethical beings. 
Both growth and deterioration are possible. 

23 L. P. Jacks, The Alchemy of Thought. 

24 L. P. Jacks, quoted by E. E. Slosson, in the Independent, 
June 8, 1911. 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 233 

If it is not the one, then it will be the other. 
There is no neutral territory in this war. It 
is either conquer or be conquered. " He that 
is not with me is against me," cries the Vital 
Impetus. This call to join in the creative 
work of the world admits of no parleying, no 
dallying. One must decide to go in on one 
side or the other. The issue is so sharp and so 
tremendous that it stirs the blood, rouses sleep- 
ing forces, and furnishes all the essential ele- 
ments of progress and self -development — in- 
terest, attention, opposition, struggle, the inner 
call to the more and the higher, the sense of 
conquest, the realization of personal and eter- 
nal values. As Steenbergen pictures it, 25 in 
his excellent account of Bergson's philosophy, 
" Freedom and spirit are all too easily over- 
come by matter through habit. New life and 
effort are needed when thought becomes a 
mere formula. We must preserve ourselves 
from automatism. Moral action is limited by 
the double activity of spirit, namely, concen- 
tration upon action, and self-consciousness re- 
garding our true nature. We must gird our- 
selves through attention to practical life for 

25 A. Steenbergen, Henri Bergson's Intuitive Philosophie. 



234 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

the sake of strength, and we must also turn 
away from practical life to see the way." 

But this emphasis upon individuality and 
personal effort does not carry with it a crass 
individualism. In the first place, Bergson does 
not identify the experience of the individual 
with his passing consciousness. The experi- 
ence of a man is the sum total of his conscious 
experience wrapt up in the unconscious 
memory, his soul, his character. But more 
than this, beyond the individual there are the 
experiences of his fellowmen which are also 
expressions of the Vital Impetus, individual 

6 rills ' of experience of independent value. 
Thus the " experience of the race " becomes a 
life factor to be reckoned with, and room is 
made for social relations and social values, and 
for that interaction between individuals and 
groups which is so fundamental to all develop- 
ment, both social and individual. Levine says, 26 

' Bergson believes that mankind is tending 
more and more towards social ethics ... (a) 
social ethics based on the principles of har- 
monious collective action and social solidarity." 
This can only mean that Bergson recognizes a 

26 Louis Levine, " Interview with Bergson." cf. the New York 
Times, February 22, 1914. 



INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 235 

necessary social element in the activity of the 
Vital Impulse itself. Indeed we might say 
that, on this view, the nature and workings of 
the Vital Impulse would be, in certain re- 
spects, more evident and more authoritative 
in social life than in individual life. At 
any rate, there could be no narrow in- 
dividualism. There must be a recognition 
of social life, its arrangements and responsi- 
bilities. The fundamental responsibility is 
that of spreading and increasing the life of 
which the Vital Impulse is the source. This 
means a social activity and a social interaction 
out of which new values and new energies will 
come — a free combination of individual auton- 
omy with social responsibility. What is this 
but a " Creative Evolution " which is essen- 
tially ethical? Is not such a fusion of individ- 
uality and subordination the very gist not only 
of morality but also of all higher forms of re- 
ligion, and especially of Christianity? 

• •••••• 

This social emphasis suggests a concluding 
thought which, very fittingly, leads us back 
again to religion. " True religion and unde- 
filed " has always been a great leveler. " God 



236 BERGteON AND RELIGION 

is no respecter of persons." This is why cer- 
tain men do not worship Him; or, if they do 
support religion, they try to twist it and turn 
it to suit their own theories of human nature. 
Religions generally, and Christianity particu- 
larly and most emphatically, insist that all men 
are equal before God. There is, therefore, an 
element of universality, sociality, and even of 
democracy, in the very nature of religion. 
The tendency of Bergsonism to include social- 
ity as well as individuality, points in the same 
direction, especially when we consider the 
basis of that tendency. Its ground is in the 
Vital Impetus, the source of all life, before 
which free souls are equal; through which and 
because of which they are enabled, are morally 
obliged in fact, to enter into social relations 
with a full recognition of one another's status 
and value. While there is no basis here for in- 
ferring the elimination of all differences and 
distinctions, a firm basis is given for the re- 
ligious tenet of equality " in the spirit," and 
for the negation of all narrow and selfish ex- 
clusiveness. 



CHAPTER VII 
IMMORTALITY 

It is generally assumed that the desire for 
immortality and some form of belief in it are 
universal, or well-nigh universal, human traits. 
On the other hand, as Dr. Osier points out in 
his Ingersoll lecture, 1 one may talk with many 
today to whom the future life is a matter of 
apparently complete indifference, if not of 
actual agnosticism or of positive disbelief. As 
one observes the common run of men also, one 
may note in general a fixed course of action 
whose motives seem to spring out of considera- 
tions limited to this life alone. " Getting and 
begetting " explain most of men's actions, and 
human life in its individual, social, and political 
aspects does not seem to be shot through with 
any lively hope regarding what lies beyond the 
grave. 

It may indeed be true that this undoubted 
fact is due to causes that have been operative 

1 William Osier, Science and Immortality, Boston, 1904. 

237 



238 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

only within recent years, and that we have now 
to reckon with a phenomenon which may be but 
a phase through which human thought is pass- 
ing — a lack of proper adaptation to new knowl- 
edge. However that may be, it is certain that 
new knowledge has tended, even though tempo- 
rarily, to turn men away from dependence upon 
a belief in immortality ; in fact it has tended to 
turn them towards disbelief, or at least towards 
agnosticism. The evolutionary conception of 
the universe, according to which man appears 
as an infinitesimal speck upon a minor planet 
which is set in the midst of an infinite number 
of rolling spheres in a cosmos whose age and 
size defy imagination; the modern biological 
view of life, according to which the great 
primal life energy brings forth a myriad of 
passing forms, man among them, which, in 
their purely biological aspect, seem to exist 
only for the continuance of that primal phys- 
ical force itself; the tendency among psychol- 
ogists to assume that the mind is only a func- 
tion of the brain, that all mental activity is not 
only accompanied by brain activity but is also 
caused and conditioned by it — that, as Cabanis 
said, " The brain secretes thought as the liver 



IMMORTALITY 239 

secretes bile," or, as Moleschott said, c No 
thought without phosphorus " ; finally, our pre- 
vailing absorption in the task of subduing 
physical nature to our will, making it prac- 
tically profitable to us ; all these modern tend- 
encies have united to dim the vision of a future 
life and to make such a life seem vague, un- 
certain, unpractical, or unbelievable. 

But one may well raise the question whether 
even past ages have treasured this faith with 
the universality, pertinacity, and conviction so 
often ascribed to them. Certainly it was for- 
merly more easy than now to pass from a nat- 
ural longing for immortality to a belief in it, 
but, to one living in their midst, the most pas- 
sionate and permanent devotion of the ancients 
would probably have appeared a devotion to 
the here and the now, as that of our contempo- 
raries appears to us. Whatever their formal 
faith, they attended, as we attend, to the things 
that are nearest and most tangible. Indeed, 
in certain striking instances, of recognized im- 
portance, even a formal faith seems to have 
been lacking, or practically lacking. While 
the early Hebrews had their Sheol, they so 
conceived it as to make death the end of all that 



240 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

was worth while to them. As a result they be- 
sought Jehovah for length of days that they 
might have as much blessedness as possible be- 
fore death came ; they treasured the gift of chil- 
dren, among other reasons, that they might 
have at least that measure of increased con- 
tinuance; they pictured a messianic kingdom 
whose blessings were purely temporal and, to 
a considerable extent also, purely physical. 
The Buddhist also, while fearing the proba- 
bility of a succession of future existences, as- 
serts the possibility of avoiding a future which 
he dreads, and prescribes a definite course of 
action to that end. 

And yet, all said and done, it is still true 
that mankind throughout the ages has held and 
treasured a belief in life after death and that, 
in the main, it still does so. The Chinese cher- 
ish the hope that they too may some day be- 
come worshiped ancestors, after having so long 
been worshiping descendants. The early He- 
brew conception of Sheol, shadowy and un- 
moral as it was, contained the germ of the 
later eschatology of Judaism, or was at least 
a form which readily lent itself to the recep- 
tion of new content in the natural course of 



IMMORTALITY 241 

Jewish development. The Sheol of later 
Judaism became highly personalized and 
moralized, sometimes as the abode of the right- 
eous alone, sometimes differentiated in its inner 
arrangements so as to receive both " the sheep 
and the goats." The very desire and plan of 
the Buddhist to achieve Nirvana are proofs of 
his conviction that most men are unfortunately 
condemned to another personal, individual life 
after death ; probably a series of lives ; in some 
cases, perhaps, an unending series of them. In 
other words, the prevailing idea that, in past 
ages, a belief in a future life was universal, is 
at least very near the truth. 

Today, also, we must recognize the fact that 
most men, the world over, remain compara- 
tively untouched by the new considerations 
previously mentioned. Whether illusion or 
fact, their belief in a future life is as strong as 
their desire for it. And most men desire it, at 
least in a vague sort of way. Even with most 
of those who have achieved sophistication re- 
garding this and other religious problems, 
there is a longing and a hope, at least at times, 
which protests against the negative and un- 
satisfying conclusions of their intellect. At 



242 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

times the upwelling of fundamental feeling so 
nearly overbears intellectual sturdiness and 
honesty that they are almost ready to say with 
Cicero that they would rather be wrong with 
those who affirm it than right with those who 
deny it. 

But it is not my purpose in this chapter to 
argue the general question of immortality. 
My intention is merely to discuss the matter in 
relation to the religious significance of Berg- 
son's philosophy. We shall come in a moment 
to the more direct phases of our subject. 
Meanwhile it will not be totally beside the mark 
to point out that this widespread sense of un- 
satisfied longing, among those who doubt or 
disbelieve in a future existence, is deeply 
grounded in the needs of human thought and 
life. The demand of the intellect for ration- 
ality in the universe, and the demand of the 
whole man for what may be called a law of the 
conservation of spiritual energy and value — 
these two demands go to the root of things and 
thus necessarily enter into the problem of im- 
mortality as well as into that of religion 
generally. 

The first demand expresses itself thus: 



IMMORTALITY 243 

Human life appears to be the noblest product 
of evolution. Can a universe be rational which 
presents such an appearance and continually 
tempts us to act upon such an assumption, if 
it is not really true that man is the highest? 
And by " highest/' of course, we must mean 
a distinctively psychical thing. This demand 
then continues by asking, u Is a universe ra- 
tional in which so much labor is spent on its 
finest product only to dash the product to 
pieces after a span of years which is as nothing, 
a mere watch in the night? " 

The second demand expresses itself thus: 
The continued exertion of the will depends 
upon a feeling of worth- whileness in the work, 
upon the feeling that somehow there will be 
permanent value in what is done. While one 
may be so self-forgetful as not to need his own 
continued existence and blessedness as a spur 
(very few are), he would surely be definitely 
affected by the thought of the certain extinc- 
tion of all men. The incentive afforded by a 
regard for subsequent generations also loses 
its edge when the final extinction of all these 
generations is postulated. Besides there is no 
guarantee of the unending existence of our 



244 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

planet. Quite the opposite. What then? On 
such a view the transitory effect and value of 
all human effort would bear down upon pres- 
ent motive and enthusiasm in an insupportable 
fashion. We might banish the thought and 
continue our altruistic plans on a purely emo- 
tional basis, but those who could do that suc- 
cessfully for any length of time would be those 
who had inherited that tendency and inspira- 
tion from forbears who acquired and main- 
tained it on the very basis now swept away. 

My chief reason for these possibly too ex- 
tended introductory remarks is to emphasize 
my conviction that it does make a great deal 
of difference to a man whether he believes in 
a future life, and what he believes about the 
future life. A fortiori it makes a great deal of 
difference whether or no this faith plays a vital 
part in the thought and ideals of a people, a 
country, a generation. It intimately concerns 
our estimate of a philosophy, therefore, whether 
that philosophy tends towards, or away from, a 
belief in immortality. In view of the influence 
of Kant upon the ideals of nineteenth century 
Germany, not to extend the illustration more 
widely, it is idle to assert that philosophy and 



IMMORTALITY 245 

philosophers make little difference and do not 
count. Even Napoleon feared the " German 
ideologists," as he called them, and in so say- 
ing, he meant the philosopher Fichte in par- 
ticular. 2 Bergson may not be another Kant, 
or not even a Fichte, but he is widely influ- 
ential. It is therefore significant to remark, in 
connection with the general considerations just 
adduced, that Bergson's thought, as we are 
about to see, is distinctly favorable to a belief in 
the continuance of individuality and person- 
ality after death. 

• •••••• 

It is most natural that belief in a future life 
should always have close connections with re- 
ligion. Certainly God may be conceived so 
as to make any belief in future life unessential 
to His worship. With the reservation already 
made in an earlier paragraph, one may instance 
in this connection the worship of Jehovah by 
the early Hebrews. Still it holds true that 
belief in God and in a future life have mani- 
fested themselves in human history as counter- 
parts. One often has reason to regret this his- 
toric connection. The limited or distorted 

2 Cf. Priest, Germany Since 1740, p. 57. 



246 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

views of earlier days are nowhere more clearly 
manifested than in the pictures of the future 
life drawn by pious artist or learned theologian. 
No Turk would desire for an Armenian a lot 
different from that which Tertullian assigns to 
non-believers. The only reason we can enjoy 
Dante's vivid pictures is because we know they 
are merely poetry. For the day in which these 
word pictures were drawn they were not 
merely poetry. Michelangelo's u Last Judg- 
ment " is a revelation to one who has not pre- 
viously realized what once went under the 
name " Christian." Doubtless one reason for 
modern disbelief in a future life has been the 
concrete picturing of that life in ways that were 
either inadequate or actually offensive. Henry 
Holt expresses the unvoiced feeling of many 
who are weary of such unjustifiable and un- 
true concreteness when he says, with his cus- 
tomary downrightness, that one thing is cer- 
tain about heaven, " there will be no damned 
nonsense there." 3 

Yet it must be admitted that, granted the 
possibility of faith, the more concrete the pic- 
ture the more lively the belief. But the day 

8 Henry Holt, On the Cosmic Relations, New York, 1915. 



IMMORTALITY «4tf 

of such concrete characterizations is gone and 
with their passing, one must admit, an inevita- 
ble diminution in the liveliness of the hope 
must come in. On the other hand, there is 
manifest danger in a too pronounced interest 
in the future. Self-seeking, lack of interest 
in the present task, lack of social consciousness 
— all these are well known accompaniments 
of an undue emphasis upon the future life. 
The solution seems to be to maintain a lively 
faith that it is along with a fitting modesty of 
opinion as to what it is, at least as far as de- 
tails are concerned. 

As we have just said, religion usually carries 
with it some form of belief in a life after death. 
The work of Charles 4 has demonstrated that 
the centuries immediately preceding the Chris- 
tian era were centuries of unsurpassed spirit- 
ual growth in Judaism. One striking feature 
of this period is the change from a belief in an 
unblessed Sheol, or shadowy abode of the dead, 
to a faith in a blessed immortality for the in- 

4 Cf. The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, edited by R. H. 
Charles; Eschatology — Hebrew, Jewish and Christian, by R. 
H. Charles, London, 1899. In this connection I would espe- 
cially recommend Charles' popular but scholarly little book, 
Religions Development Between the Old and New Testaments. 
Home University Series, Holt and Co. 



248 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

dividual. Christianity entered into the in- 
heritance of this late Jewish development and, 
consequently, the future life has always had 
a prominent place in its teaching. But, apart 
from historical connections of this sort, any 
religion based upon a lofty spiritual conception 
of God is bound, sooner or later, to meet and 
attempt to solve the problem of continued in- 
dividual existence. In varying form the ques- 
tionings of Job and of Ecclesiastes are sure to 
recur again and again, and no lofty faith in 
God can stand unimpaired if the scope of His 
activity is limited to this world alone, no mat- 
ter how broadly social the conception may be. 
In the Christian religion the situation is most 
acute because of the two-fold primal emphasis 
upon the supreme worth of the individual and 
upon the loving character of God. 

Therefore, in discussing the religious value 
of a philosophy, it is very much to the point 
to ask whether and how it is favorable to faith 
in a future life. In discussing a philosophy's 
compatibility with Christianity, these questions 
are essential. We are, as yet, without any 
formal discussion of this problem from Berg- 
son's own pen. A few informal statements by 



IMMORTALITY 249 

him are helpful and will be given here in due 
course. In general, however, we must rely 
upon reasonable inferences drawn from his 
dominant philosophical doctrines. 

• •*•••• 

In my judgment, the existing sensitiveness 
regarding faith in individual immortality cen- 
ters about two points. One point is marked 
by the motto, " The mind is only a function of 
the brain "; the other by the phrase, " The in- 
dividual is nothing — the organism is every- 
thing." The first of these two storm centers of 
disbelief may be described thus: There is no 
such thing as an independent existence of the 
soul of man. What we really mean by this 
old-fashioned and antiquated word, " soul," is, 
in fact, only a comparatively ephemeral men- 
tal life which owes its rise entirely to the ki- 
netics of nervous tissue in the brain, owes its 
variety and individuality to its connection 
with a certain distinct physical organism and 
will lose all its individuality, nay even all ex- 
istence, with the disappearance of brain and 
body. We see at once that if the human 
" soul " is to be explained, or explained away, 
in this fashion there is no use in proceeding 



250 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

further. The question is settled. For what we 
mean by " immortality/' " the future life," is 
the continuance of distinctive personality and 
individuality after death, and the position just 
sketched puts an end to the possibility of such 
a thing. We may deceive ourselves as we 
please with interpretations which define im- 
mortality in terms of continuing remem- 
brance in the thought of others, in terms of a 
legacy of benefit left to our descendants. The 
heart of the matter is gone and our question 
is answered — negatively. 

The second storm center is marked by the 
fundamental question : Has the individual any 
primary value ? Has he eternal significance in 
and for himself? Approaching this question 
from the standpoint of our intimate friend- 
ships, our hearts predispose us in favor of an 
affirmative answer. Observation of men in the 
mass, however, often impresses and oppresses 
us with the likeness of men to animals, with 
the blindness, the senselessness, the pure phys- 
ical drive of ordinary human life; and we feel 
that man is after all little, if any, better than 
the dumb beast which perisheth, little better 
than the flower that bloometh for a season and 



IMMORTALITY 251 

then f adeth and withereth away into the phys- 
ical elements from which it sprang. Contem- 
plation of the hugeness of the universe, with its 
forces and its distances staggering to thought, 
gives rise to doubtful wonder that man should 
ever have been described as " but a little lower 
than the angels," an object of permanent value, 
the center and end of all the mighty travail 
of the seons. Also, close consideration of the 
progress of organic evolution reveals an ap- 
parent disregard, on nature's part, of the wel- 
fare and existence of the individual and an 
equally apparent solicitude for the welfare and 
preservation of the species, of the race. 5 The 
resulting impression is that the individual man, 
like all other individual objects, is merely a 
small link in a great chain or, more accurately, 
an unessential by-product of a great imper- 
sonal force to which he is entirely secondary 
and entirely unnecessary. 

To one who is mastered by an emotional re- 
action of this sort, or to whom this kind of 
reasoning has brought an abiding conviction, 

6 Cf. Hermann, graf von Keyserling, Unsterblichkeit, Mun- 
chen, 1911. This book takes the position just indicated in the 
text. One puts it down with an inescapable feeling of de- 
pression. 



252 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

belief in immortality must appear as a chimera 
— beautiful and helpful, perhaps, but still only 
a chimera. In other words, faith in a future 
life is essentially bound up with the conviction 
that man is the pinnacle of creation, that in 
man we do have the goal towards whose attain- 
ment the whole of creation has been groaning 
and travailing until now. This latter convic- 
tion does not necessarily carry with it convic- 
tion of personal immortality, but faith in im- 
mortality, at least for us today, is directly 
dependent upon faith in the supreme worth of 
individual human existence. 

We see, therefore, chat a philosophy which 
is to be adjudged compatible with belief in per- 
sonal immortality — and, as we have seen, that 
carries with it compatibility with an essential 
tenet of the Christian religion and of other re- 
ligions as well — such a philosophy, I say, must 
maintain the independent existence of the 
human soul and must also favor a view which 
gives to the individual man supreme value. 
Now, Bergsonism squares itself clearly with 
both these tests of religious compatibility. Our 
author directly attacks those theories which 
reduce, or tend to reduce, mind to a purely 



IMMORTALITY 253 

physical basis. In speaking of the problem 
of the relation between soul and body, he 
says : 6 

This relation, though it has been a favorite theme 
throughout the history of philosophy, has really 
been very little studied. If we leave on one side the 
theories which are content to state the " union of 
soul and body " as an irreducible and inexplicable 
fact, and those which speak vaguely of the body as 
an instrument of the soul, there remains hardly any 
other conception of the psycho-physiological rela- 
tion than the hypothesis of " epiphenomenalism " or 
that of " parallelism," which in practice — I mean in 
the interpretation of particular facts — both end in 
the same conclusions. For whether, indeed, thought 
is regarded as a mere function of the brain and the 
state of consciousness as an epiphenomenon of the 
state of the brain, or whether mental states and brain 
states are held to be two versions, in two different 
languages, of one and the same original, in either case 
it is laid down that, could we penetrate into the in- 
side of a brain at work and behold the dance of the 
atoms which make up the cortex, and if, on the other 
hand, we possessed the key to psycho-physiology, we 
should know every detail of what is going on in the 
corresponding consciousness. 

This, indeed, is what is most commonly maintained 
by philosophers as well as by men of science. Yet 
6 Cf. Bergson's Matter and Memory, Int. pp. x-xii. 



254 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

it would be well to ask whether the facts, when ex- 
amined without any preconceived idea, really suggest 
an hypothesis of this kind. That there is a close 
connection between a state of consciousness and the 
brain we do not dispute. But there is also a close 
connection between a coat and the nail on which it 
hangs, for, if the nail is pulled out, the coat falls to 
the ground. Shall we say, then, that the shape of 
the nail gives us the shape of the coat, or in any way 
corresponds to it? No more are we entitled to con- 
clude, because the physical fact is hung on to a cere- 
bral state, that there is any parallelism between the 
two series psychical and physiological. When phi- 
losophy pleads that the theory of parallelism is borne 
out by the results of positive science, it enters upon 
an unmistakably vicious circle; for, if science inter- 
prets connection, which is a fact, as signifying paral- 
lelism, which is an hypothesis (and an hypothesis to 
which it is difficult to attach an intelligible meaning), 
it does so, consciously or unconsciously, for reasons 
of a philosophic order : it is because science has been 
accustomed by a certain type of philosophy to be- 
lieve that there is no hypothesis more probable, more 
in accordance with the interests of scientific inquiry. 

But Bergson does more than pull down the 
barns of his opponents. He attempts to build 
greater on his own account, and this attempt 
is in the direction of positive evidence for the 
independent existence of the spirit — or soul- 



IMMORTALITY 255 

life of man. His predominate use of the word 
' memory " does not conceal the real issue for, 
as he himself says : 7 

Any one who approaches, without preconceived 
idea and on the firm ground of facts, the classical 
problem of the relations of soul and body, will soon 
see this problem as centering upon the subject of 
memory. . . 

Again he says : 8 

We must now add that, as pure perception gives 
us the whole or at least the essential part of matter 
(since the rest comes from memory and is super- 
added to matter), it follows that memory must be, 
in principle, a power absolutely independent of mat- 
ter. If, then, spirit is a reality, it is here, in the 
phenomenon of memory, that we may come into touch 
with it experimentally. And hence any attempt to 
derive pure memory from an operation of the brain 
should reveal on analysis a radical illusion. 

Let us put the same matter in clearer language. 
We maintain that matter has no occult or unknow- 
able power, and that it coincides, in essentials, with 
pure perception. Thence we conclude that the living 
body in general, and the nervous system in particu- 
lar, are only channels for the transmission of move- 
ments, which, received in the form of stimulation, are 

transmitted in the form of action, reflex or voluntary. 

7 Cf. Matter and Memory, Int. pp. xii-xiii. 

8 Op. cit., pp. 80-82. 



256 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

That is to say, it is vain to attribute to the cerebral 
substance the property of engendering representa- 
tions. Now the phenomena of memory, in which we 
believe that we can grasp spirit in its most tangible 
form, are precisely those of which a superficial psy- 
chology is most ready to find the origin in cerebral 
activity alone; just because they are at the point of 
contact between consciousness and matter, and be- 
cause even the adversaries of materialism have no 
objection to treating the brain as a storehouse of 
memories. But if it could be positively established 
that the cerebral process answers only to a very small 
part of memory, that it is rather the effect than the 
cause, that matter is here as elsewhere the vehicle of 
an action and not the substratum of a knowledge, then 
the thesis which we are maintaining would be demon- 
strated by the very example which is commonly sup- 
posed to be most unfavorable to it, and the necessity 
might arise of erecting spirit into an independent 
reality. In this way also, perhaps, some light would 
be thrown on the nature of what is called spirit, and 
on the possibility of the interaction of spirit and 
matter. For a demonstration of this kind could not 
be purely negative. Having shown what memory is 
not, we should have to try to discover what it is. 

This independent spirit-reality does not 
have to be continually conscious in order to 
exist. 9 

9 Op. cit., p. 181. 



IMMORTALITY 257 

Without as yet going to the heart of the matter, 
we will confine ourselves to the remark that our un- 
willingness to conceive unconscious psychical states 
is due, above all, to the fact that we hold conscious- 
ness to be the essential property of psychical states : 
so that a psychical state can not, it seems, cease to 
be conscious without ceasing to exist. But if con- 
sciousness is but the characteristic note of the 
present, that is to say of the actually lived, in short 
of the active, then that which does not act may cease 
to belong to consciousness without therefore ceasing 
to exist in some manner. In other words, in the psy- 
chological domain, consciousness may not be the 
synonym of existence, but only of real action or of 
immediate efficacy. . . 

This means that our " soul " is much more 
than present consciousness. Our conscious 
life is always a present focal point at which the 
whole past of our stored-up experience, our 
unconscious spirit-life, seeks to bore its way 
through the plane of the immediate into the 
future w 7 hich lies beyond. One should read the 
whole of Chapter IV of Matter and Memory 
w T here Bergson sums up his case regarding the 
relation of soul and body. The following quo- 
tations give only a suggestion, and a very in- 
adequate one at that, of the course and conclu- 
sions of the argument : 



258 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

One general conclusion follows from the first three 
chapters of this book: it is that the body, always 
turned towards action, has for its essential function 
to limit, with a view to action, the life of the spirit. 10 
. . . the orientation of our consciousness towards 
action appears to be the fundamental law of our 
psychical life. 

Strictly, we might stop here, for this work was 
undertaken to define the function of the body in the 
life of the spirit. But, on the one hand, we have 
raised by the way a metaphysical problem which we 
cannot bring ourselves to leave in suspense ; and on 
the other, our researches, although mainly psycho- 
logical, have on several occasions given us glimpses, 
if not of the means of solving the problem, at any 
rate of the side on which it should be approached. 

This problem is no less than that of the union of 
soul and body. It comes before us clearly and with 
urgency, because we make a profound distinction be- 
tween matter and spirit. And we cannot regard it 
as insoluble, since we define spirit and matter by posi- 
tive characters, and not by negations. It is in very 
truth within matter that pure perception places us, 
and it is really into spirit that we penetrate by means 
of memory. But, on the other hand, whilst introspec- 
tion reveals to us the distinction between matter and 
spirit, it also bears witness to their union. Either, 
then, our analyses are vitiated ab origine, or they 

10 Matter and Memory, p. 233. 



IMMORTALITY 259 

must help us to issue from the difficulties they raise. 11 
... to touch the reality of spirit we must place our- 
selves at the point where an individual consciousness, 
continuing and retaining the past in a present en- 
riched by it, thus escapes the law of necessity, the 
law which ordains that the past shall ever follow it- 
self in a present which merely repeats it in another 
form, and that all things shall ever be flowing away. 
When we pass from pure perception to memory, we 
definitely abandon matter for spirit. 12 

For Bergson, there is such a thing as the 
human soul. It does not owe its origin to the 
brain, to matter. Indeed, the brain is merely 
a kind of central telephonic exchange for the 
transmission of messages both ways, between 
physical nature and the soul. 13 The existence 
of the soul, therefore, is not dependent upon 
the brain. It seems clear, however, that the 
soul is not a static entity, but a growing thing 
whose growth, at least under existing human 
conditions, depends upon action; and action 
means the use of the brain for definite practical 
ends. 

The acceptance of this phase of Bergson's 
teaching certainly leaves the way entirely open 

11 Op. cit., pp. 234-235. 12 Op. cit., p. 313. 

13 Op. cit., p. 19. 



260 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

for belief in individual immortality. It does 
more than that. It creates a presumption in 
favor of such a faith. More could hardly be 
expected of a philosopher who has until now 
definitely postponed the consideration of this 
particular subject. At present we can only 
draw inferences, for, in his formal works, 
Bergson offers us nothing more definite in the 
direction of a positive, constructive position. 
One important fact is certain: Bergson's 
theory, if true, sweeps away one set of stub- 
born objections to belief in a future life ; it then 
proceeds, positively, to set up a basis upon 
which one is free and even encouraged to build 
his structure of faith. 

• •••••• 

We now turn to consider the Bergsonian 
estimate of the individual. Our contention is 
that a philosophy, in order to show itself com- 
patible with a belief in personal immortality, 
must favor a view which ascribes supreme value 
to the individual. Does Bergsonism do that? 

In Matter and Memory we are led to the 
conclusion that the spirit of man is not the 
offspring of matter, nor yet its slave. Indeed, 
the general impression resulting from Berg- 



IMMORTALITY 261 

son's thesis regarding the relations of mind and 
matter, soul and body, is one of heightened 
appreciation of the place of man in the uni- 
verse. An examination of Time and Free 
Will yields the same result. Bergson contends 
that free will is a fact. To be sure, even man 
achieves it only rarely but man alone achieves 
it at all. The free act is preeminently a soul- 
ful act, and in its manifestation we may see, 
according to the philosophy of Creative 
Evolution, the workings of the Vital Impetus, 
the final reality of the universe. It takes but 
little imagination to see that this is only a mod- 
ern way of saying ancient things about the 
supreme value of man. 

It is in Bergson's volume on Creative Evo- 
lution that this doctrine of man is set forth 
most clearly and explicitly. No shallow opti- 
mism prevents Bergson from recognizing the 
present inferiority of man in certain directions, 
as, for example, in his powers of instinct; nor 
does he fail to give full play to the limiting and 
determining effect of physical forces. In 
speaking of man, also, as the goal of evolution, 
his distinctive teleological theory forces upon 
him a reserve and a restraint which may puzzle 



262 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

those who are orthodox in their teleology. It 
may make them wonder whether Bergson's 
left hand does not take away what his right 
hand giveth. In spite of these considerations 
it is correct to say that Creative Evolution up- 
holds belief in the supreme worth of man, and 
by that I mean not merely man, the species, but 
man, the individual. A few quotations will 
illustrate this. 14 

From this point of view, not only does conscious- 
ness appear as the motive principle of evolution, but 
also, among conscious beings themselves, man comes 
to occupy a privileged place. Between him and the 
animals the difference is no longer one of degree, but 
of kind. 15 

If, now, we should wish to express this in terms of 
finality, we should have to say that consciousness, 
after having been obliged, in order to set itself free, 
to divide organization into two complementary parts, 
vegetables on the one hand and animals on the other, 
has sought an issue in the double direction of instinct 
and of intelligence. It has not found it with instinct, 
and it has not obtained it on the side of intelligence 
except by a sudden leap from the animal to man. So 

14 One should read the whole book, but especially, in this 
connection, Chapters II and III. In addition to the quotations 
given, I would call particular attention to pp. 101-102, 105, 
126-134, 151, 191-192. 

16 Creative Evolution, p. 182. One should read from p. 181. 



IMMORTALITY 263 

that, in the last analysis, man might be considered 
the reason for the existence of the entire organiza- 
tion of life on our planet. 16 

Radical therefore, also, is the difference between 
animal consciousness, even the most intelligent, and 
human consciousness. For consciousness corresponds 
exactly to the living being's power of choice ; it is co- 
extensive with the fringe of possible action that sur- 
rounds the real action: consciousness is synonymous 
with invention and with freedom. Now, in the ani- 
mal, invention is never anything but a variation on 
the theme of routine. Shut up in the habits of the 
species, it succeeds, no doubt,, in enlarging them by 
its individual initiative; but it escapes automatism 
only for an instant, for just the time to create a 
new automatism. The gates of its prison close as 
soon as they are opened; by pulling at its chain it 
succeeds only in stretching it. With man, conscious- 
ness breaks the chain. In man, and in man alone, it 
sets itself free. . . 

They express the difference of kind, and not only 
of degree, which separates man from the rest of the 
animal world. They let us guess that, while at the 
end of the vast springboard from which life has 
taken its leap, all the others have stepped down, find- 
ing the cord stretched too high, man alone has 
cleared the obstacle. 

18 Op. cit., pp. 184-185. The rest of this paragraph modi- 
fies the force of the last sentence quoted, in the direction of 
Bergson's teleogical theory, but does not take away its value 
for our present purpose. 



264 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

It is in this quite special sense that man is the 
" term " and the " end " of evolution. . . 

From our point of view, life appears in its entirety 
as an immense wave which, starting from a center, 
spreads outwards, and which on almost the whole of 
its circumference is stopped and converted into oscil- 
lation: at one single point the obstacle has been 
forced, the impulsion has passed, freely. It is this 
freedom that the human form registers. Everywhere 
but in man, consciousness has had to come to a stand ; 
in man alone it has kept on its way. Man, then, con- 
tinues the vital movement indefinitely, although he 
does not draw along with him all that life carries in 
itself. On other lines of evolution there have traveled 
other tendencies which life implied, and of which, 
since everything interpenetrates, man has, doubtless, 
kept something, but of which he has kept only very 
little. It is as if a vague and formless being, whom 
we may call, as we will, Man or Superman, had 
sought to realize himself, and had succeeded only by 
abandoning a part of himself on the way. 11 

As the smallest grain of dust is bound up with our 
entire solar system, drawn along with it in that un- 
divided movement of descent which is materiality it- 
self, so all organized beings, from the humblest to 
the highest, from the first origins of life to the time 
in which we are, and in all places as in all times, do 
but evidence a single impulsion, the inverse of the 
movement of matter, and in itself indivisible. All 
17 Op. cit., pp. 263-266. Selected sentences. 



IMMORTALITY 265 

the living hold together, and all yield to the same 
tremendous push. The animal takes its stand on the 
plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of hu- 
manity in space and in time, is one immense army 
galloping beside and before and behind each of us in 
an overwhelming charge able to beat down every re- 
sistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, per- 
haps even death. 18 

However one may quarrel with, or fail to 
appreciate, Bergson's teleology, one cannot 
deny that the definite result of his view of evo- 
lution is to place the crown upon the head of 
man. Man is the goal, the very intention of 
creation, the finest flower of the organic proc- 
ess; and not only man the species, to which 
the individual is merely subordinate and sec- 
ondary, but man the individual, since it is in 
the spiritual manifestations of his inner life 
that his superiority resides. We see, there- 
fore, that our philosophy supports that faith 
which we have postulated as the second of the 
two necessary presuppositions of belief in in- 
dividual immortality. 

• •••••• 

But one or two statements in the quotations 
just given point to an even more positive con- 

18 Op. cit., pp. 270-271. 



266 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

elusion. One cannot overlook the phrase, 
" able to beat down every resistance and clear 
the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even 
death'' 19 Such statements must not be pressed 
too hard and indeed, as they stand, they do not 
necessarily imply belief in personal survival. 
They are, however, strictly compatible with 
such a faith. Further, more definite state- 
ments made by Bergson elsewhere, in an in- 
formal way, show that these sentences in 
Creative Evolution probably bore in his own 
mind at the time of writing a certain amount 
of individualistic interpretation. Let us glance 
at some of these informal observations. 

If we can prove (as Bergson thinks he can) that 
the role of the brain is to fix the attention of the 
mind on matter and that by far the greater part of 
mental life is independent of the brain, then we have 
proved the likelihood of survival ; and it is for those 
who do not believe it to prove that they are right, 
not for us to prove they are wrong. 20 

On the other hand, when we see that consciousness, 
whilst being at once creation and choice, is also mem- 
ory, that one of its essential functions is to accumu- 
late and preserve the past, that very probably (I 

19 The italics are mine. 

20 Bergson, quoted in the Literary Digest, March 1, 1913. 



IMMORTALITY 267 

lack time to attempt the demonstration of this point) 
the brain is an instrument of forgetfulness as much 
as one of remembrance, and that in pure conscious- 
ness nothing of the past is lost, the whole of a con- 
scious personality being an indivisible continuity, 
are we not led to suppose that the effort continues 
beyond, and that in this passage of consciousness 
through matter (the passage which at the tunnel's 
exit gives distinct personalities) consciousness is 
tempered like steel, and tests itself by clearly consti- 
tuting personalities and preparing them, by the very 
effort which each of them is called upon to make, for a 
higher form of existence ? If we admit that with man 
consciousness has finally left the tunnel, that every- 
where else consciousness has remained imprisoned, 
that every other species corresponds to the arrest of 
something which in man succeeded in overcoming re- 
sistance and in expanding almost freely, thus dis- 
playing itself in true personalities capable of re- 
membering all and willing all and controlling their 
past and their future, we shall have no repugnance 
in admitting that in man, though perhaps in man 
alone, consciousness pursues its path beyond this 
earthly life. 21 

A part of Levine's interview with Bergson 
runs as follows : 22 

21 Bergson, " Life and Consciousness," in the Hibbert Jour- 
nal, October, 1911. 

22 Louis Levine, " Interview with Bergson, 1 " New York Times, 
February 22, 1914. 



268 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

The religious feeling, he (Bergson) thinks, not 
only connects the individual with the spiritual source 
of life, it creates in him the hope in the continuation 
of spiritual existence beyond. There is no reason, 
according to Professor Bergson, to deny the con- 
tinuity of individual existence after death. The 
facts do not warrant such a conclusion. What we 
observe in death is the destruction of the material 
organism and of the brain. Now that would mean 
total spiritual destruction if the brain was commen- 
surate with the totality of spiritual life. But it is 
not. What Professor Bergson believes to have 
proved is that the brain is but a part of the spiritual 
life of the mind. 

Bergson thinks that the brain concentrates certain 
psychological processes necessary for action. It 
focuses the attention of the organism upon the ma- 
terial surroundings within which it has to move and 
to live. It is, therefore, limited and expresses only 
a part of the spiritual life. He holds that outside 
of it and independently of it there goes on a wider 
spiritual life in us — -the life of the instincts, the life 
of the emotions, the life of vague aspiration and of 
infinite longing, and that life is not dependent upon 
the brain, and it must not disappear with the brain. 
There is the greatest probability that it continues 
as an individual spiritual existence after the brain 
has been destroyed. 

Why is it improbable that this spiritual unity 
should continue to experience its connection with the 



IMMORTALITY 269 

original source of life and to develop its own possi- 
bilities ? Personally, Professor Bergson believes that 
it is not at all improbable. On the contrary, he has 
the feeling of certainty about it. He does not think, 
however, that the data at hand as yet warrant more 
than an affirmation of high probability. 

This report is of great value in spite of its 
occasional crudeness and clumsiness of form, 

Bergson has given the best evidence of his 
faith, or at least of his openmindedness, by ac- 
cepting the presidency of the Society for 
Psychical Research. In his presidential ad- 
dress before the Society in London, he said, 



23 



The more we become accustomed to this idea of a 
consciousness which overflows the organism, the more 
natural and probable we find the hypothesis that the 
soul survives the body. 

Were, indeed, the mental molded exactly on to 
the cerebral, were there nothing more in a human 
consciousness than what could be read in a human 
brain, we might have to admit that consciousness 
must share the fate of the body and die with it. 

But if the facts, studied without any preposses- 
sions, lead us on the contrary to regard the mental 
life as much more vast than the cerebral life, sur- 

23 Quoted from a report in the New York Times, Septem- 
ber 27, 1914. 



270 BERGSON AND RELIGION 

vival becomes so probable that the burden of proof 
comes to lie on him who denies it rather than on him 
who affirms it. 

For, as I have said elsewhere, " The one and only 
reason we can have for believing in an extinction of 
consciousness after death is that we see the body has 
become disorganized." And this reason no longer 
has any value, if the independence, however partial, 
of consciousness in regard to the body is also a fact 
of experience. 

In spite of the encouragement which these 
remarks bring to us, we must not draw from 
them hasty and unwarranted conclusions re- 
garding the relation of Bergson's philosophy, 
as such, to the problem of immortality. Carr 
points out clearly the status of the question on 
the basis of the philosophy of change. 24 After 
discussing the interrelations of spirit and mat- 
ter, he continues : 

The same considerations apply to the question of 
personal immortality. We have seen that it is pos- 
sible to regard, nay that we must regard, the soul 
as a reality distinct in every respect from the body, 
the body being an extension, the soul a duration, 
and there is no single attribute which is common to 

24 H. Wildon Carr, The Philosophy of Change, cf. pp. 193- 
195. 



IMMORTALITY 271 

both. But then we have seen that it is only in action, 
and in the change which action implies, that the soul 
endures, and it is only in the solidarity of mind and 
body that action is known or conceivable. Conse- 
quently if we could give any meaning at all to the 
soul in entire separation from its activity in the body, 
we must in imagination supply something to take 
the place of the body. It certainly seems that mind 
exists quite apart from the particular circumstances 
of the organism in which its individual activity be- 
gins and ends, each at a definite moment, for life 
passes from one individual to another by means of 
the most slender material thread. It seems to have 
the power of concentrating itself in a germ which, 
when we judge it, as we needs must, by its mass, ap- 
pears infinitely insignificant. Yet it also seems that 
this material continuity is absolutely essential in 
order that life and mind may pass from generation 
to generation. Consequently the difficulty there is 
in believing in personal immortality is much more 
a scientific than a philosophic difficulty. There is 
nothing inconceivable or inconsistent in the idea in 
the sense that it can be shown to be logically con- 
tradictory or metaphysically impossible. It is cer- 
tainly impossible that the soul of an individual can 
exist as that individual apart from the body, because 
it is just that embodiment which constitutes the in- 
dividuality. But it is quite possible to imagine, if 
we find it otherwise credible, that the miracle of a 
resurrection of the body may be a fact. Clearly it 



VIZ BERGSON AND RELIGION 

would be vain to seek in philosophy the confirmation 
of such a belief, but also it would be beyond the 
sphere of philosophy to negate it. On the other 
hand, there is nothing in philosophy that positively 
indicates such a reality as an individual soul inde- 
pendent of the body, which enters it at birth and 
survives the body's dissolution, or which comes into 
existence at birth and retains that existence after 
death. The impulse of life that philosophy makes 
its special subject-matter is equally manifested in 
the lowest form of vegetable and animal existence as 
it is in the highest forms of intellectual and instinc- 
tive activity. 

There is, however, one form (perhaps the most 
prevalent form) of the doctrine of the immortality 
of the soul which this philosophy does absolutely 
negate, — the theory of Plato that the soul is by its 
nature eternal in the sense that it is timeless and 
unchanging. According to this theory the soul is of 
like nature with God, from whom it emanates and to 
whom it returns. Like God, it is eternal and im- 
mortal in the sense that it persists unchanged. Our 
philosophy agrees that the soul is of like nature with 
God only if we understand God's nature to be the 
unceasing, ever-changing freedom of creative life. 
But there is one distinct ground of personal hope 
that this philosophy of change alone gives. We have 
seen that in the reality of a pure duration the past 
is preserved — preserved in its entirety. Now if this 
preservation of the past is a necessary attribute of 



IMMORTALITY 273 

pure duration, then may it not be that some means 
exists, some may think must exist, by which life pre- 
serves those individual histories that seem to break 
their continuity at death? If it is not so there must 
be unaccountable waste in the universe, for almost 
every living form carries on an activity beyond the 
maturing of the germ and its transmission to a new 
generation. It would be in entire accordance with 
what we know if it should prove to be so, but we may 
never know. One thing is clear, the life-impulse 
bends us to the practical task of attention to life, 
and wide though our outlook is in comparison with 
other forms of activity, we are yet confined to an 
infinitely narrow view of the reality of which we are 
a part. 

I have given this quotation rather at length, 
but purposely so. Carr is an out and out 
apostle of the philosophy of change and I 
wished to indicate here the direction Bergson's 
ideas are taking among at least some of his 
followers, especially in regard to the question 
of immortality. Some may think the result is 
disappointing. To me it is sobering, but not 
disappointing. We must not expect too much 
of philosophy. If we look to it to present us with 
a lively faith in the future life, we shall indeed 
be disappointed. But does that render useless 



Tib BERGSON AND RELIGION 

its efforts in this direction? I do not think so. 
Carr is evidently a little more " tough-minded " 
than Bergson but, nevertheless, even he goes 
beyond purely negative results. All that we 
have a right to expect from philosophy is that 
we shall gather momentum as we proceed 
along the track of reason so that when we 
reach the end of that track — and end it must, 
sooner or later — we may rise surely and tri- 
umphantly on the wings of faith into those 
regions whither reason can never penetrate but 
whence comes, through faith, a much needed 
inspiration for life. In other words, the future 
life is a thing to be believed in rather than a 
thing to be demonstrated. This does not mean 
a blind, unreasoning, or unreasonable faith, 
but it does mean faith. 

• •••••• 

Now our conclusion with regard to Bergson 
is that he leaves us free to believe; nay more, 
he furnishes us with a basis which encourages 
us to believe. The general tendency of his 
thinking is spiritual and progressive and would 
seem to be more compatible with a Christian 
conception of life — whether here or beyond — 
than with any other. Charles holds that there 



IMMORTALITY 275 

are only two theories of the future life which 
are consistent with the Christian conception of 
God, namely, conditional immortality and uni- 
versalism. Bergsonism is compatible with 
either view. " I have come that ye might have 
life, and that ye might have it more abun- 
dantly." So Christ taught of himself and so 
Bergson allows us, and even encourages us, to 
think of him, and that too whether we think of 
the more abundant life as here and now, or 
beyond the gates of death. 



INDEX 



Abbott, Lyman 132. 
Absolute, 43, 47, 57, 71, 80, 

84, 130, 195, 204. 
Absolute, the 32, 41, 44, 90, 

95, 99, 100, 107, 113, 114, 

117, 151. 
Absolutism, 37, 45. 
Absolutism, Bergson's attack 

on 45 f. 
Absolutistic, 45, 46, 94, 180. 
Absolutists, 45, 52. 
Adaptation to environment, 

101. 
Agnostic, 16, 41, 42, 45, 63, 

79, 106. 
Agnosticism, 16, 19, 33, 41-3, 

57, 61, 63, 65 9 76, 79, 80, 

115, 237, 238. 
Agnosticism, Bergson's 

thought and 44, 76 f . 
America, 9. 

Ancestor worship, 240. 
Animism, 37, 144, 161. 
Animistic, 145. 
Anti-Christ, 92. 
Anti-ethical tendencies of 

Bergson, 177, 178, 181 f., 

184. 
Anti-scientific tendencies of 

Bergson, 33, 34, 41, 81, 

169, 178. 
Aquinas, Thomas 13, 14. 
Aquinas, Bergson, Newman 

and 5. 
Arguments for immortality, 

242 f., 252 f. 
Aristotelian, 13, 14, 33, 72. 
Aristotelianism, 14, 15, 69. 
Aristotle, 13. 
Armenian, 246. 



Associationist, 204. 
Assumptions of deterministic 

science, 189 f. 
Atheist, 106. 
Augustinian, 14. 
Author, Bergson's illustration 

from work of an 169. 
Automatisms, 194, 233, 263. 

Baldwin, J. Mark 60 9 110. 

Balthaser, Nicholas 109. 

Belief in freedom, 186. 

Bergson : 

Creative Evolution, 30, 38, 

46, 66, 67, 74, 75, 95, 97 f., 

109, 111, 128 f., 145, 155, 

156, 227, 261 f. 

Emphasis on history, 179 f. 

Epistemology, 60 f ., 70 f ., 

81, 84, 85, 95. 
His thought in relation to 
Christian theism, 134 f., 
creeds, 84 f ., development 
of religion, 139 f., ethics, 
166, 181 f., finality of 
Christianity, 114 f., 142 f., 
immortality, 237 f ., in- 
carnation, 113 f., theism, 
105 f., 164 f. 
Idea of causality, 198 f., 
creative evolution, 66 f., 
90 f ., 97 f ., determinism, 
198 f., duration, 50, 66 9 
95 f., 100, 113, 194, 196, 
197, 200 f., 270, 272 f., 
freedom, 185 f., 193 f., 
God, 105 f., 108 f., in- 
stinct, 70 f ., 73 f ., intel- 
lect, 32 f., 70 f., 73 f., 
167 f., intuition, 71 f., 75, 



277 



278 



INDEX 



Bergson, Continued: 

148 f., 167 f., primacy of 
spirit, 148 f., science, 
33 f., time, 45, 99, 100. 

Influence of 9. 

Introduction to Metaphys- 
ics, 30, 38, 64, 73, 86. 

Laughter, essay on 30, 212. 

Lecture tour in the United 
States, 179. 

Materialism, attack on 52 f. 

Materialistic, 152 f . 

Matter and Memory, 30, 55, 
109, 145, 152, 162, 253, 
255 f. 

Mysticism, dangers of 177 f. 

Newman and Aquinas, 5. 

Objects of his polemic, 31 f. 

On religion, 8. 

Orthodoxy, attack on 45. 

Pantheistic or theistic ? 
107 f. 

Pluralistic or monistic ? 
106 f. 

President of Society for 
Psychical Research, 269. 

Reaction against determin- 
ism, 150 f. 

Relation to pragmatism, 
31 f., to the present sit- 
uation in France, Pref. 
viii. 

Religious values of his idea 
of evolution, 105 f., free- 
dom, 206 f ., intuition, 
81 f., 173 f., primacy of 
spirit, 164 f. 

Religious values of his pro- 
tests, 27 f., of his theory 
of knowledge, 76 f., 89. 

Significance for Christian 
thought, 5 

Subjectivism, 179 f. 

Theory of life, 65 f., of 
matter, 159 f., of memory, 
161, of the " pure mem- 
ory," 53, 146, 162, 163, 



167, of "pure percep- 
tion," 53, 54, 64, 152, 255, 
258, 259. 
Time and Free Will, 3, 30, 
50, 53, 94, 97, 109, 193 f., 
223, 261. 

Bibliography, Pref. x, 5, 6, 64. 

Biological, 37, 46, 105, 150, 
155, 238. 

Biologists, 150. 

Biology, 35, 131, 151. 

" Board of Guardians," 51. 

Body, the 110, 144, 145, 156, 
161, 163, 229, 249, 253, 
255 9 257, 259, 269 f. 

Bornhausen, Karl, 6, 153 f., 
167. 

Boutroux, Emile 192. 

Brain and mind, 158, 190 f., 
252 f. 

Buddhist view of immortality, 
240 f. 

Bursting shell figure, 67, 68. 

Cabanis, 238. 

Caird, Edward 11. 

Calvinism, 193, 214. 

Capitalism, 215. 

Carr, H. Wildon 64, 76, 78, 

95, 170, 171, 190, 193, 

270 f. 
Carr on immortality, 270 f. 
Categorical imperative, 181 f. 
Catholic, 15, 174. 
Causality, 198 f. 
Cause, 98. 

Chamberlain, S. H., 168. 
Change, 130, 131, 168, 190, 

216, 270 f 
Charge of materialism against 

Bergson, 152 f. 
. Charles, R. H., 247, 274, 275. 
Charpin, Frederic 153 
Chemical, 156. 
Chemistry, 38, 39. 
Chinese view of immortality, 

240. 



INDEX 



279 



Christ, 5, 29, 134, 136, 193, 215, 

275. 
Christian, 13, 14, 16, 26, 29, 

44, 113 f., 123 f., 131, 134, 

136 f., 143, 147, 165, 184, 

220, 227, 230, 231, 246 f., 

252, 274, 275. 
Christian thought, Bergson's 

significance for 5. 
Christianity, 11, 16, 24, 26, 

29, 44; 87, 114, 116, 131, 

136, 139, 142, 184, 216, 

228 f ., 235, 248, 275. 
Christianity and immortality, 

248 f., 252, 274 f. 
Church, the 13 f., 87, 88, 134, 

180. 
Cicero, 242. 

Cinematograph, 72, 84, 159. 
Coignet, C. 6. 
Comic in animals, the 212. 
Communion with God, 177, 

206, 210 f. 
Comparative religion, 139 f. 
Comte, A. 92. 
Concepts, 73, 87, 170. 
Conditional immortality, 275. 
Conscience, 83, 183. 
Conscious, 160, 162, 163, 181, 

182, 200 f., 234, 256, 262, 

267. 
Consciousness, 54, 55, 103, 

104, 106, 108, 109, 111, 

152, 158, 159, 162, 170, 

171, 191, 201, 234, 253 f., 

262, 263, 266 f. 
Conservation of energy, 149, 

202, 203. 
Contingent, 201, 202. 
Conversion, religious 222 f. 
Cooperation with God, 206, 

214 f. 
Corbiere, Charles 6, 106. 
Corrance, H. C. 108, 130. 
Cosmic soul, 163, 164. 
Cosmos, 110. 
Creation, 49, 99, 100, 109, 118, 



133, 145, 152, 158, 194, 

252, 266. 
Creative, 110, 208, 213, 225, 

227, 277, 230, 232, 233, 

272. 
Creative Evolution, Bergson's 

30, 38, 46, 66, 67, 74, 75, 

95, 97 f., 109, 111, 128 f., 

145, 155, 156, 227, 261 f. 
Creative evolution, Bergson's 

idea of 90 f. 
Creator, 107 f., 146, 176. 
Creeds, 51, 84, 87, 88, 134. 
Creeds, Bergson's thought and 

84 f. 

Dante, 246. 

Death, 187, 229, 265 f. 

Deist, 110. 

Democritus, 55. 

Determinism, 31, 34, 37, 57, 

94, 149 f., 188 f., 198. 
Determinism, Bergson's idea 

of 198 f. 
Deterministic, 36, 37, 93, 141, 

149, 150, 161, 188, 192, 

193, 198. 
Determinists, 189, 199. 
Development of religion 3 

Bergson's thought and 

139 f. 
Dignity of religion, 83 f. 
" Ding-an-Sich," the 77. 
Dogma, 84 f. 

Dogmatic, 41, 57, 89, 101, 114. 
Dogmatism, 31, 34, 40, 41, 46, 

47, 122. 
Dogmatists, 46, 52, 88, 89. 
Doubt regarding immortality, 

237 f., 249 f., 270 f. 
Douglas, 5. 
Dualism, 36, 108, 159. 
Duration, 50, 66, 95 f., 100, 

113, 194, 196, 197, 200 f., 

270 f. 
Dynamics, 198. 
Dynamism, 201. 



280 



INDEX 



Ecclesiastes, 25, 248 
Ecclesiastical presumption, 51, 

122. 
Ecstasy, 174, 181. 
Edghill, E. A. 16, IT. 
"Elan vital," 66, 67, 95, 159. 
Eleatics, the 50. 
Empiricism, 39. 
End, 61, 129, 130, 133. 
England, 9. 
English, 24. 

Environment, 98, 101, 117, 187. 
Epiphenomenalism, 53, 253. 
Epistemology, Bergson's 60 f. 
Eschatology, 135, 240, 247. 
Eternal life, 133. 
Ethical, 20, 145, 146, 164, 166, 

167, 181, 184, 213, 214, 

228, 232, 235. 
Ethical value of Bergson's 

doctrine of the soul, 166. 
Ethics, 6, 7, 35, 36, 62 , 165, 

181 f., 234. 
Ethics, Bergsonian 181 f. 
Ethnic faiths, 142. 
Eucken, R. 5. 
Evil, problem of 120 f. 
Evolution, 45, 46, 49, 57, 66 f., 

78, 90 f., 149, 157, 161, 

203, 213, 231, 235, 238, 

243, 251, 261 f. 
Evolution and mechanism, 

91 f. 
Evolution, Bergson's idea of 

66 f., 97 f., 
Evolutionary systems, his- 
toric 90 f. 
Extensity, 50. 



Facts against belief in free- 
dom, 187 f. 

Faith, 81, 82, 87 f., 115, 120 f., 
143, 147, 154, 176, 180, 
192, 225, 239, 244 f., 260, 
266, 273, 274. 

Faith and intuition, 173 f. 



Faith and reason, 20 f. 

Fatalism, 121, 133, 230. 

Fatalistic, 214. 

" Father," the 134 f., 215. 

Fechner, 43, 44. 

Fichte, 245. 

Finalism, 47, 49, 99, 102, 111, 

116, 117, 127 f. 
Finalists, 48, 98, 112, 117. 
Finality, 115, 128, 129. 
Finality of Christianity, 

Bergson's thought and 

the 114 f., 142 f. 
Flux, 127, 128. 
Formalism, 167, 174, 176. 
France, Pref. viii, 9. 
Freedom, 49, 50, 56, 103, 104, 

110, 117, 130, 154, 157, 

166, 167, 183, 263, 264, 

272. 
Freedom and iconoclasm, 

217 f. 
Freedom and morality, 220 f. 
Freedom of the individual, 

185 f. 
Free will, 49, 150 f., 261. 
French, 24. 

Galatians, Book of 193, 220. 

German, 24. 

" German Ideologists," 245. 

Germany, 9, 244. 

Gerrard, 5. 

Gillouin, Rene 34, 151. 

Gnosticism, 151. 

Gnostics, 173. 

God, 28, 29, 42, 46, 49, 51, 52, 
80 f., .86 f., 103, 105, 106, 
108 f., 115 f., 130, 132 f., 
145 f., 148, 164, 176, 177, 
183, 187, 189, 206 f., 245, 
248, 264, 268, 272, 275. 

God, Bergson's idea of 105 f. 

God growing, 49, 100, 116 f., 
119, 125 f. 

God, omnipotence of 116 f., 
124 f. 



INDEX 



281 



God, omniscience of 116 f., 

124 f. 
Goethe, 167. 
Gospel, the 113. 
Greek, 29, 60. 

" Habit memory," 162, 167. 

Haeckel, 90, 91, 92. 

Harnack, 17. 

Heathenism, 139. 

Heaven, 246. 

Hebraism, 139. 

Hebrew, 240. 

Hebrew-Christian, 143. 

Hebrew Prophetism, 229. 

Hebrew view of immortality, 
239 f. 

Hebrews, 239, 245. 

Hegel, 90. 

Hegelian, 140. 

Hegelian view of religion, 
11 f. 

Hegelians, 11, 91. 

Heracleitan, 5. 

Hermann, E. 5. 

Hermann, W. 16, 17. 

Historical, 181, 248. 

History, 131, 149, 155, 179, 
180, 183, 245. 

History, Bergson's emphasis 
on 179 f. 

Hoffding, 211. 

Holt, Henry 79, 179, 246. 

Human longing for immor- 
tality, 241 f. 

Humanitarianism, 61. 

Hume, 76. 

Hymenoptera, 66, 170. 

Iconoclasm and freedom, 217. 
Idealism, 11, 32, 53, 93, 131, 

173. 
Idealist, 17. 

Idealistic, 32, 149, 167. 
Illusion, 42, 50, 185, 241, 252. 
Immanent, 106, 108, 109, 164. 
Immortality, 104, 155 f., 163, 

227 f., 237 f. 



Immortality, Bergson's 

thought and 237 f. 
Immortality, is belief in it 

universal? 237 f. 
Incarnation, 113, 114. 
Incarnation, Bergson's 

thought and 113 f. 
Indestructibility of matter, 

149. 
Indian, 113. 
Individuality, 230, 231, 234, 

245, 249, 250. 
Individuals, 68, 99, 104, 111, 

161 f ., 182, 183, 216, 229 f., 

235, 241, 247 f., 259 f., 

265, 268, 271 f. 
Industrialism, 215. 
Inertia, 74. 
Infinite, the 229. 
Influence of Bergson, 9. 
Instinct, 67, 69, 70, 72 f., 

170 f., 261, 262, 268. 
Instinct, Bergson's idea of 

70 f., 73 f . 

Intellect, 32, 33, 39, 64, 66, 

67, 70 f., 76, 78, 81, 82, 

84, 85, 130, 159, 169 f., 

176, 178, 190, 194, 197, 

209, 241, 242. 
Intellect, Bergson's idea of 

32 f., 70 f., 73 f., 167 f. 
Intellectualism, 150, 180. 
Intelligence, 110, 111, 116, 

262. 
Introduction to Metaphysics, 

Bergson's 30, 38, 64, 73, 

86. 
Intuition, 33, 37, 38, 71 f„ 

104, 151, 153, 166 f., 211, 

217. 
Intuition, Bergson's idea of 

71 f., 75, 148 f., i67 f. 
Intuition and mysticism, 

173 f., and religious faith, 
81 f., 173 f., and science, 
177 f. 
Iron filings illustration, 98. 



282 



INDEX 



Islam, 193, 214, 229, 230. 
Italy, 9. 

Jacks, L. P. 43, 44, 172, 232. 

James, William 31, 32, 93. 

Jehovah, 176, 240, 245. 

Jerusalem, 193. 

Jesus, 87, 134, 135, 144, 177. 

Jewish, 135, 241, 248. 

Job, 248. 

Joussain, A. 6. 

Judaism, 125, 229, 240, 241, 

247. 
Judaizing, 29. 

Kaftan, 17. 

Kant, 6, 30, 110, 151, 162, 182, 

183, 244, 245. 
Kantian, 159. 
Keyserling, Herman graf von 

251. 
Kingdom of God, 123, 135, 

136. 
Kinship with God, 206 f. 

Language, 73, 87, 156, 204. 

" Last Judgment," Michael- 
angelo's 246. 

Laughter, Bergson's essay on 
30, 212. 

Lecture tour in the United 
States, Bergson's 179. 

Legalism, 29, 180, 228, 229. 

Leibnitz, 40. 

Le Roy, E. 5, 26, 64, 71, 108. 

Levine, Louis 7, 8, 109, 160, 
165, 174, 234, 267. 

Libertarian, 195, 204. 

Liberty, 106, 109. 

Life Impulse as object of 
worship, 154 f. 

Limitation in God, 102. 

Limits of scientific determin- 
ism, 192. 

Lincoln, 19. 

Lindsay, A. D. 64, 168. 

Literary composition, illustra- 
tion from 75. 



Locke, 60. 

Lodge, Sir Oliver 106, 107. 

Logic, 31, 33, 72, 79, 85, 95, 

100, 173, 214. 
London, 269. 

Lord's Prayer, the 137, 138. 
Loveday, T. 179. 
Love joy, A. O. 91. 
Luther, 29 

McDougall, William 36, 144, 
161. 

Macintosh, 5, 174. 

Material, 148, 149, 268. 

Materialism, 31, 36, 52 f., 61, 
65, 152 f., 159, 162, 256. 

Materialism, Bergson's at- 
tack on 52 f. 

Materialism, how to refute 55. 

Materialist, 17, 53, 55. 

Materialistic, 152, 185. 

Matter, 38, 39, 47, 53 f., 66, 
68, 74, 98, 99, 104, 107 f., 
144, 145, 151, 152, 157 f., 
167, 185, 201, 202, 209, 
228, 232, 233, 255 f., 264, 
270. 

Matter, Bergson's theory of 
159 f. 

Matter and Memory, Berg- 
son's 30, 55, 109, 145, 
152, 162, 253, 255 f. 

Mechanical, 39, 91, 94, 127, 
145. 

Mechanism, 39, 47, 49, 91, 99, 
102, 117, 128, 129, 144, 
167, 201. 

Mechanism and finalism, 46 f. 

Mechanistic, 39, 46, 47, 128, 
161. 

Mechanists, 48. 

Mediators, 124. 

Memory, 77, 162, 163, 224, 
255 f. 

Memory, Bergson's theory of 
161. 

Meredith. J. C. 71. 



INDEX 



283 



Mero-gnostic, 80. 
Messianic, 240. 
Metaphor, 73, 85. 
Metaphorical conception of 

dogma, 85 f . 
Michaelangelo, 246. 
Mind, 53, 108, 144, 152, 157 f., 

191, 197, 204, 238, 249, 

252, 261, 270. 
Miracle, 36. 
Missionaries, 139. 
Missionary work, 140, 143. 
Modernists, 9, 13, 108. 
Modern skepticism regarding 

freedom, 185 f. 
Moleschott, 239. 
Monism, 106, 108. 
Monistic, 108. 
Moral, 105, 220, 221, 228, 229, 

232, 233. 
Moral equivalent for war, 

232. 
Morality, 26, 62, 183, 216, 221, 

231, 232, 235. 
Mories, A. S. 5, 174. 
Motion, 145. 
Muck-raker, 28. 
Muirhead, J. H. 64, 107, 108, 

111, 133, 173. 
Mystic, 5, 112, 174 f., 216, 228. 
Mysticism, 5, 82, 103, 169, 

171, 173, 174, 180, 181, 

216, 228. 
Mysticism, Dangers of Berg- 

sonian 177 f. 



Napoleon, 245. 
Natural selection, 98. 
Nature religions, 214. 
Necessity of dogma, 87 f. 
Neo-platonic, 5. 
"New Logic," the 72. 
Newman, Bergson, N 
and Aquinas, 5. 



" New Realism," the 72, 94. 
"New Realists," the 94. 
Nineteenth century thought, 
148 f. 



Nirvana, 241. 
Norm, 114 f. 

Objects of Bergson's po- 
lemic, 31 f. 

Olympians, 29. 

Omnipotence, 49, 118 f., 126, 
132, 135, 136. 

Omnipotent, 117, 120, 124, 
125. 

Omniscience, 49, 118, 119, 
122, 126, 132, 135, 136. 

Omniscient, 116, 124, 125. 

" Once Born " type of re- 
ligion, 207, 209. 

" Open Door Theory," the 94. 

Optimistic, 44. 

Organism, 117, 129, 249, 269, 
270. 

Oriental and occidental re- 
ligion compared, 112 f. 

Orthodox view of miracle ex- 
plained, 36. 

Orthodoxy, Bergson's attack 
on 45. 

Osier, William 237. 

Oughtness, feeling of 181 f. 

Pagan, 123. 
Paganism, 124. 
Palmer, W. Scott 164. 
Pantheism, 103, 106, 108, 112, 

176, 229. 
Pantheism, value of 112. 
Pantheist, 107, 108, 111. 
Pantheistic, 112. 
Parable of sheep and goats, 

216. 
Parallelism, 53, 253, 254. 
Paul, 29, 120, 193, 207, 216, 

220. 
Pauline, 225. 
Paulsen, 60. 
Perception, 54, 72, 162, 163, 

173. 
Personal, 109, 110, 160, 161, 

164, 185, 229, 241, 252, 

966 9 271. 



284 



INDEX 



Personal worth, sense of 229 f. 

Personality, 68, 109, 110, 132, 
133, 158 f., 198, 204 f., 
210, 213, 217, 224, 230, 
245, 250, 267. 

Personality of God, Bergson 
on the 108 f. 

Pessimism, 44. 

Petitionary prayer, 123 f. 

Phases of life influencing be- 
lief in freedom, 192. 

Philosophy and belief in im- 
mortality, 274. 

Philosophy and religion, rela- 
tion of Pref. v-vi, 10 f . 

Physical, 155, 157, 181, 189, 
191, 197 f., 214, 215, 
238 f., 249 f., 259, 261. 

Physical and psychological 
determinism, 203 f. 

Physical sciences, 35, 74. 

Physics, 38, 39. 

Physiological, 191, 203, 254. 

Physiological psychologists, 
185. 

Physiology, 35. 

Place of protest in life, 27 f. 

Plan of book, Pref. vi-vii, 
23 f . 

Plato, 168, 272. 

Platonic, 131. 

Plotinus, 3, 173. 

Pluralism, 94, 106, 107, 108. 

Pluralist, 108. 

Pluralistic, 107. 

Pogson, translator of Time 
and Free Will, 3, 194. 

Polemic, 33, 34, 45, 62, 63, 
112. 

Positivist, 106. 

Practical nature of dogma, 
85 f. 

Pragmatism, Bergson and 31, 
32. 

Pragmatic, 31, 93, 150. 

Pragmatists, 31, 32, 78, 94, 
173. 



Prayer, 118, 123, 124, 137, 

138. 
" Preacher," the 42. 
Predestinarian, 214. 
Predestination, 49. 
Present situation in France, 

Bergson's relation to 

Pref. viii f. 
Priest, George M. 245. 
Primacy of Spirit, 148 f. 
Pringle-Patterson, 60, m y 63. 
Progress, human 218, 219. 
Prophets, Hebrew 29, 116. 
Protest, 34, 40, 50, 57. 
Protestant, 12, 27 f. 
Protestant, Bergson the 27 f. 
Protestantism, 32. 
Protestants, great 29 f. 
Providence, 46, 98, 99, 116 f. 
Psychic, 57, 148, 156, 157, 

160, 162, 164, 181, 182, 
191, 198 f., 243, 254, 257, 
258. 

Psychical Research, Society 

for 269. 
Psychological, 46, 47, 56, 95, 

97, 100, 128, 130, 155, 174, 

202, 203, 258, 268. 
Psychologists, 56 9 145, 150, 

185, 238. 
Psychology, 35, 37, 144, 151, 

161, 197, 198, 204, 256. 
"Pure Memory," the 53, 146, 

162, 163, 167. 

"Pure Perception," 53, 54, 
64, 152, 255, 258, 259. 

Purpose, 45, 52. 

Purpose in the universe, 46 f., 
98f., 116 f., 128 f. 

Qualitative, 114, 197. 
Quality, 50, 96, 97. 
Quantitative, 114, 197. 
Quantity, 50. 

Rational, 110, 243. 
Rationalism, 31. 



INDEX 



285 



Rationalistic, 31, 46. 

Rationality, 242 

Reaction against determinism, 
Bergson's 150 f. 

Realism, 53, 173. 

Reality as " Becoming," 95 f. 

Reality, how do we know 60 f . 

Reason and faith, 20 f . 

Reasons against materialistic 
explanation of mind, 
190 f. 

Recent tendencies in thought, 
93 f ., 148 f . 

Relativism, 63, 174. 

Relativity of knowledge, 38, 
71, 77. 

Religion and belief in free- 
dom, 192 f., belief in im- 
mortality, 245 f ., 252, 
democracy, 235 f ., phi- 
losophy, Pref. vf., 10 f. 

Religion, Bergson on 8. 

Religion, possibility of rise of 
a new 114 f. 

Religious difficulties raised 
by Bergson's idea of evo- 
lution, 106 f. 

Religious values of Bergson's 
idea of evolution, 105 f., 
idea of freedom, 206 f., 
idea of intuition, 71 f., 
75, 148 f., 167 f., idea of 
the primacy of spirit, 
164 f., theory of knowl- 
edge, 76 f., 89, protests, 
27 f. 

"Representative Memory" 162, 
167. 

Resurrection of the body, 271. 

Revelation, 110, 113, 115, 122, 
139, 142. 

Ritschl, 16, 17. 

Ritschlian, 18. 

Ritschlianism, 15 f. 

Ritschlians, 17. 

Ritual, 20. 

Roman Catholic, 12 f. 



Roman Catholics, 12, 13. 
Romanticism and religion, 6. 

Sabatier, A. 87, 88. 

Salvation, 139, 142, 226 f. 

Scholastic, 113. 

Science, 6, 9, 19, 34, 37 f., 46, 
47, 66 9 71, 72, 74, 76, 82, 
101, 104, 150, 151, 161, 
168 f., 188 f., 193, 194, 
197, 203, 237, 253, 254. 

Science and agnosticism, 41 f., 
freedom, 188, immortal- 
ity, 237 f ., 249 f ., 270 f ., 
philosophy, 37 f., religion, 
40. 

Science, Bergson's idea of 
33 f. 

Scientific, 31, 34, 35, 37, 40, 
41, 57, 133, 149, 150, 178, 
180, 181, 190 f., 203, 254, 
271. 

Scientific determinism, Berg- 
son's attack on 34 f. 

Scientists, 34, 35, 91, 100, 188. 

Sheaf figure, Bergson's 140. 

Shell figure, Bergson's 140, 141. 

Sheol, 239 f., 247. 

Simultaneity, 50. 

Skepticism, 14, 46, 63, 76, 79. 

Slosson, E. E. 173, 232. 

Social, 9, 21, 87, 88, 105, 156, 
165, 182, 196, 211, 212, 
215, 216, 234 f., 247, 248. 

Sophists, Greek 60. 

Soul, 5, 37, 56 9 57, 99, 104, 
144 f., 161 f., 173, 175, 
176, 182, 186, 204, 209, 
212, 213, 221, 225, 232, 
249, 253 f ., 270 f . 

Soul, distinct existence of 
161 f. 

Soul, evolution and the 144 f. 

Source of life spiritual, 160. 

Space, 55, 97, 195, 196. 

Spaulding, E. G. 72. 

Species, 68. 



286 



INDEX 



Spencer, 90, 91, 92. 

Spencerian, 45, 77, 90, 140. 

Spinoza, 40. 

Spirit, 53, 55, 79, 99, 104, 109, 
188, 189, 207, 209, 215, 
233, 254 f. 

Spiritism, 161. 

Spiritual, 57, 103, 109, 110, 
112, 134, 148 f., 207, 210, 
213, 219, 228, 229, 242, 
248, 265, 268. 

Spiritualism, 53, 55. 

Static view of reality com- 
bated, 95 f . 

Steenbergen, A. 70, 233. 

Stoicism, 61. 

Subconscious self, 150. 

Subjectivism, 63. 

Subjectivism in Bergson, 
179 f. 

Succession, 50, 96, 196, 197, 
199. 

Supernatural, 207. 

Symbolic, 38, 88. 

Symbolic view of dogma, 84 f. 

Symbolism, 66, 100. 

Symbols, 38, 97, 168, 197, 198. 

Syndicalists, 9. 

Teleological, 127, 261, 263. 

Teleology, 45, 46, 102, 262, 
265. 

Tendency, 131. 

Tertullian, 246. 

" Theanthropic " religion, 
206 f. 

Theism, 110, 111, 116, 130, 
134, 137, 138, 165. 

Theism, Bergson and 105 f., 
164 f. 

Theism, Bergson and Chris- 
tian 134 f. 

Theistic, 110, 112, 138, 165. 

Theists, 107, 110, 138. 

"Theocratic" religion, 206 f. 

Theological, 111, 133, 181. 

Theologians, 145, 246. 



Theories of knowledge, his- 
toric 65. 

Theory of knowledge, Berg- 
son's 59 f., 65, 66, 70 f., 
81, 84, 88, 95. 

Theory of knowledge, im- 
portance of having a 62 f. 

Theory of life, Bergson's 65 f. 

Theory of life, relation to 
theory of knowledge, 65 f. 

Theory of matter, Bergson's 
159, 160. 

Time and Free Will, Berg- 
son's 3, 30, 50, 53, 94, 
97, 109, 193 f., 197 f., 
202 f., 223, 261. 

Time, Bergson's idea of 45, 
99, 100, 168, 195, 197, 198. 

Turk, 246. 

" Twice Born " type of re- 
ligion, 209. 

Underhill, 5. 
Universalism, 275. 
"Unknowable," the 45, 77. 
Utilitarian, 181. 
Utilitarianism, 61, 165. 

Validity of knowledge, 62 f., 
76, 78, 82, 83. 

Validity of religious knowl- 
edge, 82 f . 

Value of belief in immortal- 
ity, 244 f ., of epistemol- 
ogy, 63, of the individual, 
229 f., 250 f., 261 f. 

Vital Impetus, the 52, 66 f., 
95, 98, 99, 105, 108, 111, 
116, 117, 129, 131, 133, 
136, 141, 142, 155 f., 160, 
163, 166, 175, 179, 181 f., 
208, 213, 221, 222, 225 f., 
233 f., 261. 

Vitalistic, 144, 150. 

Vitalistic school, the 93. 

Wordsworth quoted, 80 
"World Flight," 228. 



BERGSON'S CREATIVE EVOLUTION 

Translated from the French by <Dr. Arthur SMitchett 
8th printing, $2.50 net, by mail $2.67. 

"Bergson's resources in the way of erudition are remark- 
able, and in the way of expression they are simply phe- 
nomenal. ... If anything can make hard things easy to 
follow it is a style like Bergson's. It is a miracle and he 
a real magician. Open Bergson and new horizons open 
on every page you read. It tells of reality itself instead 
of reiterating what dusty-minded professors have written 
about what other previous professors have thought. Nothing 
in Bergson is shopworn or at second-hand." — William James. 

"A distinctive and trenchant piece of dialectic. . . . Than 
its entrance upon the field as a well-armed and militant 
philosophy there have been not many more memorable occur- 
ences in the history of ideas." — Nation. 

"To bring out in an adequate manner the effect which 
Bergson's philsophy has on those who are attracted by it 
let us try to imagine what it would have been like to have 
lived when Kant produced his 'Critique of Pure Reason.' " — 
Hibbert Journal. 

"Creative Evolution is destined, I believe, to mark an 
epoch in the history of modern thought. The work has its 
root in modern physical science, but it blooms and bears 
fruit in the spirit to a degree quite unprecedented. . . . 
Bergson is a new star in the intellectual firmament of our 
day. He is a philosopher upon whom the spirits of both 
literature and science have descended. In his great work 
he touches the materialism of science to finer issues. Prob- 
ably no other writer of our time has possessed in the same 
measure the three gifts, the literary, the scientific, and the 
philosophical. Bergson is a kind of chastened and spirit- 
ualized Herbert Spencer." — John Burroughs in the Atlantic 
Monthly. 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS NEW YORK 



DARWINISM TO-DAY 

By Prof. Vernon L. Kellogg, of Leland Stanford University, 
Author of " American Insects," etc. 395 pp. and index. 8vo. 
$2.00 net; by mail, $2.15. 

A simple and concise discussion for the educated layman of 
present-day scientific criticism of the Darwinian selection 
theories, together with concise accounts of the other more im- 
portant proposed auxiliary and alternative theories of species- 
forming. With special notes and exact references to original 
sources and to the author's own observations and experiments. 

"Its value cannot be overestimated. A book the student must have at 
hand at all times, and it takes the place of a whole library. No other 
writer has attempted to gather together the scattered literature of this 
vast subject, and none has subjected this literature to such uniformly 
trenchant and uniformly kindly criticism. Pledged to no theory of his 
o*ra, and an investigator of the first rank, and master of a clear and force- 
ful literary style, Professor Kellogg is especially well fitted to do justice 
to the many phases of present-day Darwinism." — David Starr Jordan 
in The Dial. 

"May be unhesitatingly recommended to the student of biology as well 
as to the non-professional or even non-biological reader of intelligence . . . 
gives a full, concise, fair and very readable exposition of the present status 
of evolution." — The Independent. 

"Can write in English as brightly and as clearly as the old-time French- 
men ... a book that the ordinary reader can read with thorough enjoy- 
ment and understanding and that the specialist can turn to with profit 
as well ... in his text he explains the controversy so that the plain man 
may under stand it, while in the notes he adduces the evidence that the 
specialist requires. The whole matter is thoroughly digested and put in 
an absolutely intelligible manner ... a brilliant book that deserves gen- 
eral attention." — New York San. 

"The balance-sheet of Darwinism is struck in this work . . . the attack 
and the defense of Darwinism, well summarized . . . the value of this 
book lies in its summing up of the Darwinian doctrines as they have been 
modified or verified down to date." — Literary Digest. 



*** If the reader will send his name and address, the publishers will send, 
from time to time, information regarding their new books. 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS NEW YORK 



